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Volume VII
1947

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General
Topics

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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

Volume Seven · · · Spring 1947 · · · Number One

. . . Featuring . . .

U. S. MAGAZINES FOR EXPORT
—Reuben S. Nathan

COSTS --- A BARRIER TO CULTURE
—Karl F. Zeisler

DIEGO RIVERA --- PEOPLE'S ARTIST
—Bertram D. Wolfe

AUSTRALIA'S LABOR PHILOSOPHY
—Lloyd Ross

CONNOLLY, ORWELL & OTHERS
—David Dempsey

Short Stories by Paul Selvin and Irvin Stock

Other Articles by Joachim Joesten, John C. Sparks, Wendell C. Gordon, John J. Honigmann, Manmatha N. Chatterjee, Jack Barbash, Markam P. Bryant, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

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MEMO FROM THE EDITORS . . .

. . . A Statement and Request

This year marks the sixth anniversary of THE ANTIOCH REVIEW.

Launched with little more than goodwill, hope, and the support of the community of people at Antioch College, THE ANTIOCH REVIEW has established a reputation among national magazines of which we can be justly proud.

We are proud of the rapid growth of THE ANTIOCH REVIEW. Its articles—and in recent days its fiction as well—have acquired a national reputation for significance. For example, the Gresham Press chose three of our articles for inclusion in its new anthology "American Thought 1947" (top number of selections from any magazine was four). And a national liberal organization, selecting the dozen most important progressive magazines for its membership, has included THE ANTIOCH REVIEW as its only quarterly.

We believe THE ANTIOCH REVIEW has a great potential for an even wider audience, and we want to reach that audience with an even better ANTIOCH REVIEW. We are now seeking the means to do this.

The life-blood of every quarterly we know of is a subsidy. THE ANTIOCH REVIEW, however, has had no guaranteed subsidy.

We have depended chiefly on subscription income because it means genuine interest in the quarterly on a national scale. To supplement this income, we have now created The Antioch Review Subsidy Fund, which will devote contributions solely to the cost of publishing THE ANTIOCH REVIEW.

This means that there are now three ways you can help us publish an even better ANTIOCH REVIEW:

- Subscribe to THE ANTIOCH REVIEW for yourself or friends.
- Advertise in THE ANTIOCH REVIEW.
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—The Editors

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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

"Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"

—ABRAHAM LINCOLN

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AMERICAN MAGAZINES FOR EXPORT

By REUBEN S. NATHAN

AMERICAN PUBLISHERS, anxious to capitalize on the great demand for information pent up and stimulated by the war, are currently planning to flood the world with magazines made (or dreamed up) in the United States. They have taken up the challenge of telling the world about America. But political headaches are just over the horizon. They will not be confined to the publishing trade.

This literary invasion of the world is as momentous and logical a development as the opening of the American West by the railroads. Where the rail kings sought dollars and, as a by-product, made history, the new international magazines implement this nation's rise to world power.

However, the great international junket of American publishing is not guided by profit motives alone. Some publishers are interested in building up world-wide prestige; others in a sincere attempt to promote global co-operation; still others are setting out to advertise the "American Way of Life." But whatever the motive, all of them will find themselves performing as American ambassadors, as self-anointed representatives of the American people. For any American publication going abroad reflects and projects the United States of America. These printed envoys —sensational, intellectual, or escapist—are as easily liable to hurt as they are to help real international understanding.

Fairly typical of the approach to the problem taken by publishers aiming at the world market is that of the international editions of *Time* and *Life*. This pair of "street-corner, in-the-pocket, on-the-living-room-table diplomats" has, according to a recent full-page advertisement, a "double job to do." The rest of the ad's copy went like this:

> One of their jobs is to tell the candid, undistorted news of America to thinking people of other lands. That's a specially urgent job right now, when part of the world looks to America for democratic and economic leadership—and another part is busy maligning our motives and way of life.

> The other job of these diplomats is to carry to buyers everywhere the sales messages of American industry. And that's a highly important job too. Because if America sells 10 billion dollars' worth of goods to the rest of the world each year, that will provide 5 million jobs here at home.

That seems like clear thinking and common sense. But unless the publishers of international periodicals do their work with a full understanding of their rather frightening responsibility, their magazines are doomed to political and commercial failure. The damage that can be done to American prestige abroad may be irreparable.

This opportunity is peculiarly American. Russia's international propaganda, spread through Communist parties and organs everywhere, is essentially controlled by the Kremlin. In Britain the government is openly in charge—working through the Central Office of Information or the British Council. But American government propaganda by magazine publication is strictly confined to occupied areas (under the auspices of the War Department's Civil Affairs Division) and to the USSR (handled by the State Department's Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs which took over from the defunct OWI). As far as the American people are concerned, the rest of the world is the happy hunting ground of free enterprise.

The battle of ideas is in full swing all over the globe. America, the last power to comprehend the importance of international propaganda, is entering this explosive competition of words, pictures, and ideas by peddling commercial magazines. And there we have the challenge and the problem: how will this country be represented in the free-for-all which may determine the future welfare of the earth?

II

It is not even easy to answer the question: *who* will represent it. Columns and trade papers are buzzing with rumors, gossip clouds the issue even further. Plans continue to be made, to die aborning and to change. Certain it is that *Reader's Digest,* already a world power with its six gigantic foreign-language editions, is expanding its publishing empire; something new has been added in Japan; and Germany, Austria, and France are next on the list. *Time* and *Life's* international editions are facts as is *Newsweek's.* The Canadian *Magazine Digest,* by now an almost American institution, is hitting its stride in the export trade. *Americana* and *Norte* threaten *Reader's Digest's* virtual monopoly in South America.

Crowell-Collier's are going ahead with plans for a glamor magazine in more than a dozen languages. Curtis' and Marshall Field's projects X are preparing for the domestic market but keep an eye, and perhaps even two, peeled on the great beyond-the-frontiers. *Encore,* owned by *Saturday Review of Literature,* has begun to think in international terms. And there are at least half a dozen groups of enterprising people in this country anxious to discuss ambitious global publishing plans with potential sponsors or with what pass for experts in the field.

The remarkable success of the international magazine program of the Office of War Information, which has undoubtedly inspired many of the publications now under way, provides a valuable record of experience for all comers. At least some of this experience will filter into the magazines through former OWIers who either rejoined their old outfits after having been lent to OWI for the duration or who were taken up by commercial publishing because of the impressive records they ran up during the war. *Life* and *Time* have their C. D. Jackson and James Linen, *Newsweek* its Ed Barrett and Tom Malley; Crowell-Collier's international fling is initiated by DeWitt Patterson. Curtis enters the arena with Allen Chellas and Ted Christie, Marshall Field's project X and *Encore* are headed by Norman Cousins. *Reader's Digest* enlisted the help of Douglas Miller, Adrian Berwick, and of the British Political Intelligence Department's Harman, an expert in psychological warfare who made good in North Africa and Washington, D.C. The list is incomplete but indicative of a significant change of heart: it appears that free enterprise is in the process of revising its opinion on the government screwballs who "bungled" the propaganda job.

Actually most of OWI's propaganda publications were sold in the open market of foreign countries and competed with local products. Where they outsold national periodicals as so many of them did, they not only proved the feasibility of international publishing but established principles for success.

OWI's international periodicals program was divided into two major groups. One was a purely American product and emphasized the projection of America. The other, published jointly by the British and American governments, stressed international information.

In the first group were primarily six magazines. *Kijk,* OWI's Dutch picture magazine, reached a paid circulation of about 300,000 in little

Holland and Flemish Belgium. *Voir,* a picture magazine in French, sold up to 500,000 copies and made so much money that when OWI was forced to abandon it, private enterprise offered fantastic sums for the title alone. But OWI could merely abandon, not sell, since any publisher who might have taken up the title would have been identified as publishing in the American government's name.

Kijk and *Voir* were taken abroad as representative of the American manner of publishing. They might have done well in the States themselves. Others in the group were less successful. *USA,* for example, an attractive digest magazine published in several languages, was probably too thin physically and too obviously American in its contents; it had been designed to tell the story of America as nicely as possible without getting involved in provocative and controversial issues. Also it had been edited thousands of miles away from its target areas and this remoteness, an important factor in causing failures of international publications, was apparent in its lack of impact.

If the *Victory* series was a success, it was probably due to its lavish getup; it was made to impress but it impressed less by intellectual force than by the material glamor with which the material achievements of this country were conveyed. A-typical also and less significant to commercial publishers are *Heute* and *Amerikanische Rundschau,* both still circulating in Germany. *Heute,* a sister magazine to *Kijk* and *Voir,* owed its initial success—400,000 copies fortnightly—to the fact that German publishers were not yet capable of producing an equally informative picture magazine; today it has become an institution which, under the capable direction of Major Norden, had to abandon hope of ever coping with the demand for it. *Amerikanische Rundschau,* a scholarly bi-monthly designed to impress a learned German elite with Western thought and American intellectual standards, surprised its planners by selling ten times as many copies (more than 250,000) as they expected, for it struck a reading public avid to learn of intellectual developments abroad. Its circulation began to decrease slowly only after about a year and a half.

Obviously, the field for typically and exclusively American magazines will gradually narrow down as the craving for information on America is satisfied more and more by normal national channels of information. When the extraordinary conditions of wartime publication are ended, American magazines will have to overcome local competition by im-

pressive make-up, better international coverage, high standards in general, and skilled treatment of controversial political issues.

It is of real significance, therefore, that OWI's greatest success in the field of international publishing was with the second group of periodicals. This was the Anglo-American Joint Digest Magazine Program, which was generally accepted as acknowledging the reading habits of foreign readers in its basic editorial policy. The story of the Joint Digest Magazines can hardly be told in terms of circulation alone. Impressive as the figures are, war conditions prevented production and distribution from ever keeping in step with demand. The French magazine *Choix* sold 350,000 copies monthly while Hachette, the private French distributing agency, shouted for 500,000; the Italian *Il Mese* sold 125,000 copies in the face of outrageous distribution difficulties; and *Sei Mese*—bound volumes of six issues—sold another 150,000 copies each (though transportation was practically paralyzed), proved unobtainable within days after publication, and then became a favorite object of black market operations at fancy prices. *T'Venster,* the Dutch sister magazine, sold 125,000 copies; *Neue Auslese,* the only one still in production, sells more than 600,000 copies at one mark apiece and against stiff competition from licensed German and Austrian periodicals.

The initiative which made these magazines succeed was as truly international as their editorial policies. The idea was originated by capable John McMillan, then Chief of the British Political Intelligence Department's Editorial Unit (he now heads the Periodicals Section of the Central Council of Information), but OWI played a decisive part in formulating editorial policy, in shaping *Choix, T'Venster,* the Danish *Idag og Imorgen,* and particularly *Neue Auslese,* as well as in boosting circulation in general.

Taking everything into consideration, the key to the success of this group of magazines was probably what came to be known as the "formula." This formula was discovered only ex post facto, and even now can hardly be described as anything more than the conscientious effort on the part of a number of virtually independent editors to select the very best articles, stories, and poems from magazines and books published anywhere on earth. There were no orders that the contents of the various language editions were to be similar; there was hardly ever a meeting in which all editors participated; their problems, involving five

language areas and many more countries, appeared to be too different to make common practice efficient. Yet when a survey was made as the last joint magazines were going to press, it turned out that the six editors had consistently built about fifty per cent of their tables of contents on the same material.

The other aspect of the formula—in addition to the conscientious choice of the "best"—was the individual character of each of the publications. *Il Mese,* edited by erudite Dr. Montana, was sophisticated and appeared almost light; *Neue Auslese,* headed by scholarly Dr. Adler for the British and by this writer for the American side, appears more heavy and brooding. One might say it is characteristically German, although it concentrates on what appeals to other people, not necessarily to Germans. *Choix,* under Captain Gilbert, might have been taken as an embodiment of the Gallic spirit. Yet half of the contents of all these magazines were identical.

The difference in character was due partly to editorial cutting (for length, not policy), partly to divergent approaches to the difficult problem of translation, individual layout, illustration, and, primarily, to the choice of additional material of particular interest to the target country.

This formula—if it can be called a formula—was successful not only from the point of view of circulation. It enabled the editors to include among an impresive variety of items from all over the world articles implementing Allied policy without building up sales resistance. A perfect example of this was the fact that 650,000 Germans were willing to pay one mark for a copy of *Neue Auslese* which included among its main features such items as Justice Jackson's basic memorandum to President Truman on the prosecution of war criminals as well as reports on concentration camps.

Editorial and political honesty was meticulously observed (though slaps in the face of any Allied nation were avoided) and the principles of Western democracy found eloquent statement through the articles chosen, without any padding with original political material. Letters to the editor were more convincing to the staffs than circulation figures as a gauge of success. The final proof, however, that the magazines were on the right track, was found in something that was taken for granted yet remains an amazing phenomenon: no serious political controversies

among the editorial representatives of the various nations ever hampered operations.

The question which publishing businessmen in this country have been most anxious to ask OWI staff members on their return from Europe is this: how much did the advantage of government backing account for the success of these publications? The answer is fairly simple. No international functions are possible in time of war without government backing, and the advantages of being official are more than balanced by the disadvantages of working under war conditions. Despite all priorities, the battle for mechanical facilities is as hard while a war is being fought as any fight against peacetime competition is likely to be. Moreover, with respect to budget, a private publisher is in a better position than a state official. A successful commercial publisher may increase his budget with the increase of circulation; a successful government publisher may provide income for the United States Treasury but must stay within his original budget no matter what his success seems to demand from him in the way of improvement and of additional features. The Joint Magazine Program would have been a money maker even if it had paid cash for material and services which were provided by reverse lend-lease or reparations; yet its personnel was so limited that some who have asked questions of us have found it hard to believe the truth.

The truth is that all the digest magazines with the exception of *Neue Auslese* had one editor each; *Neue Auslese* had two. If the editor was lucky, he had a girl assistant; the entire Anglo-American staff for all five magazines, including layout, copyright, and clerical personnel, never exceeded two dozen people. The individual editors, aside from being quasi diplomats, were responsible for the selection of their material, its editing and condensing; for the supervision of translations; for illustrations, layout, and proofreading; for answering letters to the editor. Most of the time they were their own publishers in the bargain, arranging for and pushing production, solving distribution problems, and trouble-shooting in general. In short, they began with reading books and magazines in many languages and called it a day when the magazines reached the newsstands, at which time the whole thing started all over again. At one stage of the game in London the entire American table of organization for editing five foreign language magazines with a total circulation of one and a quarter million monthly consisted of one American citizen

responsible for all magazines and of a staff of three—two assistants and one typist, all hired locally. Compare this with the mastheads of some commercial magazines—and the proverbial "government inefficiency" does not stack up so badly. . . .

III

An integral part of the Joint Digest Magazine Program was the promise to suspend it as soon as conditions permitted its replacement by normal free enterprise. The first step in this direction was taken when *Verden Idag,* the Norwegian member of the series, was turned over to a Norwegian publisher upon the liberation of Norway. The next step took effect on December 31, 1945. This day marked the editorial deadline for *Choix* No. 12, *Il Mese* No. 24, *T-Venster* No. 6 and *Idag og Imorgen* No. 6. It also marked the end of the Anglo-American Joint Magazine Program. The United States government withdrew.

American withdrawal did not come as a surprise. The continuous sniping against OWI, the permanent uncertainty of its future had sapped OWI's strength even before victory. When V-E Day came, the end was in sight. Functions were cut so drastically that the British felt the Americans might be running out on them precisely as they had twenty-five years before. The worst was that American prestige in Europe had just reached its all-time low; it was the time of the tidal wave of demobilization, of army demonstrations and of an all-pervading swell coming in the wake of outrages committed by men who believed the war to be over and all reasons for discipline at an end. If ever there was a need for American publications abroad, it was then.

However, congressional and commercial pressures were too strong. There was also fear at that time that joint Anglo-American government publications might be construed as an expression of a Western bloc. *Choix, Il Mese, T'Venster,* and *Idag og Imorgen* disappeared from the newsstands. Only *Neue Auslese* was continued for occupied Germany and Austria.

But at the very time when the joint magazines made their last appearance in France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Denmark, a new series of similar periodicals was being born. They are international in character too, but they are published by the British government alone. To the British with their great experience in international relations and propaganda, the success of the joint magazines was something not to be abandoned

easily. The new magazines continue to include American items but the balance between American and British material is heavily in favor of the latter. Commercial American publishing will have to make good for that.

IV

The problem which confronts American editors publishing for a world audience is now, and will be increasingly as time goes by, a tangle of political and commercial considerations. How are these magazines going to influence the reputation of America abroad? No editor can afford to ignore this question, either as a businessman or as a citizen. To answer it he must have dependable information on the nature of his audience, its expectations, its tastes, its political boiling point. And—feeling his way as best he can—he must regard himself as representative of his country. For he will be, in actual fact if not in official status, what others see him to be.

American journalists overseas often have a hard time explaining what freedom of the press—American brand—really means. Most people outside of Western Europe simply do not understand that the American government cannot be held responsible for attacks on foreign countries in domestic American periodicals. Actually, it has come to the point where magazines like *Reader's Digest* are accepted as the official expression of the voice of this country. Even in England, some of us got the impression that the new series of international monthlies launched by the Central Office of Information as successors to the Joint Magazines are meant to be the answer to international versions of America's most widely read popular magazine. When Japanese and German editions of the *Digest* are initiated—under official auspices (as they must be in those occupied countries)—the task of convincing non-Americans that the magazine does not speak for all of the American people becomes next to impossible.

One of the first questions to arise in the minds of prospective international publishers is whether their magazines shall be American or international in contents. At present the trend seems to be toward emphasis on the American. The reason for this cannot be found entirely in commercial motives. *Reader's Digest,* for instance, does not and cannot expect immediate profits from its Japanese and German editions. As in the case of *Time* and *Life,* the apparent idea is to sell the American Way

of Life as it presents itself to the publisher. It is questionable, however, whether an exclusively American slant is the best means of attaining that objective. There can be little doubt that any halfway good American magazine will attract foreign readers at this time when their curiosity for all things American seems to be insatiable. But there can be little doubt either that this appetite may be satisfied rather soon. Nations preoccupied with their own problems, nations bent on re-examining and perhaps revising their thinking, nations pondering problems of a philosophical nature which to them mean the difference between life and death, must soon be fed up with homely American virtues, production figures, Hollywood curves, and the abundance of life derived from the American system. And the type of story which has made our slick magazines what they are will impress an international public as rather naïve.

What Europe and Asia crave is thought—thought which may serve as a basis for philosophical and political orientation in a world of confusion; information on what is happening everywhere in the world; literature at its best; and at least for the time being, some factual details on the technological developments in which the United States excels. The long-range success of American magazines abroad, therefore, is likely to depend on presentation of material without regard for its place of origin but with regard for high quality: in other words, a combination of American experience in producing appealing publications with superior coverage of international thinking and events. Within this broad scope, American selections will be read more eagerly and, incidentally, the editors' political message will carry its point more effectively. The relative failure of OWI's *USA* and the success of the Anglo-American Joint Magazine Program illustrate this principle; the British decision to continue the Magazine Program on international rather than purely British lines is based on the same conclusion.

It seems an extraordinary phenomenon that wealthy American publishers should have decided to invest capital and to go the whole hog on the exportation of magazines which promise small returns for years to come. Some explanation is found in the willingness of farsighted advertisers to prepare temporarily quarantined markets for business which they expect to materialize in the future. Moreover, political incentives may pay off in profits as well. OWI's international magazines did well financially. But the publishers must realize what this involves.

Most people abroad look for a political line, for a message, for a conviction behind printed matter. To them, the word is consciously or unconsciously a promise of action. Actually, it is one of the hardest tasks of the Information Control Division in Germany to persuade Germans that there is such a thing as a newspaper or a magazine published for the sake of mere objective information or enjoyment. The enjoyment of reading is to foreign readers, more than to Americans, the enjoyment of looking for meaning.

Therefore, people putting their money on the a-political magazine as a business proposition on the international market may be in for a disappointment. Surely, the outside world labors under terrible conditions that should produce a craving for escapist reading. But these conditions presumably are temporary. The average European looks for a solution of his troubles before he looks for entertainment, and he looks for this solution in significant thinking. American magazines which stake their future on entertainment alone may gain a temporary advantage, but they will pay for it in the long run. And even this temporary success may be gained at the expense of American prestige.

V

Predictions of success or failure are a ticklish business. It will be interesting to see how a typically American magazine will make out on the other side of the Atlantic. The American approach to intellectual matters has always differed from the European. This difference is now greater than ever, with America practically untouched by the ravages of war which affect the remainder of the globe. As American magazines are bound to reflect a world that is strange and unreal to outsiders, they may annoy rather than please; certainly they will be open to gross misinterpretation. In foreign-language versions accessible to the average person abroad, provinciality may be offensive. How will the common man react?

Let us look at a few examples. A conservative American magazine prints an article unfavorable to labor or an attack on a specific union. Reaching Europe today, such an article becomes excellent Communist propaganda as it seems to confirm what the Russians shout from the house tops: that the United States is a reactionary country which exploits its own labor and intends to exploit labor everywhere.

Suppose an American magazine attacks Russia, suggesting the possibility of immediate open conflict between the two nations. The author

may have been writing sincerely with the interests of America at heart. Abroad, however, his article will militate against our interest; the average reader, confirmed in his suspicion that a war between the USA and the USSR is inevitable, may tend to favor closing ranks with Russia, the immediate and more dangerous neighbor. The mildest reaction will be a renewed attempt to fish in the dark.

Even in less dangerous fields, we come up against American habits of overstatement which may arouse resentment or disbelief. The typical popularization of technical progress, which ignores the contributions of other nations and detours into the realm of fancy, will prejudice the effect of all American articles on the subject in question. People abroad already take it for granted that the lowest American figure is a million and they apply their pound of salt, but they cannot help deducing from the presence of one error the existence of many. In medicine, moreover, foreigners are not accustomed to popular writing of the American type. The average American knows that a "new drug against tuberculosis" does not necessarily mean the end of tuberculosis. The average reader abroad is inclined to accept statements of this type without reservation. If it turns out to be an overstatement, he considers it a lie—and the country where the lie originated, a country of cheats.

With such potential misunderstandings in mind, it is possible to hazard some guesses on the publication methods likely to be most efficient in preventing them. The chances are that it is not wise to turn out American "master" magazines and to publish them abroad in simple translations. Adaptations rather than translations are in order. The foreign-language version must be tailored to the mentality of its public—which involves less a question of editing material available on the home market than of selecting it with special care.

For these reasons British and American information units overseas discovered early during the war that native Englishmen and Americans were, on the whole, at a disadvantage in editing foreign-language publications in comparison with foreign-born personnel, who found it relatively easy to apply British or American directives in editing magazines for the country of their origin. However, it was found equally important to keep top direction in the hands of persons who had learned their trade in this country. An American publisher working with responsible foreign-

born editors may be considered an ideal combination to produce a truly American magazine which is acceptable to the foreign reader.

The difficult translation problem must, of course, be handled by people who are not only bilingual but also thoroughly familiar with both countries involved. Try to find a Frenchman in the France of today who is not stumped by "destroyers running interference for Task Force 58" or a German to whom a penthouse is more than a cold-water flat under the roof! Or else try to find a former Frenchman or German who has been away from the country of his birth for several years yet knows the French or German terminology for an analysis of atomic energy, radar, or merely modern aviation! A bilingual editor checking on a bilingual translator on the other side of the Atlantic might do the trick—but even these two may produce translations which are as much the reflections of their opinions as the expression of the author's. The best criterion for the publisher is the incorruptible conscience of his editor-in-chief. Yet even this paragon must refrain from dictating to his translators; if he is going to escape a deadly monotony in the magazine, he must limit his efforts to supervision, checking, and correcting.

However, the best editor is helpless if he cannot keep his finger on the pulse of the people for whom he works. With the present speed-up in international political and social change, he finds contact with the market area imperative. Naturally publishers and editors alike hesitate to establish editorial headquarters overseas, if only because of the intolerable complexity of taxation difficulties. The most substantial profit or salary means little if subject to double taxation at the fantastic rates common abroad.

Yet this system—the overseas editorial office representing a publisher thousands of miles back home—appears to be the solution of a whole series of technical as well as editorial problems. It is a solution, moreover, which would enable organizations of relatively small financial means to compete with the giants of American publishing, some of which are said to be ready to invest many millions of dollars in their international fling. If editorial headquarters are geographically close to the countries serviced, it becomes easier to publish through subsidiaries within those countries. Headquarters may supply about eighty per cent of the editorial and advertising copy; the subsidiaries, supervised by bilingual staff editors, may supplement this material with local copy and produce the finished version.

The home publisher's share in the revenue accruing from international advertising might perhaps be balanced against the foreign publisher's share in sales revenue—which would do away with the problem of blocked currencies. This method might alleviate the paper problem also. Since the magazine would make its appearance as a native rather than an imported product, paper rationing administrations might refrain from discriminating against it. Obviously, a scheme of this nature would cut capital requirements to the bone and open the field to men whose present resources are relatively small.

That would be all to the good. Every competitor on the international market is a carrier of the flag. That there should be some enterprising, though not eminently wealthy, men among these unelected representatives cannot fail to improve a situation which even the most convinced believer in free enterprise must consider curious. Only the greatest possible competition representing the greatest possible number of American points of view—with its potential elimination of the intellectually weakest—can operate to the ultimate goal of increased international understanding.

The best that the American people can hope for is that the new era of international publishing will also initiate a new trend in publishing responsibility.

THE STRANGE WAYS OF GERMAN DEMOCRACY

By JOACHIM JOESTEN

GERMAN POLITICS," a foreign observer wearily commented the other day, "is an inextricable maze, where only hardened explorers have a chance of finding their way." The truthfulness of this remark can be appreciated only by those who have made a valiant attempt to penetrate the German political jungle.

It was, of course, inevitable that the new German democracy should turn into a mess. Politically speaking, the Germans are a primitive race. Fancy an aboriginal tribe in some dark continent being proselytized by four different teams of missionaries, each preaching its gospel and all working at cross-purposes. What result could you expect?

Five major brands of democracy are being practiced in Germany today: the American, the British, the Russian, the French, and the Berlin or international kind. The American brand, moreover, comes in three varieties: the Bavarian, the Hessian, and that of Wuerttemberg-Baden.

The particular complexity of political developments in the American zone results from the doubtlessly well-meant, but perhaps a little utopian, endeavor of the American Military Government to allow the Germans the greatest possible latitude in working out their democratic salvation.

Since last December, the three *Laender* (states) of the American zone all have freely elected parliaments and democratically chosen cabinets. They also have self-tailored constitutions which were approved by the Military Government with a minimum of interference.

The voting system under which the three *Landtage* (state legislatures) of the American zone were elected in November and December is that of proportional representation (PR), which is in the European tradition. Under this system, the voters cast their ballots for party lists, rather than for individual candidates, and even small political parties have a chance of gaining proportionate representation in the legislature.

Nevertheless, in Bavaria, the Communist party (KPD) has been successfully kept out of the *Landtag* through a neat constitutional trick worked by the two principal parties, the clerical and conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Social-Democratic Party or SPD.

When the Bavarian Constitution was in the making last summer, the Social-Democratic Minister-President Wilhelm Hoegner, father of the draft, suggested a restriction of the PR system, with a view to preventing the expected mushroom growth of "splinter parties." With the wholehearted support of the CSU, Hoegner pushed through the insertion into the constitutional draft of the so-called "ten per cent clause."

This clause stipulates that a party unable to muster at least ten per cent of all ballots cast in any one constituency is to be barred from the *Landtag*. A counter-suggestion to eliminate the words "any one constituency," thus making ten per cent of the total vote the prerequisite for admission, was parried by the CSU-SPD coalition, for a very good reason: the clause was never intended to kill off all small parties without distinction, but only the Communist Party, which, as the constitutional strategists very well knew, was thinly spread over the country, without a firm foothold in any one city or constituency.

The constitutional draft prepared by Hoegner and his cohorts was adopted by the Bavarian people at the plebiscite of December 1, 1946, and with it the "ten per cent clause" went into immediate effect.

At the concurrently held *Landtag* election, the CSU gained, as had been generally expected, an absolute majority. It captured 104 out of the Diet's 180 seats. The SPD took 54 seats, the Economic Reconstruction Party, 13, and the Free Democratic Party (a Rightist group), 9. The Communists, who had 8 seats in the Constituent Assembly elected in June, got 0. They were the only victim of the "ten per cent clause," a trap specially designed for them.

Yet, as an analysis of the returns shows, the Communists polled considerably more votes than the Free Democratic Party: 185,000 as compared with 172,000. Normally, they would have been entitled to 10 or 11 seats in the *Landtag*. The Communist vote, incidentally, increased by 40,000 between June and December.

Not only the Communists, but liberal and democratic circles throughout Germany have protested this result of the Bavarian election as lopsided and unfair. For instance, the Berlin newspaper *Der Tagesspiegel,*

which is published in the American sector and represents distinctly anti-Communistic views, wrote editorially on December 31, 1946:

> We have already pointed out, immediately after the December 1 election, how absurd it is that the Communists with 185,000 votes obtained no seat in the *Landtag*, while under PR they should have taken eleven, whereas the FPD with 172,000 votes got nine seats. . . . No one can deny that this is scandalous and that the "ten per cent clause" grossly violates the principles of proportional representation.

The *Tagesspiegel* also pointed out that the elimination of the Communists from the Bavarian Diet serves no other purpose than to provide them with excellent food for agitation. Indeed, the handful of Communist deputies, who would have been perfectly harmless in the *Landtag*, have now set themselves up as a sort of counter-parliament in Munich. They are filling the air with clamors and recriminations, attracting much more attention than they would have otherwise mustered. The chances are that at the next election the Communists will easily make the grade and perhaps send twice as many deputies into the *Landtag* as they were entitled to this time.

In the two other states of the American zone, the Communists are represented according to the principles of PR. In the Hessian *Landtag* they hold 10 seats, and as many in the legislature of Wuerttemberg-Baden. In Hesse, where the SPD has 38 seats, the two workers' parties together have a majority over the two parties of the Right, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with 28 and 14 seats, respectively. However, after the election, the Communist member of the Hessian government, Oscar Mueller, was dropped, and the new cabinet consists exclusively of Social-Democrats and CDU ministers. Paradoxically, in Wuerttemberg-Baden, where the two parties of the Right have a majority together, the Communists are represented in the cabinet, which is an all-party coalition.

The British brand of democracy, as practiced in Germany today, is no less bewildering. There are as yet no popularly elected legislatures and governments in any of the three new states of the British zone (North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein), where the first *Landtag* elections are scheduled to be held in late March or April.

However, communal and county council elections were held throughout the British zone in two rounds, September 15 and October 13, 1946. On the strength of the returns from these polls, the British Military Gov-

ernment appointed the members of the provisional state assemblies and governments now functioning in the zone.

In a radical break with German tradition, the British authorities did away with the PR system, substituting instead a voting procedure based on that used in their own country.

No party lists were permitted. Instead, the voters were called upon to cast their ballots for individual candidates. Originally the Military Government even planned to forbid mention of a candidate's party affiliation along with his name, address, and profession printed on the ballot, but eventually it gave in on this score to the remonstrations of German political leaders who feared the voters would be completely lost if there were no party labels.

The system was further complicated by the introduction of "reserve lists"—a concession to the system of proportional representation. Under this arrangement, a certain number of candidates in each constituency was elected by relative majority, and a few more were chosen by the parties from a "reserve pool" of unused votes.

With all these innovations and complications, the voting procedure in the British zone was not only confusing for the electorate, but it also makes a comparison of the returns with those obtained in the other zones all but impossible. For, in the British zone elections, each voter cast from three to six ballots. The total of valid ballots counted at the October 13 poll alone turned out to be substantially higher than the entire population of the zone, babies included.

An analysis of the returns shows that there is a wide discrepancy between the popular vote figures and the distribution of seats in the city and county councils. For example, in the most populous and most important state of the British zone, North Rhine-Westphalia, the county council election of October 13 yielded this surprising result:

	Votes	*Percentage of Votes*	*Seats*	*Percentage of Seats*
CDU	6,512,206	45.9	2925	66.4
SPD	4,851,226	22.5	930	26.3
KPD	1,367,745	9.4	76	2.2

The voting system, then, heavily favored the clerical and conservative Christian Democratic Union (which, incidentally, is much more so in the British zone than elsewhere) at the expense of the Social-Democrats and, particularly, of the Communists. In order to elect one county coun-

cillor in North Rhine Westphalia, 2226 Christian Democratic, 5109 Social-Democratic, and 17,996 Communist votes were required.

In some places, it is true, the system had the opposite effect. In Hamburg (fourth state of the British zone), the Social-Democrats polled only 43.4 per cent of the popular vote but took 72.1 per cent of the seats in the city senate; the Christian Democrats got 27.2 per cent of the vote and 13.9 per cent of the seats; the Communists, 10.5 and 7.9 per cent respectively.

Generally speaking, it can be said that the voting system of the British zone gave an unfair advantage to the two strongest parties, CDU and SPD, at the expense of the smaller parties, in particular the Communists. The confusing and inequitable procedure will probably be abandoned, or at least modified, at the forthcoming state assembly elections, in view of mounting German protests. The influential *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung* has termed the electoral system of the British zone a "mockery" and the Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia, Dr. Rudolf Amelunxen, in a formal statement criticized the discrepancy between votes and seats and demanded that the system be made to conform to "the true will of the people."

In the Russian zone, things are done in a much simpler fashion, but that doesn't mean a more democratic one. If the cards are stacked in the western zones, the dice are loaded in the eastern. There, the KPD, masquerading as the SED, or Socialist Unity Party, exercises a controlling influence that certainly does not correspond to its voting strength.

While elections in the Soviet zone have been generally marked by a fair count and strict application of PR principles, they have been thoroughly vitiated in the past by two principal elements. One, in the pre-election campaigns, the SED was heavily favored by the authorities through a generous allotment of newsprint and paper for handbills, posters, and so forth, while the other parties were stinted. And too, the SPD, the largest, or second-largest, political party in Germany today, has been effectively barred from putting up candidates in the Soviet zone elections since the fake merger with the KPD last April.

As a result of these devices, which gave the Communists in the eastern zone an unfair advantage much greater than the disadvantage suffered by them in the western zones, the SED polled the following percentages at the *Landtag* elections of October 20, 1946:

In the State of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 50 per cent; in the State of Thuringia, 49.3 per cent; in the State of Saxony, 49.1 per cent; in the Province of Saxony (Saxony-Anhalt), 45.8 per cent; and in the Province Mark Brandenburg, 43.9 per cent.

Thus, in spite of its preferred status as "The Party" in the Soviet zone, the SED was unable to win a clear-cut majority in any of the five *Landtage* of the Soviet zone. However, thanks to the existence of several small groups allied to it, the SED does control the state legislatures of Saxony, Thuringia, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, while in the two provincial assemblies of Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg the two "bourgois" parties, CDU and LDP, together wield a majority.

Nevertheless, through firm and dexterous wielding of the coalition government formula, the SED has captured control of all five regional administrations in the Soviet zone, including the two provinces where "The Party" is in a parliamentary minority.

In the three regional units of the French zone (the newly created state of Rhineland-Palatinate and the two rump states of South Baden and South Wuerttemberg), the Christian Democrats rule supreme. Political conditions in the French zone approximate those of the British zone, although they are less confused and confusing.

There is, of course, no perfect form of democracy, nor an absolutely equitable voting system. However, any fair-minded person seeking a way out of the political labyrinth now existing in Germany will look to the Berlin municipal election of last October 20 as the best working model.

The Berlin poll, conducted under the watchful eyes of all four occupation powers, provided the only wholly fair and trustworthy test of political strength in present-day Germany. There, and there alone, SPD and SED confronted each other on equal terms, the former winning a spectacular triumph, as is well known.

It would be wrong, of course, to try to gauge political conditions in the rest of Germany by the Berlin yardstick. Berlin has always had a political climate of its own. It would be a good thing, however, if the occupying powers, taking the Berlin experiment as a guide, agreed on the admission of all anti-Nazi parties in all zones, and especially on a common voting system. It is high time the German political labyrinth were opened up a bit for easy inspection.

ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS AND THE BALANCE OF TRADE

By WENDELL C. GORDON

THE PROBLEM of gaining access to raw materials has been a burning international issue for many years—if one may judge from the volume of literature on the subject. The effort to insure access to raw materials has furnished the excuse for demands for colonies and for other pressures by one country against another in the field of international power politics. It seems to the present writer that, for this to be a legitimate excuse for such pressures, it must be shown that there is discrimination by sellers of raw materials against some of those who wish to buy. It is the thesis of this paper that there is no such discrimination to any important extent and that the problem of access to raw materials is no genuine problem.

I believe it is common sense to say that the people of a country gain if their country imports more goods than it exports. The process of making a living represents a continuous struggle. Each man attempts to gain as much as he can for himself at the cost of as little work as possible. If more value comes into a nation than goes out, the nation and its people gain. If more value goes out than comes in, the nation loses. The classical theory of international trade supports this position. The day has not yet arrived when the economic system produces as much as each person would like to have. This is still true even though the potential may be present to produce as much as each person would like to have, and even though we may have only ourselves to blame for not having as much of the world's goods as we could desire.

But, strangely enough, that thing which is called a favorable balance of trade involves exporting more value of goods than is imported. Why is the word favorable so used? The offhand answer is that once upon a time it was thought desirable to hoard gold on a national scale (in order to have a suitable reserve to pay the mercenaries when the next war came); and the way to accomplish that feat was to send goods abroad in greater quantity than they were imported and to encourage payment

in gold and to resist payment in goods. The "mercantilists" rationalized this position by arguing that there was intrinsic value in a pile of gold.

But a favorable balance of trade (and by that the customary use of words forces me to mean an export balance of trade) is still generally considered a desirable thing—ask almost any Congressman. And the desire to accumulate a hoard of gold at Ft. Knox or at the Sub-Treasury building on Wall Street does not furnish the reason.

What is the reason behind this advocacy of something which, on the surface, appears quite irrational?

In explanation there is a line of argument that runs somewhat as follows: The more men a nation has working the better off it is. The larger the foreign market that is found the harder the industrial plant can work and the larger the number of men that can be employed. Also, according to this line of argument, imports must be kept down to a low figure in order to protect the domestic market for domestic industry. So, the larger the exports and the smaller the imports the more a country's industrial establishment tends to hum and the more prosperous that country is.

To Abraham Lincoln has been frequently attributed this remark, which he probably did not make: "I do not know much about the tariff, but I know this much—when we buy manufactured goods abroad, we get the goods and the foreigner gets the money. When we buy manufactured goods at home, we get both the goods and the money." This argument, which William B. Munro calls "claptrap," has frequently been used by those favoring the tariff; but I never have heard it used by anyone as an argument against exports, in which latter case the foreigner is likely to get the goods and keep the money as well. At least he will keep the money if he defaults on the debt as sometimes happens.

There is, however, a refinement of this argument, which merits more serious consideration. Soule, Efron, and Ness, in a book called *Latin America in the Future World*, which was written under the supervision of Alvin H. Hansen, say: "It has been demonstrated that for most Latin-American economies, if not for all, exports (mainly of raw materials) play the active role that we have come to believe new investment plays in the more fully developed economies." Alvin H. Hansen says that an increase in exports can be part of a process which involves greater employment and therefore greater consumer purchasing-power. This leads

to greater demand than there would have been otherwise and leads to more production. In the end there is greater consumption at home as well as the greater export abroad.

This is the multiplier in operation, and it is advocated as a means of getting a country on its feet again following a collapse. It is assumed that exports may, at least in some cases, be substituted for new investment as the primary exciting force working toward a recovery. So far as the theory of the multiplier is concerned, I can understand that, at the time of a particular crisis and for a particular country, a sudden spurt in exports might serve as the stimulus which would lead to the desired domestic improvement. But I gain the impression from his chapter on "Gold, Exports, and Liquidity" in *America's Role in the World Economy* that Hansen has, perhaps unconsciously, used the theory of the multiplier as an argument for an export balance of trade. The time interval he covers in the analysis is at least 1934 to 1945, during which time the United States was absorbing $14 billion in gold. Eleven years is a bit too long for a pump-priming operation that involves injury to foreign countries —injury against which the foreign country can protect itself by retaliatory action.

I do not intend this as a criticism of most of the argument of Hansen in his *America's Role in the World Economy*. He does state elsewhere in the book that he realizes the fact that retaliation will probably counteract the export gain derived from an inflation of the currency. More important, I feel that the International Bank and the Monetary Fund, which he is primarily interested in defending, are very desirable indeed. But that is aside from the main subject of this paper.

I do not believe that the Keynesian multiplier provides the justification for the advocacy of an export balance of trade. In the field of international trade the retaliation of foreign countries becomes a factor with such devastating effect that pump-priming by means of the encouragement of a spurt in exports is going to have a result in practice which will be far different from that which was hoped for. Foreign countries are not going to sit idly by while another country tries to "export its depression" (assuming that to be possible). These countries merely raise their barriers against imports and the net result of the whole process is less trade and more depression all around. This particular experiment was

made several times during the '30's with precisely this trade-strangling result.

I believe that Keynes's contribution to economic theory has narrowly missed being a very vicious influence in the field of international trade. Intentionally or unintentionally, he almost influenced a large group of liberals to change over to the advocacy of economic nationalism. That could have been one of the great tragedies of modern times, and may be yet. Perhaps he should carry some of the responsibility for the trade restrictions that occurred during the '30's and for the war which followed (and against which he had so ably warned the world in the *Economic Consequences of the Peace*).

The danger lies (and lay) in the nature of the methods available for starting the multiplier principle to working. To be specific, when the Keynesians decided that an increase in exports could serve as an initial stimulus to get the business recovery started they provided the advocates of the export balance of trade (Mr. Hansen's "practical businessman") with a very useful argument to justify pushing exports. The Keynesian argument could be used to justify England's going off the gold standard in 1931, to justify United States devaluation in 1933, to justify protective tariffs, to justify bilateral trade agreements, to justify exchange control and quotas. It could, with or without the permission of Keynes, be used to justify all of the trade warfare of the '30's. And this trade warfare was a very important factor in making for the unstable world situation that brought on World War II.

When Hansen says: "These policies lead to economic warfare. Other nations do not take the beating lying down. They retaliate in kind," he is speaking a great truth. But he did not come to that truth by application of the principles of Keynes's economics.

Personally I subscribe to much of the viewpoint of Keynes. I believe that he, perhaps intuitively, realized the terrible danger inherent in a policy that leads to economic warfare. But his theory lends itself to use by others who may gain in the short run as a result of this trade warfare. And Keynes himself has said just enough in encouragement of that viewpoint so that the "master's" name can be used to justify much economic nationalism and economic warfare. For example, Keynes said, with regard to Britain's abandonment of the gold standard in 1931:

> Currency depreciation and tariffs were weapons which Great Britain had in hand until recently as a means of self-protection. A moment came when we were compelled to use them, ***and they have served us well.*** But competitive currency depreciations and competitive tariffs, and more artificial means of improving an individual country's foreign balance such as exchange restrictions, import prohibitions and quotas, help no one and injure each, if they are applied all round. (Italics mine).

Why could not Keynes have made a clear-cut statement against economic nationalism and international economic warfare? Instead he has provided the economic nationalists with the argument which they can use most effectively to destroy the World Bank and the Fund. And this precisely is going to be the crux of the problem ten years from now when the great postwar depression begins.

So much for the Keynesian argument for the promotion of exports under certain circumstances. That and other arguments have been actively used to justify the export balance of trade—but why and by whom? Who is it that is really interested in and benefited by the export balance and why is he able to make his case heard so effectively? It is my belief that the economist would understand the trade problem much better if he would take a leaf from the book of the student of government and pay a considerable amount of attention to the significance of pressure groups. In particular he should try to find out what it is that makes one alignment of pressure groups stronger than another.

What I am about to say does not purport to be a definitive analysis of the role of pressure groups in international trade, but I do hope that my comments sound sufficiently plausible to arouse some interest in this approach to the problem.

I shall make the heroic assumption that consumer and importer interest are substantially the same and that producer and exporter interest are substantially the same—at least so far as the problems discussed in the following section of the paper are concerned.

Man makes a living by making something for sale. With some men it is a service, with others it is a tangible object. Man, in the process of making his living, is interested in making and selling as much of his product as he can at as high a price as he can. He has come to realize, with the passage of time, that he will be more successful if he organizes with fellow producers of the same thing. So, you have trade associations and Chambers of Commerce, employers' associations and labor unions,

the National Association of Manufacturers and the CIO. All of these organizations have proved highly active and sometimes effective in pushing the interests of the producer-seller, whether the latter be the manufacturer with his product to offer or the labor union member with his service to offer.

So far as the consumer is concerned the situation is somewhat different. It may be true that the individual consumer is just as interested in making an individual purchase as cheaply as possible as the individual producer is in making the sale as costly as possible. But there is a fundamental difference between the bargaining power of producer and consumer because of the fact that producers can organize more effectively than consumers can. If all the consumers of aspirin tablets in the United States wanted to organize in an effort to obtain aspirin tablets as cheaply as possible, the organization would include very nearly everybody in the country, something approaching 140,000,000 people. Such an organization would be able to bargain effectively with the makers of aspirin. But there is no such organization and no such organization is likely to be formed. On the other hand, producers of aspirin could band together very easily to agree on some policy that would increase their profits as a group, if they wanted to do so.

Especially of late years there has been some effort to organize consumers. Several organizations have been formed to help people buy the best and most economical product—Consumers Research and Consumers Union, for examples. A certain amount of effort has been made to organize for the purpose of presenting the point of view of the consumer before Congress. But I am almost sure that no one will gainsay the accuracy of the statement that producers are much more effectively represented in the "lobbies." However, this is hard to prove.

As evidence, but not proof, I offer the following data. An analysis of "a corrected list of national organizations with permanent representatives in Washington" was used as the source of data. This list appears on page 197 of TNEC Monograph No. 26 and was prepared by Donald C. Blaisdell. Roughly it is a list of 383 lobbies or pressure groups interested in influencing Congress. As best I could I divided these organizations into four classifications: (1) Those representing consumer interest, such as the Anti-Saloon League and the National League of Women Voters. (I leaned over backwards in case of doubt to assume that an organization

represented consumer interest.) (2) Those representing the interest of producers of goods, such as the National Association of Manufacturers. (3) Those representing the interest of sellers of their services, such as the AFL, the CIO, and the AAUP. (4) And those I could not classify. The result was as follows:

Organizations representing consumer interest	27
Organizations representing producers of goods	110
Organizations representing sellers of services	130
Questionable	116
Total	383

Let us disregard the "questionable" figure and the figure for the sellers of services, even though labor unions have at times supported the tariff. We still find only 27 organizations representing consumer interest and 110 representing producer interest. Of course, the question remains as to which organizations in each group are the most influential. This subject can stand further investigation; but I shall assume in the rest of this paper that producers are equipped to exert more pressure on Congress than are consumers.

Very often the producer-exporter even makes the price of an export to the foreign buyer lower than the price of a similar article to a domestic buyer. The producer, in that case, has decided that he will make higher profits if he uses a two-price system than if he sells at one price. The foreign price will be the price that will bring him the largest net return from the foreign market, he hopes. In one sense of the word he is not giving anything away to the foreigner. He has to sell cheaply to compete in the foreign market. But his lobbying has enabled him to insulate the domestic market. Congress and the protective tariff see to that. So, the price to the domestic buyer may be higher than the price to the foreign buyer, as the producer sells in the domestic market at the price which will give him the highest profit there. The system has the purely accidental result of making many exports available more cheaply to foreigners than to citizens of the home country.

Of course there are cases where there is no such price differential. In such a case the producer may operate to sell as much of his product as possible both at home and abroad for as much profit as he can. For some reason the two-price system is either not beneficial or not feasible in that particular case.

Producers with the help of Congress protect the domestic market for themselves with tariffs, embargoes (such as the sanitary embargo on Argentine beef), and other types of controls. With the help of Congress also they push their sales abroad with bounties, subsidies, and so on. Occasionally they can get the benefit of monetary inflation to help out. Other countries operate the same way. Through most of the nineteenth century it was generally doubted in learned circles that there was anything particularly favorable about a favorable balance of trade. But that did not matter a great deal. Individual traders were not buying or selling a balance of trade; they were buying and selling particular commodities. The producer was interested in pushing the sale of his commodity as effectively as possible. He did that regardless of whether the balance of trade was favorable or unfavorable. It just so happened that the fact that sellers were pushing their sales more effectively than buyers were pushing their purchases meant that, on a world scale, there was effort to have an export balance, when on a world scale exports must equal imports. And this result naturally occurred in a world that thought it understood that there was nothing favorable about a favorable balance of trade.

This line of thought leads me to hazard a guess about mercantilism during the period when the New World was being colonized. The same sort of an alignment of forces existed then. Producers were organized in pushing sales better than consumers were organized for effective cheap buying. That relationship, I think, existed, even though producers as a class in society were not relatively as important then as they are now. Spain was constrained by the effective lobbying of her producers and merchants virtually to prohibit manufacturing in the New World. The only industry that was encouraged (and its efficiency was not encouraged) was the mining industry, which could provide raw materials not present in Spain, specifically gold and silver. The identification of gold and silver as the only products whose production was encouraged at all lends weight to the argument. Gold and silver sent from the New World to Spain were either already the property of Spaniards or else automatically tended to encourage shipments of Spanish goods to the New World. It was a fine, well-integrated, thoroughly selfish system. But Spain was not alone in playing the game. It is the natural thing to do as long as one can. England did it too.

English producers did their best to make the English empire one in which the products of England would find a ready market. The Boston Tea Party occurred in connection with an effort to market tea in the American colonies. English producers were interested in preventing such production in the colonies as would compete with production in England. They could do this effectively because their lobbying in London was more effective than that of the colonists or than that of the English consumer. Adam Smith, in a passage in the *Wealth of Nations,* says:

> It cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of this whole mercantile system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose interest has been entirely neglected; but the producers whose interest has been so carefully attended to; and among this latter class our merchants and manufacturers have been by far the principal architects.

It is not very useful to say that the consumer is the forgotten man. It is more useful to say that mankind, as a whole, has forgotten that it is a consumer.

With the coming of Adam Smith and liberal economics the myth that there was anything favorable about a favorable balance of trade, at least so far as the nation as a whole was concerned, was refuted. But that theoretical refutation did not change the alignment of forces. The producer-exporter remained a more effective bargaining group than the consumer-importer. And therefore the pressure remained strong on governments to do what they could to encourage exports and discourage imports, because the pressure was strong to aid particular exports and discourage particular imports.

Individuals (in some cases backed by their governments) frequently struggle bitterly with other individuals from foreign countries for the right to be the producers of raw materials. That fact does not run counter to the argument of this paper. I agree that there is vigorous struggle among producers for the privilege of mining or producing raw materials. In addition, nation states may pass legislation or take action to restrict foreigners in coming into their country to exploit local raw materials. But that is an argument among producers for the privilege of producing and making the profit to be made from production. It does not invalidate the argument that the raw materials are made available to foreign consumers without much discrimination—are even sometimes forced upon foreign consumers. Local producers are frequently in a position to put

more pressure on their own government than the foreigner can. They therefore are in a privileged position, frequently, for purposes of getting control of a resource for exploitation. But once in control of the resource, and once having set their price, have no doubt, they tend to sell anywhere in an effort to obtain the maximum profit. Thus, despite Anglo-Dutch control of rubber in the East Indies, the United States importers could purchase rubber—as long as the shipping lanes were open—and purchase it on as good terms as any consumers. Of course, all consumers were paying more than they would have if the monopoly control had been nonexistent. But that fact has nothing to do with any favoritism as between nations in making the supply available. The same is true of copper, lead, and zinc; wheat and corn; coffee and sugar; cotton and flax.

If the preceding discussion has been at all successful, it has indicated that nations are more effectively pushing selling than buying. Applied to the problem of access to raw materials this proposition assumes a very real significance. This paper began with the statement that: the problem of access to raw materials is no genuine problem. It is no problem because, by and large, the producers of raw materials are interested in marketing those raw materials wherever they can. There have been very few incidents in history where a nation (or its merchants) has refused to sell because the buyer lived in a potentially enemy country. Can you think of one such example (except possibly some example occurring on the very eve of war)?

It has been argued that each nation needs to guarantee unto itself a supply of the strategic raw materials necessary for waging war. "The nation can have no confidence in the source unless it owns it as a colony" runs this argument.

The argument has a specious plausibility. But it would be utterly impossible to put such a plan into effect with fairness to all. In the first place it would be impossible to draw political boundaries around colonies so that each nation would have its fair share of each raw material. That is true whether you try to give all fifty-odd nations a "square deal" or whether you try only to give four or five of the more powerful ones such favorable consideration. The boundary makers have enough of a headache now without trying to construct somewhere between five and fifty times as much boundary as now exists in the world.

In the second place, it is desirable to consider the situation that arises when war actually comes. It was said, by those arguing for colonies, that this secure source of raw materials, which could be obtained from one's own colonies, was needed in case of war. But, in time of war, it does not matter whether a country owns a particular colony or not. The only thing that matters in wartime is whether the shipping lanes are open. If the shipping lanes are open the raw material can be bought anyway. If the whole first part of this paper was of any value, it tended to show that the most influential force in international trade is the producer-exporter engaged in marketing his product as profitably as possible. Colonies do not guarantee a country that it will have a secure source of raw materials in time of war. And they are not needed to guarantee a source of raw materials in peacetime.

The United States has been known to make its staple commodities, such as cotton and wheat, available to foreigners at prices below the domestic price. Brazil for her coffee, Cuba for her sugar, Chile for her nitrate and copper, all are looking around desperately for foreign countries in which to sell those items. They are doing that most of the time. Their principal scheming does not involve the development of ways and means for keeping foreigners from acquiring those items.

About the only thing one can put his finger on, out of the last few wars, that the victor has gained is this. After victory he can force his goods upon the defeated nation. If necessary the victor can in addition "force" loans upon the defeated nation so that the vanquished can afford to pay.

During the '20's the producer-exporters of the countries that won World War I (in particular the United States) were extremely active in exporting things to Germany. Loans to Germany facilitated the process. The victors had rendered Germany powerless to defend herself. They sold Germany "everything but the kitchen sink." And, at the same time, they had Germany in a position where that country could not effectively push her own exports. The producer-exporters of the victors overextended themselves. There came a time when Germany could not or would not pay what she was owing, and the whole mechanism of international finance got out of gear. Who can say how much of the subsequent world misery has occurred as a consequence of the international financial collapse of 1929-1933?

United States neutrality legislation in the 1930's represented a simple popular reaction, at least in part, to foreign defaults. Neither Germany nor our former Allies of World War I would pay their debts. Therefore through the neutrality legislation of the 1930's we planned to avoid such embroilment in the future. The neutrality legislation may have been and probably was at fault from other points of view, but I shall hazard the guess that those other faults were not the only reason why the repeal movement was successful. Businessmen saw a chance to sell at a profit abroad under the circumstances prevailing at the end of the 1930's. The neutrality legislation, which stood in the way, was repealed.

You may recall that the principal event in our trade war with Germany during the 1930's was not an embargo by us on shipments to Germany. It was a restriction on German shipments to us. We were not trying to keep Germany from getting our goods. We were trying to keep German goods out of the United States.

Raw material control schemes have created enough furor so that everybody, or almost everybody, is now aware that the Brazilians control most of the coffee, the British and Dutch control most of the tin and rubber, and so on. An ordinarily intelligent person can easily see the possibility that those who thus have almost monopoly control of the supply may cut off that supply at an inopportune moment. That is a reasonably intelligent thought; but the "ax does not grind that way." You may be sure that the monopolists (or their governments functioning as such) controlling tin, rubber, and coffee, will charge the consumer a monopoly price, if they can figure out what that is. The fact that this control exists means that the consumer, wherever he may be, will pay a higher price for the commodity than would be the case if there were competition. But there is little evidence that effort is ever made in these cases to keep foreigners from buying the product. And there is a very considerable amount of evidence to indicate that monopolies frequently sell abroad at a cheaper price than they use at home.

However, this much is true with regard to restrictions on exports. Some countries tax a raw material export more highly than the finished product in order to encourage processing within the producer country. But this restriction has not been, to the writer's knowledge, framed to work an especial hardship on potential enemies. And it does not make

it more difficult for foreigners than for nationals to gain access to the ultimate finished product.

I should say that these tariffs on exports, which encourage processing in the country that produces the raw material, should be discouraged for the same reasons that a tariff on imports should be discouraged. They tend to locate production in high-cost places. But actually I am not inclined to become particularly concerned about the amount of industrialization that this method has brought to backward areas. If that is the only genuine difficulty presented by the whole raw-materials problem—so far as the major manufacturing countries are concerned—then the problem is not one of a very considerable importance.

So, there existed this strange situation in the prewar world. Nations were not trying to keep their rivals from access to raw materials. On the contrary they were trying to thrust those raw materials upon their rivals, and it did not make any particular difference whether those rivals were prospective rivals in war or not.

To summarize: Access to raw materials is open to all in peacetime. In wartime it is not the possession of colonies but an open shipping lane that secures supplies. Some tariffs on exports may have been imposed in backward areas in order to encourage a certain amount of processing in those areas. Perhaps that should be mildly condemned. But the total result of such activity does not provide any one of the great industrial nations, which have clamored for access to raw materials, with excuse to justify their demands for colonies.

A STORY

THE BLOTTER WOMAN

By PAUL SELVIN

THE HEART OF NAPLES during the war was Via Roma, and all of it was for sale. When you walked the mile and a half from the Museum to the Opera House, a never-ending cascade of propositions and entreaties washed upon your ears: the world was yours for a piece of bread or a carton of cigarettes. The vendors, with desperate energy, sold their possessions and themselves to live. Hunger made them shameless and amoral, and the street was a human bazaar.

The pimps were the most numerous class on the street. They offered sisters, wives, daughters, mothers, cousins, friends. Most of them were men, but many of them were urchins, both boys and girls, who would never be young. But they were only one kind of vendor, though the most obvious. Old women, barefooted and in rags, sold bad wine. Hoards of children begged cigarettes or offered rooms and "chicken dinners" which were uneatable. Men on corners sold trinkets and watches, and vendors sat in doorways or leaned against dirty walls with gaudy and worthless "souvenirs." Religious trinkets, badly made but colorful division patches, false diamonds, cameos, silver bracelets and rings, tarnished medalions, and souvenir knives glinted in the sun. Red and purple pillow covers and silk handkerchiefs embroidered with "45th Division," "Fifth Army," "34th Division," "Mother," "Sweetheart," or "I Love You Always" were thrust under your nose by entreating women. Shoeshine boys, striking their workboxes with their brushes, their faces stained with polish, assailed you to have "an American shine," and beggars met you with outstretched hands at every third step. A blind man sat against a building vacant-eyed and muttering to himself, a box for alms on his lap. His legs extended halfway across the crowded sidewalk, and the throng stumbled against him or walked upon him. A nun approached you with a badly printed card: "Please donate for the Church of St. ——, destroyed in American bombing August 1943," and a child with one leg, a placard about his neck announcing that he was an orphan, plucked at your sleeve for alms. Under foot were gangs of underfed children in rags, and jostling

against you were soldiers of all nationalities, their army and division insignia proudly worn. Many of them were drunk, most of them seemed much larger and healthier than the Italians in the crowd. Jeeps and trucks, horns blowing and gears grinding, were jammed in the street, and the babel of a dozen different languages was deafening. Such was Via Roma, and what soldier who was there will ever forget it?

I knew the street photographers best. Many of them were concentrated at the Officers' and Enlisted Men's Red Cross Clubs. But I preferred the two score whose crowded open-air studios were in a large square on Via Roma before Casa Dante, a large red building which had been a school but now was a headquarters billet. Part of the square had been fenced off with barbed wire as an allied parking lot, but the rest of it was overrun by the crowd that surged on Via Roma. Over the trucks and jeeps and multicolored human carnival stood a huge statue of Dante, looking white and immobile upon a human hell. Here motionless in the turbulent crowd stood three sailors posing before a camera, their arms about each other's shoulders, their teeth showing in wide grins. Nearby was an American staff sergeant, with wings and two rows of ribbons on his chest. Before another camera were an officer and his latest courtesan, and at the next two Poles, squinting sheepishly. And everywhere the press of the crowd.

The photographers fought fiercely for the soldiers' patronage. "Beautiful," "Two minutes," "Three for a hunnerd lira," they chanted and called to you. "Best pictures," "Send home good pictures." You had only to nod to one. With nervous hops he would pat his camera, resettle the weak tripod anxiously, move you into position, studying and turning your face just so in the sun. His fingers were moist upon your chin. Then he shooed a myriad of children out of the way, patted the stomach of his ancient camera again, and hopped quickly behind his box, burying his head under a dark cloth. His arms on both sides of the suddenly personable box motioned you ever so slightly first this way and then that; then both hands went up—you were "in position." His head reappeared from the cover. He placed a metal cap over the lens, inserted a fresh plate in the camera, studied you briefly and intently once more. Then a warning, his left hand up, thumb and index finger joined in a small circle, "Still. Stand still." He took the cap from the lens, held it away for two seconds, then swiftly replaced it. "Good! Good! Now *aspette* one moment." His

stained hands worked in the bowels of his camera, his brow furrowed in concentration. You waved shoeshine boys away and made no response to a whore who smiled at you. The crowd richocheted about you. Ah! now the negative was finished. He placed it upside down on a small wooden arm about a foot from his lens, then made three impressions quickly, surely, replacing the cap on the lens each time. His hands worked again in the interior of his camera and finally came out with the prints. He dropped them in a pail of dirty water hanging from the rickety tripod, then fished them out and to shed the water passed each print between two forefingers pressed together. A quick inspection, a smile of approval. "Ah! Good!" Another pass between the fingers. "Very good! Very good! See!" A flourish, a slight bow, an outstretched hand. Your hundred liras disappeared into a pocket while he turned to a sergeant who had been watching amusedly. "Pictures? You like pictures? Very good!" Do you wonder that Americans had their picture taken often on Via Roma? For a moment he had been an artist, and you had been carried away. Then the roar and color of the crowd caught you up again.

* * *

In the turbulent world of Via Roma an Italian lived by his wits or on the niggardly sympathy of the foreign crowd. Desperation spawned many strange occupations. The most pathetic was the blotter woman's. It was in March on the square before Casa Dante that I first saw her. I had posed for my second picture in Italy, marveling at the busy open-air studio. The photographer had just handed me my prints, I had paid him and was turning away when I felt a hand on my sleeve and a thin voice said, "Dry pictures? Dry good." I looked down. A small, old woman was beside me. "Dry?" she repeated. Most of her teeth were gone, and her lips were flaccid. "Dry good." The three prints in my hand were damp; in fact, I was holding them so that they would not touch each other. Without thinking I handed them to her and followed her as she shuffled to a board lying nearby on the ground. She kneeled, then placed my pictures face down upon the board and pressed upon them with the palm of her hand. For a moment I did not understand what she was doing. Then I saw there was a small blotter on the board; she was blotting the prints. With a grunt she rose to her feet and handed the prints back to me; they were blurred, dirty fuzz was on their face. "Ten lira," she said. Automatically I paid her.

The pictures had not been very good to start with; now they were ruined. Bewildered, I looked again at the blotter—it was old, torn, ink-stained, and matted with dirt. She had probably found it in a ruin; it was obviously worthless as a blotter; worse, it was harmful—it would stain and blur your prints. Yet here she was saying, "Dry your pictures?" and asking for ten lira merely to press your prints against a dirty blotter! In a way, I felt, it was a joke on me; I should have known better. But I knew that if it was a joke it was a desperate one for her. How many allied soldiers would be foolish enough to give her ten lira for ruining their prints? How many would even give her their prints in the first place? If she did not realize the hopelessness of her trade she must have set up her business very recently. She shuffled past me toward another photographer, and I studied her small form. Her dress was old and torn across the shoulder; it was too large for her, and was gathered up misshapenly by pins. She wore but one stocking, and it had fallen about her right ankle. Her sandals were tied to her feet by string. Her hair was uncombed, her neck was dirty. Looking at her so I knew there was nothing else for her to do but beg for alms outright; the blotter business, I realized, was really a form of begging.

I walked after her. What had she done before she had found the miserable blotter? I could not help wondering if there were any children dependent upon her. As I passed her I looked again at her face. It was small and old, lined and tired; the skin was grey. She was about fifty-five years old. Like most Italian women she was wearing a crucifix about her neck. I passed on and drifted with the crowd. She would not have any young children, I decided. Probably she was alone in the world. But who can tell? Perhaps the war had thrust grandchildren upon her care. How had she lived till now? I do not know why I thought these things.

* * *

I saw the blotter woman often after that. She was not doing much business. I gave her ten lira occasionally, and whenever I had a picture which was not too good, and that included most of those I had taken on the square at Casa Dante, I let her blot them for me. I still have them and you can see how they were ruined. I could not help thinking each time I saw her how pathetic she looked, though now bewilderment was not the only emotion which showed in her face. Occasionally her eyes were sharper now, and the lines of her face were harder. I often wished

I could go with her and see how she lived, if she supported any others, what hovel was her home. I confess I even made up stories about her past.

It was in the middle of June that she first spoke to me about something other than drying pictures. She still had the same old blotter; it was dirtier and harder than before. The pictures I had just paid for were exceptionally good and I shook my head negatively when she approached me with her pleaful "Dry? Dry pictures?" I turned on my heel and walked to the edge of the sidewalk, looking at the crowd, my imagination stirred as always by the tossing heads, the swirling colors, the tense faces. It was a few moments before I noticed that she had followed me. She was standing beside me with her head down, her neck bent so that her chin was close to her throat and so that I could not see her eyes. I sensed she was making an effort to speak, and I thought I heard her mutter something, but was not sure: the words seemed to blur in her mouth. As I looked down at her I felt pity for the grey hair in disarray, the slight body, the soiled pinned dress. She mumbled again. I was sure now she was talking to me, and I caught her last word, "... *signorina.*" I bent my head toward her. "What did you say?" She looked at me quickly, then lowered her head again. I could not fathom the multitude of emotions that lay behind her eyes. She was silent for a moment, and then she said piteously in a low voice, "Do you want a girl?"

It was so unexpected I was taken aback. I had been propositioned scores of times on Via Roma, but never like this. It was as though she had stepped grotesquely out of character. But suddenly, remembering her voice as she had said the words, I understood. It was the first time she had ever dared say this. She was not a pimp; she could not be cynical or bold or brazen or insinuating in her approach as the others were. And yet, she had come to this. I was silent for a moment. Then I shook my head. "No." I could not help but wonder whom she was offering me. Surely it was not herself; even in her deepest desperation she could not possibly imagine that she could earn money that way. But I did not dare ask her. She said nothing, though I could swear that a look of relief passed over her face when I refused her offer.

I walked away a few yards, then stepped to the side of the walk to watch her. She stood still for a moment, breathed deeply as though taking hold of herself with new purpose, and then went up to another soldier who had just had his picture taken. Did he wish to have his prints dried?

He shook his head. She stood with resignation again, then approached a sergeant as he was paying for his pictures. He nodded, and she blotted his prints. He gave her five lira. I watched her for about ten minutes. She did not proposition anyone else for a girl during that time. I turned away, but could not forget her.

* * *

It was shortly after this that I left Naples for a few weeks, and it was almost two months later, at the end of July, before I had my picture taken again on the square. The old woman was there, and her blotter and board were beside her on the ground. But I saw immediately that there was something different about her. Her face was harder, the eyes were not bewildered, the lips, despite the lack of teeth, were tight in a faint sneer. I watched her and saw that she was pimping. Only occasionally did she ask a soldier if he wished to have his prints dried on the blotter, and then only as an afterthought after she had asked him if he wished a girl. I saw her speaking with two English soldiers. She nodded her head, speaking persuasively, then motioned them to follow her. She left her blotter and board where they were on the ground; they were valueless, no one would take them even on Via Roma. I knew where she was going—to a room on some nearby side street where she had a girl. I shrugged my shoulders and watched the backs of the three of them disappear in the crowd. I should have known. My refusing her first attempt had given her courage for perhaps an hour. Who knows? It may have been even a day before she brought herself to offer the girl again to a soldier. But what good was such a postponement? It solved nothing. Morbidly I waited for her return. It took her five minutes: she was back alone. I walked past her down the street.

But I had not gone two blocks, deaf all the while to the propositions of all sorts falling around me, before I turned about. She had asked me first, and I knew how she had done it then. I wanted to see how she asked soldiers now. I walked back to Casa Dante and stood near her. Two soldiers spurned her offer; but I was too far away to hear her voice. Then I walked slowly past her, looking at her face as though I wished her to proposition me. She did not notice me the first time, and I went on about ten feet up the sidewalk. I turned about and walked back so that again I would pass close to her. This time she was looking in my direction and our eyes met. As I came close she said, "Wanna girl?" I shuddered. The

voice had fallen into the pattern of all the others on the street. If I shut my eyes I could visualize any one of the thousand pimps on Via Roma propositioning me with that voice, with that phrase of broken English.

But I wanted to know more. I stopped and raised my eyebrows, pretending that I was both interested and yet not sure that I had heard her correctly. "What?" I said. Someone in the passing crowd jostled me, and I was pushed even closer to the woman.

"Signorina?" she said again. "Nice. Good." The voice, though trying to be insinuating, had a hard quality, an almost impersonal tone, like a worn record. It was not the voice of the old woman who had first spoken to me in the spring. That woman had been bewildered, piteous. This woman was matter-of-fact, business-like, cold. If there was any emotion in her tone it was lost in the obvious cynicism and purpose which gave it a hard ring. The eyes that looked at me were cold. They required an answer, even if for business purposes only.

"How old?" I asked, following the Via Roma pattern.

"Young. Sixteen. Nice."

"Dove? Where?"

"Not far. Follow me."

She turned and started off. I noticed that she still wore only one stocking. I did not want the girl, but I wished to learn more. I followed her, trying to walk beside her. I wanted to talk with her. We left Via Roma, and now it was easier for me to walk close to her; the crowd was thinner. I made out I was impatient. *"Dove?"* I repeated. "Where?"

"Not far." She pointed ahead with her hand.

"How old?" I asked again.

"Young. Sixteen. Good."

I watched her face. "Your daughter?"

She looked at me quickly, then turned away. But I had seen her eyes. In that moment they were not the same as they had been on the square. They were frightened, anguished. Then she shook her shoulders, her lips tightening. "No," she said shortly.

"Who?"

The word seemed to hit her, and almost in spite of herself, as though it were slipping out because it was the truth which could not be denied —not because she wished to reveal it but because she could not conceal it from herself—she said, "My granddaughter."

I had what I wanted to know; there was no need for me to go further. I stopped abruptly. "No want," I said.

She turned and looked at me. For a moment I am sure she thought I was not going with her because I thought it was wrong for her to offer me her granddaughter. Fleetingly the hardness left her face and she was a tired old woman again who looked as though she had just been slapped. But then she could not admit such a thought to herself, because even if it were not my reason it was obviously on her own conscience. The eyes became hard again, the voice brusque. "Only two hundred lira," she said. "Good." I shook my head. "No want." Then I turned and walked back toward Via Roma. I walked slowly, and soon she passed me, walking with purpose again. She went back to the square and I watched her. Soon she had a sergeant who nodded he would go with her. I turned away and went on.

* * *

It was perhaps a month later that I noticed that the blotter woman was no longer on the square. I knew one of the photographers fairly well by then; he had taken my picture often enough to recognize me whenever I passed him. In my bad Italian I asked, "Where is the old woman who used to dry pictures here?"

He handed me my prints and took my hundred lira note. His voice had no emotion in it as he said, "She is dead." He adjusted one of the rickety legs of his tripod, then added as though repeating information he had read in an old newspaper, "She killed herself about three weeks ago. She used to live near me."

I closed my eyes and shuddered. Then I looked about the teeming square again, the shoeshine boys, the scores of swaggering soldiers, the urchins pimping and begging, the vendors, the photographers, and I remembered her as I had first seen her. In my imagination I saw her as though there were three of her, one image behind the other—the bewildered old woman ruining bad photographs of foreign soldiers; then her face as she had asked me the first time if I wished to have a girl; and then her face as I had seen it the last time, when she had been pimping without reticence. I knew there was a fourth image, but I steeled my mind against conjuring it up. What could it be but a most terrible fusion of these three, a contorted face and a rope? . . .

But the photographer had mistaken my thoughts. "If you wish her girl you can still have her."

I turned and looked at him.

"She is a good piece. Over there. That boy. He is her grandson."

I followed the direction of his arm and saw a boy of about ten. He was standing on the edge of the sidewalk speaking to soldiers as they passed. His clothes fitted him badly, and his face was older than his years. Mechanically I walked close to him, then slowly past him. He propositioned me. "Wanna girl, Johnny?"

I paused and made out that I was considering his offer. His quick lines followed the usual Via Roma pattern as I hesitated before him. "Good. Nice and young." His voice was brazen, insinuating. He nodded his head, letting me know that I was in on a good thing. "You like, you see. Come."

"*Aspette*. Wait a minute," I said. I wanted to be sure. "How old?"

"Sixteen. Good."

"Where?"

"Not far." He motioned in the direction I had followed the old woman.

"Who? Your mother?"

"No!" It was a great joke to him. His mother! "No! Young! Sister! Nice." He smirked and nodded his head again insinuatingly. "You'll like."

I shook my head and turned away, remembering the old woman's eyes and her plaintive "Dry? Dry pictures?" "Best on Via Roma!" he called after me, proud of his offer and of his additional English. She might as well not have lived, I thought. Or, living, she might just as well not have killed herself. It had accomplished nothing. There was no trace of the old woman in him. He wore no crucifix and he had never lived anywhere but in a world of Via Romas. He would never have any doubts or misgivings about this street or about his life. I might just as well forget about her.

COSTS—A BARRIER TO CULTURE

By KARL F. ZEISLER

THE STANDARD PRICE of books in America a generation ago was a dollar; in those benighted times a dollar was also a day's wage. As wages went up, so did the price of books, but while wages have outstripped book prices, a study of the economics of culture will show that book buying in a richer and more literate society has failed to keep pace. As a matter of cold statistics only about three per cent of the American people regularly purchase current quality books. As far as the other arts are concerned, their patronage is confined to even smaller groups.

Out of 140 million Americans the number of actual, regular book buyers, patrons of the arts, lecture audiences, stage devotees, and concert-goers comprises little more than five million. Beyond this select circle are millions of high school and some college graduates, supposedly capable of absorbing culture, who may borrow a best seller from a friend or a library, be dragged to an occasional lecture or art exhibit or concert by a less crass mate, or attend the legitimate theater on an annual buying trip to New York or Chicago. But they can hardly be termed the dependable audience or market for literature of quality, books of ideas, classical records, sculpture, paintings and etchings, or scholarly discourses. The patronage of the arts remains largely within this select three per cent who possess an active desire for culture and the means to afford it.

I think this confinement of the leaven of ideas, culture, and enlightenment to narrow segments of a democratic people is dangerous. We cannot begin to overcome it unless we appreciate the economics of culture, unless we understand first the factors that discourage the wider spread of the media of intellectual and artistic expression.

One phase of such a study would consider the barrier of communication, the difficulty of understanding imposed on their works by all too many writers, and the remoteness of much of modern art from comprehension by the people. But the phase I am concerned with here is the

barrier of the budget. I want to show how the media of culture, from books to sculpture, are simply priced too high and thus unavailable to most of the 97 per cent of the people outside the magic circle. Not only a barrier of communication, but a barrier of the family pocketbook confines American culture to the few; a simple inability on the part of the many to make ends meet and allow for books, paintings, statues, records, and ideas in their economic life. The great bulk of American families, regardless of their education or taste, simply can't live comfortably in a physical sense and retain enough of their income to invest regularly and habitually in what now passes for media of culture. And in America comfort comes before culture. I am not saying that all who can afford culture purchase it; of course many people with means ignore art and letters. But I am saying that many who would become regular patrons of the arts are barred because it is beyond their financial grasp.

The most obvious way to bridge this gap between income and enlightenment—a consummation which would seem essential to a democracy—is to reduce the cost of production and distribution of the various media of culture so that they will be more widely available to the 97 per cent. Some insight into the economics of culture and more enterprise on the part of the entrepeneurs of culture could accomplish this now by application of sound American practices and principles of mass production and mass distribution. Up to now, except tentatively and inadequately in reprints and discs, the producers and distributors of culture have put too high a price tag on their wares to attract mass consumption. Of course more money is spent for liquor and cosmetics in America than for education or for the media of culture. But let's not blame the people for being indifferent to culture. Note that a box of face powder or a drink is priced at under a dollar retail, but that books at a dollar or less have returned to America only recently, and then only in reprints. And where can you buy an example of the work of an American artist or sculptor in this price range?

Getting the media of culture down to the pocketbook level of the 97 per cent is the challenge to the industry of culture, and it is an encouraging sign that in books and recorded music, the American genius for mass production, salesmanship, and distribution is beginning to get results. Books that once were issued only in trade editions at $2 to $4 now are available as reprints as cheap as a quarter, and semi-classical phonograph

records formerly retailing at a dollar to a dollar and a half now sell as low as fifty cents. This is progress.

It came the hard way, however. "It was an axiom of American publishing that readers here could not be induced to buy an inexpensive paper book," writes John K. Hutchens in the *New York Times Book Review*. "Several years ago Robert F. DeGraff . . . presented the solution. It was to distribute paper-bound books as magazines." Now 110 million of these books have been sold in a year and one publisher since 1940 has sold more 25 cent reprints, 144 million copies, than the combined total of all the best sellers published in the United States since 1880. One author alone, Earle Stanley Gardner, expert compounder of mysteries, reputedly sold six million copies in 1945, mostly in 25-cent reprints, of course, which is partial proof at least (since many would argue that Gardner does not come under the strict heading of culture)—proof that given what they want to read at a price they can afford, the 97 per cent will buy books. The barrier of the budget, the confinement of book sales to the five million, takes on added meaning in the light of such figures.

There are virtually no technical problems involved in the mass production of books, discs, quality art prints, or reproductions of competent sculpture. There is none incapable of solution in finding merchandizing outlets for their mass distribution, as the reprint publishers discovered. There has always been, however, a curious tendency on the part of the writer and artist, furthered by the publisher and producer, to keep the price of cultural products at standard levels lest they be "cheapened" in mass distribution format. Writers in particular (*vide* the testimony of the James M. Cain-Authors' Authority group), complain bitterly of the limited royalties accruing through the reprint trade. These writers talk of limited royalties in relation to huge publishers' profits. But are they correct, and will not the inevitable result of their agitation be to drive the price of popular reprints upward? What these writers may be overlooking is that it may be economically sound to sacrifice income via reprints to broaden their readership and provide the larger audience by which they could command greater total royalties.

Writers who insist on the 10-15 per cent royalties and publishers who insist on the $1-$3 trade edition prices are blind to the economic lesson which the automotive industry so graphically teaches. What if the bellwether of mass production, having achieved the assembly line and dealer-

ships in every hamlet, still sold all its cars for the "standard" $2000 they once cost lest it run out of a market? At one time the fear of that very catastrophe hung over Detroit, which regarded the sale of a million motorcars a year as the absolute peak—all the market could absorb. Yet as prices went down under the pressure of competition and production efficiency, the market expanded until, even before the depression, the 5,000,000 car year was reached. And the ultimate saturation point in a period of general employment is not yet in sight.

In the field of culture, with production no insurmountable problem, the entrepeneurs still hesitate to apply this lesson to achieve mass consumption. Long ago the motor-makers learned that a market existed for cars in price ranges from a few hundred dollars to several thousands, and produced for that market. The book industry is just now getting its toes wet by mass distribution of the 25-cent reprint; when it gets accustomed to the water it may yet plunge in neck deep as the automakers did by offering fresh, new, undigested books by recognized authors at 25 or 50 cents, hot off the press. What is "cheapening" about selling 2,000,000 copies of a 25-cent book as against 165,000 copies of a $3 edition? And wouldn't both author and publisher profit in the long run from such wider distribution, balking which stands principally the barrier of the budget?

Of course not all books merit sales of 2,000,000. But a few ventures in that direction by some that do, point the way. The late Wendell Willkie's *One World*, issued simultaneously in cloth and paper, attained drug- and dime-store sale in the dollar edition. The two Bob Hope opuses at the same price promptly ran up phenomenal sales records. What would have happened if Steinbeck's *Cannery Row* had been sold when fresh and timely, in a dollar edition with mass distribution? No one knows for sure. But *Omnibook* and its ilk prove that book distribution, even in stale, digest form, enormously expands as the price descends. And their sales volume adds convincing evidence that trade editions at $2 to $4 are simply beyond the budgets outside the three per cent limit. So are reproductions of paintings and sculpture and subscription prices to quality magazines.

* * *

A study of the economics of culture might persuade the cultural industry that it is perpetuating the mistake the motor-makers would have

made if they had not dared to cut their price to the point where they had to sell to the limit of their productive capacity to make a profit. All too few writers and publishers have tried to produce literature that surmounts the barrier of communication, offered at a price the people would willingly pay and distributed where everyone could readily buy it. If more of them did, the average American family might regard a book as no more a luxury than a car. The most recent evidence is given by Granville Hicks in *Small Town:*

> In the mythology of contemporary America the automobile is a potent symbol. . . . Of course it is a symbol of power, too, but mostly of freedom—the freedom to go somewhere. . . . In Roxborough its economic importance can hardly be exaggerated; . . . for the average resident an automobile is more important than anything except the barest shelter and a sufficiency of the cheapest kind of food.

Against this, Mr. Hicks points out the utter absence in such a community of the media of culture:

> Many realms of thought that are important for me and all intellectuals do not exist for the people of the town. Though there are some persons who read novels, and occasionally good novels, there is no interest in criticism and certainly none in aesthetics. Music, aside from current dance tunes, ballads and folk songs, is something to be ignored when it comes over the radio. . . . On the walls of the majority of homes one sees only calendars and family photographs.

Incidentally, while Mr. Hicks has written with insight an appraisal of village life that deserves wide readership as an interpretation of much that baffles American intellectuals, at $3 a copy not even many intellectuals can afford it.

The reprints have pointed the way, it seems to me, and proved that the 97 per cent want to buy books; the book clubs, offering standard editions, fresh, at discounts plus delivery beyond the bookstores where many of the 97 per cent live, have broadened the scope of the best seller geometrically; these trends, laying aside questions of literary quality, are in the right direction. Today a Dakota rancher, a Mississippi school teacher and a New York villager can get, without special effort, current books. And even in small interior towns it is possible to buy a mystery, a work on gardening or golf, the latest bridge manual or a magazine serial or movie script in book form for a quarter along with a sandwich, cigarets, and aspirin. Publishers of children's books learned long ago not

to rely solely on bookstores, and increased their sales tremendously by distributing cheap editions through dime, drug, department, and variety stores that do business in towns bereft of bookstores. The reprint has brought the book, even if it is in paper covers, back to the people, though somewhat in the sense that the automotive trade would offer its leftover 1947 chassis at cut prices along in 1950.

I believe the purveyors of inexpensive books do some injustice to their potential market by offering goods only after they have been tested for appeal on the three per cent fringe market. The excitement in the Emily Dickinsonian sense of having a book take off the top of your head comes from reading it while those who are looked up to in the community as being on the button are talking about it, while it is a subject of puns on the radio and making headlines in the daily press, and before it is filmed. Offered thus fresh, the Willkie and Hope volumes sold over a million copies each because they reached the people with a dollar as quickly as the people with three dollars, and before they were pawed over by the intellectuals and shopworn by the commentators.

This one last daring step, of putting fresh, timely books on the mass distribution market, as one new publisher is venturing to do, has to be taken before the book industry meets the challenge of the unread, budget-bound 97 per cent. The book trade needs its flivvers and klunks and custom jobs on the market simultaneously if it is to sell to the masses. It surely learned what a demand existed for fresh, vital wares in flivver format when the men in uniform had a chance to consume 105 million copies of Armed Forces editions. Yet a few months after V-J Day the book trade was calling these sales a fluke and dourly predicting a sharp decline in postwar book sales. Up to last Christmas at least, the *New York Times* reported no such falling off. The book trade needs to get off 42nd Street a bit and out where no bookstores exist to ascertain the hunger of the 97 per cent for books they can afford.

It is as though the food industry catered only to the palates of gourmets, or the construction industry built nothing cheaper than $10,000 homes (which is so true today that we see a house market going begging as much as a book market among the 97 per cent). Our cultural industry produces goods that can be consumed only by an extremely narrow clientele, both in cost and communicability.

* * *

I was astonished, in thumbing through a 1905 file of *McClure's* magazine, to find breath-taking reproductions of Grand Canyon water-colors. Since 1905 marvelous new techniques have been perfected in the optical, chemical, and mechanical processes of reproducing color. The *National Geographic, Life,* and *Look,* among other periodicals, have demonstrated the practicality and cheapness of mass-marketing color photography and paintings. All the world's treasury of pictorial art stands at the threshold of the homes of all the people today. The humblest flat could afford examples of the finest old masters and best contemporary artists as easily as it can afford "art" calendars and family portraits as its sole adornments. Enterprise and the co-operation of contemporary artists who want to communicate their art to the people, are awaited to make this vast storehouse of culture available. But scan the "art" counter of the dime store or the basement picture gallery of the department store. Atrocities only are marketed at prices the people are willing to pay for a bright spot on a drab wall; why not offer them great art, which modern mechanical means can put in their homes for exactly the same price?

Fine prints enter the homes of the three per cent through art associations similar to the book clubs; the next step is to utilize the new color-printing techniques in mass production to reach the market of the 97 per cent. Contemporary artists, certainly, deserve the royalties and the audience for their work that such a mass market offers. Are the picture magazines alone possessed of enough enterprise and awareness of the people's hunger for art to furnish them with pin-up snatches of it? For years visitors to my study have exclaimed over a half dozen beautifully reproduced natural color photographs of western scenes, and asked where I purchased them. They are given away by an oil company at gas stations. Neither mass production nor distribution is a problem in this field, but it will take enterprise and venture capital to flood mercantile counters with great art until the existing stocks of pastoral scenes, the photos of Hollywood stars and souvenir postcards are driven off the market.

Again, prices will have to drop below the $5 and $10 levels of prints and etchings now available. But all that is required is the application of mass production and marketing techniques to the field of pictorial art, plus the willingness of artists as of authors to permit their works to reach the 97 per cent.

In a speedily-built war plant I watched a mass-produced machine tool reproduce within a thousandth of an inch the contours of a die used for press-forging hundreds of thousands of aluminum cylinder heads for American superbombers. As I watched its knowing mechanical finger carve the intricate contours in the hardest steel I marveled that this genius had been applied so far only to the mass production of weapons and machines. Why not use it to reproduce in miniature the works of the best sculptors in the enduring sheen of stainless steel, aluminum or bronze, so that the people might possess and enjoy them? We have certainly progressed beyond the Victorian era's plaster casts of Greek statuettes and politicians' busts.

I watched, too, a permanent mold-casting machine fill huge bins almost by the minute with complex die castings accurate to fine tolerances for these same bomber engines. And again I wondered why this genius had been applied so far mainly to ash trays, bookends, bric-a-brac, and home-bar gadgetry. Is sculptural art still in the stone age? Plastics reproduce the patina, texture, and color of the costliest marble and ivory and can be cheaply electroplated in bronze, copper, silver, or gold; this latter process produced every veteran's discharge button. Is art too stuffy to take advantage of today's technology? Do sculptors use modern-tool steel chisels but balk at precision mass-reproduction of their works for artistic adornment of the people's homes?

* * *

Microfilmed books are beginning to be produced for the service hospitals, with a simple projector by which the bedridden can read them on the ceiling. "Talking" books are recorded on discs for the pleasure of the blind. Yet microfilm books, for children and adults, with technicolor illustrations and possibly even recorded sound effects for the very young, have never been deemed possible. And still, the book industry fears competition from television!

The first radio sets were tuned by fiddling with at least three knobs. It wasn't long before the set makers had one-dial tuning, and their sales began to mount; still later came push buttons, all in the interest of making it easier for everybody to enjoy broadcasting—and buy radio sets. But up to now radio, with a well-nigh universal audience, as the Link-Hopf findings confirm, has largely fumbled its cultural opportunity by paying slavish heed to program ratings and the dictates of advertising sponsors

who put sales first, quality last. Broadcasters, blasted by the FCC Blue-book, are emitting feeble, self-righteous whines in defense of their commercialism, every argument of which is deftly parried by the increasingly alert and disgusted radio critics of the periodical press, and dismissed by a large segment of their audience.

Both television and FM radio seem destined to have only limited audiences and selective programs for some years to come. Why should not both of them transmit truly cultural material? It is possible that such programs would lack sponsors of the ordinary type. But why should not the industry of culture, the book publishers, the disc makers, the art reproducers sponsor literary, dramatic, music, and art programs and use them for advertising their own wares? They would thus contribute a public service with some probable gain to themselves. The technical marvels of these new media of communication otherwise may be used to disseminte only dramatized comic strips and animated boogie-woogie.

The technical perfection of the true-color sound film has certainly been wasted largely on super-colossal musicals, westerns, and the same type of sexy romances now selling phenomenally through the book clubs. Is this what Edison wrought? In Hollywood the production of competent documentaries and artistic, skillful "shorts" from travelogs to the late Robert Benchley's delightful celluloid witticisms is handicapped and well-nigh stifled by the film production and distribution system. Such "program" reels are the output mainly of small companies working under the complete domination of the major studios. For years their distribution was limited if not throttled by block-booking. And now they are threatened equally by its erasure in the courts by being unable to contract in advance for even their limited output and thus finance their operation. It is noteworthy that some of the excellent war training films were at least government-financed. Yet Hollywood would be the first to squawk if such quality, cultural, and educational films had to be federally subsidized in peacetime.

The film industry, like the older book industry and the newer radio-FM-television industry, must find its own way of subsidizing culture through mass production and distribution techniques intelligently applied to meet democracy's hunger for and need of culture. The publishing industry has long subsidized books it recognizes as having cultural but not sales value. It seems to me that films and radio have vastly profited

by mass production and distribution without doing their share of such subsidization, and that the publishing and other cultural industries need to take advantage of mass production and distribution of wares with wide appeal to justify and continue their subsidization of culture.

These are some aspects of the economics of culture, an intelligent study and understanding, too long neglected, of the limitations needlessly thwarting democratic distribution of art and ideas. Of course America can keep on writing and publishing books and magazines and producing art and music for the select circle that can afford and comprehend them, and it can keep on producing radio programs and films that sell with too little of the leavening spark of artistic and cultural values. If we do, however, if we fail to apply our native genius to the challenge of making culture universally available, of making our art in the best sense popular, of making our presently popular arts cultural, then we are only accelerating the division of America into a relatively few cultural and intellectual aristocrats and a vast mass of uninformed, uncultured, uninspired and unled Philistines.

THE NEW ATTACK ON CULTURAL LAG

By JOHN J. HONIGMANN

A STRONG VITALIZING FORCE is quickening social science, that youngest division of knowledge to achieve independent status and academic recognition. Largely responsible for this awakening are the fresh insights into human behavior injected by the vigorous, new science of anthropology. When, roughly about fifty years ago, specially trained observers replaced casual travelers in studying the ways of life of simple native communities in America, Africa, Oceania and elsewhere, no prophet visualized the relevance that this study would have for solving practical social problems. Today the actual and potential contributions of anthropology to modern life are still not widely appreciated. To many people outside of academic circles, the ethnologist is still a rather glamorous world traveler who interests himself in bizarre customs with only incidental regard for scientific method and utter unconcern for human welfare. Such attitudes are not in step with the development of social science in general nor the growth of modern anthropology in particular.

The anthropology with which the man in the street is still best familiar is the work that was done at the turn of the century. That is, the popular conception of the anthropologist is a dry scholar reveling in a series of exhaustive skull and body measurements. Sometimes he is visualized returning from field work in exotic places bearing in triumph a dusty collection of weapons, clothes, and other artifacts. More frequently of late his stock in trade is seen as consisting of records of strange gustatory, marital, and sexual customs that never suffer for lack of a fascinated reading public. It would scarcely be wise to relegate these traditional products of anthropological research into the trash heap with a disrespectful swoop. The heritage left by the early collectors and recorders (for, frankly, many early anthropologists were more collectors than humanists or scientists concerned with understanding their knowledge) has proved its value in solving many historical and technical problems con-

nected with human behavior. Thus the rise of agriculture and animal domestication in Asia and the Near East, the development of writing and systems of numeration in the Old World, provided prehistorical depth to the efforts of historians concerned with the background of European culture. Painstakingly abstracted from the storage collections of museums or ferreted out of ethnographic monographs, early anthropological data became the building bricks out of which the comparative science of human behavior grew. Ethnocentric complacency in the "rightness" of patriarchal family life and the inevitable propriety of western mores was pleasantly shocked by the odd dissimilarities in "savage" behavior. The lacunae in such early data in turn stimulated fresh, purposeful study that yielded new, valuable knowledge. By and large, however, all this work did not directly illuminate immediate and compelling problems of modern life.

The first signs of what anthropology could offer our own society came when men like Boas, who had spent time deeply immersed in small native communities, began to perceive the ease with which people, who were brought up in a certain way of life, consistently, sanely, and logically lived by values which to western thinking seemed crazy. Here was a glimmer of a great new understanding—the role of culture in shaping human behavior. Perhaps this insight had partly occurred to other travelers as far back as the Greeks. Certainly Herodotus was no slouch when it came to noting the relativity of behavior between one society and another. Like many discoveries, this one had to wait for a favorable time to make its impact. After World War I, with its jar to the placid conventions of Victorian thought, in a world of knowledge where psychology and sociology already possessed some influence, conditions were more favorable. Now the importance of what was still loosely called cultural determinism percolated through the scientific world with facility born from having something valuable to offer.

In many respects the postwar years present a period of enthusiastic maturation in the social sciences. At the same time that the importance of culture in influencing human behavior was winning recognition, psychologists were questioning the doctrine that blind instincts determined human behavior. Faith in the heredity of intelligence and mental disease was giving way to dynamic notions holding these phenomena to be largely social products. Now too psychoanalysts were emphasizing the

importance of the first six or seven years of life for determining whether an individual would end his career happily married or in a mental hospital. Anthropology fitted neatly into this ferment. Its message dovetailed with the emerging knowledge of psychology. In addition to offering ammunition for the anti-instinctivists, ethnologists provided a stimulus for helping explode the notion that intellectual and emotional characteristics were biologically correlated and hence genetically determined. They pointed to the civilizations achieved by African Negroes as evidence that this group of people could never be called hereditarily inferior. For the first time the humanist drew scientific support when he denied the viciousness of some ethnic group or the inferior intelligence that had hitherto, without warrant, often been associated with any skin color other than "white"—or whatever shade the Caucasian complexion corresponds to. Locke was also vindicated by the new science, which was ready to affirm that even if the human mind at birth was not exactly a blank slate, at least it was so constituted as to present a series of potentialities which the instrument called culture—a traditional way of life—could develop in a great variety of directions. The anthropological use of the term "culture" is not consistent with popular usage. True the social scientist includes in the concept arts like music and the dance, but he also embraces in the word a people's processes of making clothing, building houses, and planting corn. In fact culture includes all of the techniques by which man adapts himself to his natural, social, and supernatural environments. In this, the scientific, usage of the word no people lack culture, although societies differ in the complexity of their culture.

In retrospect we can now appreciate that much of the value of anthropological findings arose from the fact that, whereas sociology and psychology had spent their careers in only one society—the western world—anthropology accepted the assumptions of no single society for defining the character of human behavior. From its *avant-garde* position, anthropology could point out that too many conclusions in social science had hitherto been based on behaviors which were normal in just one culture and not at all necessarily universal. The mysterious power of culture, which never wholly escaped the danger of deification in the thinking of ethnologists, was the prime mover on which the habits of the human animal depended. There were hundreds of cultures throughout the world. Each of them was successful, to a wide degree, in molding the potentiali-

ties of its members, encouraging aggression or pacificity, promiscuity or chastity, competitiveness or co-operation with seemingly equal ease.

Imbued with the fervor of awakening social science, anthropologists felt they held a bright new key for understanding the processes of human relations. They had to see what more doors the key fit. Enthusiasm makes the reports of field workers and thinkers like Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Bronislaw Malinowski exciting reading. For the key did fit, and many astounding discoveries poured out of the doors it unlocked. In Samoa, Margaret Mead discovered that adolescent unhappiness was not a universal phenomenon necessarily attendant upon physiological maturity, but rather an affliction which very likely followed as a consequence of our puritanical mores. From New Guinea, Mead reported it not to be inevitable for men to manifest the dominant assertive behaviors which they so often show in Europe and America; nor was it necessary for women to be retiring, maternal and "feminine." Culture can make both men and women maternal, or it can produce "feminine" men and assertive women. Looking at the Pueblo Indians in the southwestern United States, Ruth Benedict compared their life style of moderation, reserve, and caution to that of the frenzy-loving Dionysian warriors of the Plains. Temperament, she pointed out, is not so much inborn as culturally determined. There are even societies precariously held together by chronic haters, where a kind, generous, loving person is a misfit.

Despite the immediate impact of these ideas on many social scientists working in the related fields of sociology and psychology, the deeper significance of these discoveries for improving our own way of life were not so spectacularly apparent. But men began to think. Among the first to comprehend the significance of anthropological discoveries for social welfare were psychiatrists. These men, many of them medical doctors imbued with social zeal, were fully aware of the urgency of doing something about the rising tide of mental disorder. Perhaps mental disease was not increasing, but more and more people were being diagnosed as suffering from neuroses and psychoses. That in New York State one out of twenty persons could expect to be hospitalized for some mental disorder and that many more would suffer from "nervous breakdown" were disturbing truths to these scientists, who powerlessly faced a reality they couldn't control. Freud had already emphasized the seeds of neurosis, if not psychosis, lying in early childhood. As the great Viennese analyst

phrased it, however, there was relatively little one could do to alleviate childhood pressures. We could only hope that somehow a person's adjustment would be strong enough to get him through a life protected from more severe emotional crises. The mental hygiene movement had also been founded to deal with the problem of preventing mental breakdown, but like the psychiatrist, the hygienist lacked much clear and systematic knowledge concerning the genesis of functional disorders.

Gradually psychiatrists came to realize the significance of anthropological knowledge for their problems. The child is a product of culture. The personality traits that make for unhappiness, in the main, are culturally induced while many of the conflicts that child and adult must solve are also cultural. Look at the Trobriand Islands. There is no father-complex here but rather an Oedipus complex involving the mother's brother, who is the principal disciplinarian of the child. Perhaps the inevitable Freudian sequence did not have to occur. Or look at Samoa, where there is no adolescent unrest and little guilt or conflict about sex. Evidently culture influences mental disorder by the way it shapes the child's personality and through the nature of the problems it poses for human solution.

Anthropologists in turn become caught up in the psychiatrist's speculations and, returning to the field, verified that in particular instances culture indeed influences the genesis of personality, endowing it with strength or weakness for tackling the conflicts of later life and even creating specific conflicts. Everywhere parents behave in different fashion to children. In some societies children are rejected and lied to; we now believe that such children tend to grow up into suspicious adults who are afraid of the world around them and express their suspicion in hostility which disrupts social living. In other societies children are offered a great deal of affection and treated as responsible beings so that they are more likely to grow up into mature and happy adults.

Considerable skill and some psychiatric ability were required to pick out the parental attitudes most significant for character formation. Anthropologists who used this approach soon became aware that they needed the assistance of psychiatrists, while psychiatrists felt the urge to collaborate with scientists whose training prepared them to perceive and view objectively bits of behavior that might be of fundamental significance for the origin of a strong or weak personality. Out of these needs grew

partnerships, like that between Abram Kardiner, New York psychoanalyst, and Ralph Linton, a Columbia University professor of anthropology. These two men have done much of the pioneer work in the new study that has come to be called "culture and personality." Later another profitable collaboration grew out of the association of Kardiner and the anthropologist, Cora Du Bois. Other anthropologists, like Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, and A. Irving Hallowell painstakingly absorbed the principles of dynamic psychology and psychoanalysis for application in non-European societies. Meanwhile psychiatrists and psychologists like E. H. Erikson, Geza Roheim, and A. H. Maslow assumed the field work duties of the anthropologists and applied psychological analysis to native peoples in America and Australia.

Certain specific relationships between early childhood conditioning and adult personality soon became clear to these intensive workers in the field of culture and personality relationships. Thus Kardiner pointed out that inadequate affectional care in infancy and childhood may be responsible for one Indonesian society's unstable marriages, lack of social cohesion, and poor constructive ability.[1] Among the Balinese, Bateson and Mead delineated a similar relationship between a teasing, nagging mother who forces children to inhibit their affectionate demands and an extremely withdrawn and almost "schizoid" adult personality.[2] Obviously no inevitable one-to-one relationship can be drawn in so complex a process as the growth of personality. Before the true importance of any early situation can be gauged with present knowledge, it is always necessary to know the total cultural atmosphere in which the child matures and the scope of the problems he must attempt to handle.

While culture and personality studies make considerable use of psychoanalytic theory, many convincing contributions have been influenced by the theories of neo-Freudian analysts, like Karen Horney. That is to say, anthropologists (like Freud in his later writing) learned to be more concerned with the vicissitudes of the "ego drives"—which compel the human being to guard his safety—than with the blind, wishful impulses

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[1]Abram Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society* (Columbia University Press, 1945).

[2]Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead, *Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis* (Special Publications of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. II, 1942).

originating in the Freudian libido that seek every opportunity of gratification. A growing tendency among anthropologists is to start with the assumption of culture as shaping character or basic personality. Briefly to summarize the theory generally applied in culture and personality studies, we must conceive of governmental, family, economic, religious, and other social institutions as shells of stated beliefs and behaviors. Beneath these behavior manifestations lies a body of unspoken principles, a set of values, which the members of a particular society unconsciously regard as indispensable for safety. These are motivating premises whose origin lies in childhood. They are largely unconsciously acquired by the infant and child from the generosity with which he is nursed, the trauma he experiences in weaning, the severity of parental authority, and the kind of training he receives in responsibility and self-reliance. In some societies the principles derived from socialization stress the friendliness of a bountiful world and the capability of the individual. Basic values of this sort, students of culture and personality believe, lead a group's members to use their institutions for the common good; people motivated by such premises tend to be friendly, co-operative and emotionally warm. In other societies, the principles may stress the danger of environment, the meanness of people, and the powerlessness of the individual in a world of hostile forces. It would seem, from what we know of human nature, that if the members of a society feel they cannot control fate and perceive the world as a jungle, they become anxious, unhappy, and predisposed to hostility. In a society of such people institutions tend to be used to pit one individual against another, to shrink the area of warm human relations, and to emphasize the role of power in human relations. The basic values of personality determine what use will be made of wealth, how people will regard the supernatural, how neighbors will get along, and, most important, how people will again rear their children. The circle, whether beneficent or vicious, is continuous and apparently must remain relatively closed until it can be penetrated by conscious direction.

The importance of culture and personality studies for shaping character and preserving happiness in our society becomes clear when it is realized that the child very largely *learns* his personality. He acquires most of it from the attitudes and behaviors of parents and other adults when he is still quite young. If, as General G. B. Chisholm, former Cana-

dian deputy minister of health, has recently suggested,[3] the social sciences get together to build a prophylactic psychiatry, then it may be possible to influence adults in their attitudes toward children. By introducing conscious direction into parents' behavior, it should be feasible, from what we now know, to empirically control, at least in some degree, the creation of appropriate basic values which will lead social institutions in the direction of a better society. The circle can be broken!

This is a startling proposal. The very idea, quite apart from its application, is revolutionary. For centuries man has been creating his customs blindly, but according to laws which anthropology has been able to discover. Now comes the possibility that we may be able to control not only the physical world of nature, but the world of human nature as well! Heralded by no journalistic trumpeting, this point of view probably holds more far-reaching possibilities for the world tomorrow than the atomic bomb.

Anthropologists and industrial sociologists have already been able to engineer social change in their association with colonial administrators and in vast factory systems. Such changes, however, although important for the welfare of African and Melanesian and industrial populations, have been relatively superficial. In all likelihood any more basic program of human relations engineering still has a long time to wait for its adoption. In a democratic society it is essential that the population must first be educated to the value of a social program before that program can be implemented by action. Apart from political values, it is difficult to see how family life can be influenced without intensive education; the best functioning dictatorship cannot manipulate the private life of parents and children. Yet in our cities prenatal clinics are already doing much to educate mothers in scientifically derived principles of child care. The contemporary practice of feeding baby whenever he cries, for example, is earnestly taught in such centers and, while this is a return to grandmother's day, has the full approval of modern psychiatry.

More than this will be demanded of a scientific approach to character formation. First of all a great deal more information is urgently needed. More anthropologists must study and restudy the hypotheses of person-

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[3]G. B. Chisholm, "The Re-establishment of Peacetime Society," *Psychiatry,* Vol. IX (1946): 3-20.

ality conditioning that are being offered. Then there remains the paradox of trying to change one aspect of culture—child care—without at the same time altering other customs. Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, and other members of the British functional school of anthropology have shown vividly how the parts of a culture—education, politics, economics, and others—hang together or, as would now be said, are activated in common by the same unconscious premises of personality. A society's attitudes to children are determined by how its adult members secure their food, picture their gods, and behave to neighbors. Coming closer to home, is it possible that we can, in an organized fashion, spare children from the lie of a Santa Claus if the manufacturers of our society insist on December advertising as usual? Can a father relax with his son after eight hours of competitive business? Granted that our competitive system is impersonal, to what degree are our human relations to be made more personal and co-operative in the pattern of power that extends from local government to international affairs? The principles by which we seek safety define that state to exist in domination. There can be little security in a world where one man or nation feels safe only when his neighbors and competitors have been reduced to relative submission.

Perhaps there is still a further question: In what direction should personality change be directed? The psychiatrist is aware of a number of specific pressures in human life which are productive of misery and unadaptive modes of behavior. Among these a prominent place is alloted to chronic fear, persistent anxiety, and the tendency to look for one's values and certainties without, rather than within. Such motives stimulate behaviors whose effects slap back at the individual, reaffirming his perilous and fettered view of life. In place of these crippling drives the social scientist dares visualize a society in which people will experience relatively strong security, self-confidence, freedom, and responsible spontaneity. Such a goal does not appear to demand utopia.

There can be no doubt that we are living in stirring times. The ferment of change envelops us—in global war, atomic energy, and United Nations. The vitalizing influence of anthropology in social science has received much less publicity than any of these developments, but the anthropologist is confident that he is at last helping to find a way to patch up the cultural lag that has so long existed between the scientific control of nature and the planned control of human relations.

NEW IDEAS FOR OLD: SOCIO-POLITICS *vs.* GEOPOLITICS

By MANMATHA N. CHATTERJEE

GEOPOLITICS—as practiced by the Germans with its emphasis on power, prestige and the state—plunged the world into blood, sweat, and tears. Millions of lives were snuffed out; many more millions have starved, will be infested by lice and killed by typhus. The Germans, by making geopolitics their guide, turned the plowed fields into graveyards; in search of conquest they tore the "heartland" into shreds. What glory geopolitics now! What failure!

In any reconstruction we must understand the German failure, cast aside the deadly scheme which brought catastrophe, and replace it with something dynamic, life-giving, a scheme for the service and the improvement of man. Let us call this new plan socio-politics.

Geopolitics emphasized control over the land of the globe by one all-powerful state; socio-politics will lay stress on the fullness of life of every human being all over the earth. In socio-politics the state exists only to serve each one of its members. Therefore its first concern will not be to grab what others have but to evolve a sound moral code on which an adequate economic structure can be erected to enable its citizens to realize the aims of life. It will lessen the rigor of the struggle for existence at home, and decrease the area of dependence on the outside world. It will emphasize production of goods for consumption, and will be thus in a position to help other sections of humanity in distress, to ensure the weaker peoples a place in the sun. Jungle law will give way to social and spiritual law.

The exponent of the science of socio-politics looks at facts, institutions, men as they are in relation to one another, for, a thing by itself is well nigh meaningless in social living. Socio-politics would point out that the only defense against war is absolute immunity. A stronger dose of typhoid or smallpox is no defense against those scourges. One has to become immune to their presence. Therefore the problem of defense,

which the geo-politicians have made necessary, is not to be solved by making better and more up-to-date armaments alone but by the discovery of an antitoxin which will make armament unnecessary. Softheartedness may be a virtue but softheadedness certainly is not. Let us face the situation squarely and acknowledge that the present economic system simply can not exist on what we have to assume under the name of "normal trade" without being propped up by an armament industry. Let us remember that Winston Churchill once wrote:

> Rearmament in its industrial aspect will soon reach its culminating point. To stop or slow down the great wheels is not only to enable alarmed rivals to catch up but to deprive of employment millions of hard-pressed men hitherto placated only by state work and already restive under grevous physical privations.

A glance at history reveals the fact that people in different lands have repeatedly been thinking in terms of "defense" of some sort against their neighbors. They have been living in fear. Their actions have corresponded to their thought. For example: The Sumerians built a great wall across Mesopotamia from the Tigris to the Euphrates in 2390 B.C., as a defense against the Akkadian horsemen of the north; the Chinese built the great wall to prevent the Tartar and Turkish horsemen from entering China; the Romans built two great walls in Scotland against the Picts. Recently the French built the Maginot Line, the Finns the Mannerheim Line, and the Germans the Siegfried Line. From 2390 B.C. until 1941 A.D. the mechanism of "defense" has followed the pattern of thought created five thousand years ago. Of course, immense "progress" has been made. Finer equipment has been invented, and immensely superior tools have been designed. Mankind has gone a long way from 2390 B.C. to 1941 A.D. but one wonders whether it has gone upward or downward.

One of the ideas of geopolitics, constantly reiterated, concerned the economic necessity which "forces" the have-not nations into war. Acting upon this idea Hitler built a tremendous war machine. Now that Hitler and his armies have been defeated, the idea behind them has presumably been discredited. But what have we put in its place? Hitler said Germany wanted "lebensraum." Nations other than Germany now want "security." But the action, whether the pretext is the one or the other, is essentially the same—more armament and expansion of power at the expense of other, weaker nations.

What the leaders do not yet understand or recognize, because their view of history is blinded by passion, is that all such national ideals end in the same result—bankruptcy for all. Let us be reminded of the simple obituary:

> Here lies the body of Jonathan Gray,
> Who died defending his right-of-way.
> He was right, dead right, as he rolled along,
> But he's just as dead as if he were wrong.

The dead on both sides are equally right. They both died with ideals in their hearts. Victory or defeat can not reach them. If life is meant primarily for living, and human beings must live with a purpose, then sociopolitics must replace geopolitics. It will be necessary to change one's attitude toward life and society so that social man may emerge.

Democracy, as an instrument for bettering humanity, has been discredited. Totalitarian states scoffed at it. The reason is not far to seek. Democracy as practiced at present connives at class domination, and demands the rule of law under which subjugation of other peoples on the plea of national safety becomes a practical necessity. Law is class law because only those who possess means can benefit by it. In the British House of Commons a member once said:

> We the Britishers, the Hindus, the Africans and other subjects of His Majesty, are all "brothers-in-law" as long as we, the Britishers alone, are the one who make the law!

However unsavory and undiplomatic this assertion may be, it hits the nail right on the head. Law is made to legalize conquest; arbitrary power and domination are necessary to enforce the law. Hitler, Mussolini, Hirohito wanted power and domination also.

What they all failed to recognize, however, is that human relationships, except those of master and slave, are seldom inculcated by compulsion. Law keeps black and white separate while nature tends to bring them together. Law crystalizes status. This is the reason why Mahatma Gandhi objected to the legalization of the so-called depressed classes in India as such. Law so often is made to keep the *status quo*, the slave in his place, and the vanquished to eternal subjugation, or at least subordination. The Nazis and Fascists knew it well. One must not forget that World War II was started as a protest against certain legal restrictions imposed by the victorious democracies on the vanquished after World

War I. Let us grant that this was a mere plea, but one could hardly deny that there was a point to it.

It is not readily seen that there is no legal machinery adequate enough nor can there be any, that can adjust the claims of the loser; because claims and demands of both the conquerors and the vanquished are necessarily arbitrary. Law validates right by conquest, and encroaches upon the natural rights of people (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; every man has a right to live, etc.). Law sanctions the struggle for power and aggrandizement in the name of "defense," and it reverses the natural order of life by sacrificing the young to perpetuate the rule of the old. It is the son who should normally bury the father and not the other way around. National states, democracies as well as others, impose conscription, forced labor, and declare war in which young men are sacrificed. To avenge such losses, the victorious powers impose by law heavy punishments on the vanquished. But the immutable principles of social dynamics will not allow the vanquished to stay put. He will break through legal restrictions, the police force notwithstanding! The more strict the laws are, the more vigilant and powerful the police are, the greater and more dangerous will the future Führers be.

It is well to bear in mind that, from time to time, many attempts have been made to find a formula for international good behavior. None has succeeded even though all such plans have been based on legal concepts of one sort or another. All such ventures failed because law-making disregarded the fact that as possession is taken for nine-tenths of the law, the loser can not be expected to respect it, though under duress he is compelled to acquiesce. Law provokes conflict within a nation and war among nations. If history teaches anything at all, it is that a legal basis alone is not sufficient for amicable human relationship. The concept of social and international relationship, therefore, needs drastic overhauling.

The fact of the matter is that "modern civilized" man has not thought clearly where he is heading. He is simply moving, not going anywhere in particular; he has speed but no control. Periodically he must live in "black-outs" in spite of excellent lighting facilities, and sleep in "dug-outs" even though he has built beautiful homes. The means are overshadowing the ends, and loom far larger in his mind. They occupy a greater share of his time and attention than the ends they, in reality, seek to serve. Therefore, the recording of a piece of business has more time

given to it than the performance of the business. There is more supervision and inspection than the work to be supervised and inspected; more writing than reading; more newspapers than news. A thousand, a hundred thousand men are being sacrificed to ensure the success of one man. Governments, systems of administration, diplomacies and policies come to believe themselves and to be believed far greater and more important than the people and their simple living and well being for which alone they exist; the public servant waxes and the public wanes.

This new "civilized man" also behaves like a spoiled child in his conception of nationalism. He does not realize that he has, by his own act, made the oceans like ponds and the mountains like plains. That is, at his onslaught the world has physically shrunk. Intellectually, however, thanks to his educational system, the world remains too large for his comprehension. Science brings all the peoples of the earth together, politics keeps them apart. The idea of national egotism reigns supreme in his daily life though he "knows" that national prosperity is dependent on international co-operation. He is oblivious of the fact that what is national is oftentimes not rational.

Those who would plan for the future must see that order and sanity are invoked if life is to continue on the human plane. The pattern of thought must be changed. The dominant "West" must recognize that violence gives rise to more violence, and that democracy is not merely a representative form of government but is also a way of life. New efforts must be directed towards finding a formula for better human relationship in this modern world of science, moral bankruptcy, of poverty in the midst of potential plenty.

Geopolitics debased mankind not so much by its atrocious behavior or even by its hunger for power and domination as by injecting an ideology which differentiates its nationals from the rest of mankind both pagan and Christian, ancient and modern. Its race ideal was not expressed by any positive achievement on its part, by having won a victory for humanity, but by disallowing others to grow to their full statures. Geopolitics worked on differences among peoples, emphasized and magnified the imaginary dire consequences of close contact with anyone but of his own kind. The Nazi idea of German superiority depended on the subjugation of the rest of the world. The more the Jews were crushed to nothingness the greater the German race was to become! It was the old

pagan idea: "If you want to look bigger than the other fellow, go and cut his legs"!

It is no transcendental quality that eludes our grasp. The same relationship holds true the world over. It is only a sign of moral immaturity when one swears by race-types and race-geniuses or oriental and occidental ideals of existence. Humanity is fundamentally one, and differences are essentially individual. An African Negro is capable of displaying the same emotions and feelings as an Englishman or a Frenchman with all the pride of his civilized life. There are Negroes and Negroes as there are Englishmen and Englishmen. The most fundamental consideration in human beings is the individual personality and not the group, the individuality of character and not the so-called collective conscience or group-mind.

In socio-politics there is no Eur-American and there is no Asia, There are only diverse stages of modernized development in the one area as in the other. Instead of a division between East and West it advocates the thesis of medievalism against modernism. Japan in Asia was therefore more or less similar or equal to Italy in Europe; the Balkan states, Latin America and some others in the Western world are more or less identical with India, although these Eur-American countries are politically free and India politically a dependency. Asiatic countries are becoming "modernized" in science, technology, and economic patterns. Social distinction at present is being kept alive artificially, and it persists through inertia. War and hatred have clouded the atmosphere. Trust and faith are on the wane. Army and police are keeping society from total collapse.

The greatest industrial nations are now fighting for their very existence. The pressure from within has driven them into gigantic struggles twice in twenty-five years. Even now the greatest fear on the part of democracies is that of Marxism. Is it possible for Russia and the democracies to agree to live together? In the Russian scheme unemployment cannot exist—in the democracies unemployment is chronic. It is generally acknowledged that capitalistic democracy cannot function without a "dole" by way of subsidies from the public treasury.

The highest ambition of the leaders in the democracies seems to be to find ways and means of feeding their people, provide adequate medical care for them, and pensions for their old age; in other words, a scheme of complete social security is the universal demand of the day. The state

which demands complete loyalty—body and soul—must also necessarily guarantee sustenance and see that all state charges are taken care of from "womb to tomb"!

This is the grandest social outlook which leaders can hold out to a regimented public. This is the great social vision of the chief industrial nations whose leaders are not mature enough to realize that "what is huge is not great." Such a social scheme has a vision befitting the Nazis, for their leaders also had an answer for the first principle of homo-dynamics: man will satisfy his primary reflexes (food and sex) by the shortest route possible. The Nazis collapsed because they had denied accommodation to the second principle of homo-dynamics—man wants to achieve something which will make him immortal—and thus drove away the best brains of the country. Revolutions and wars are inevitable because subject peoples will not stay put but will assert themselves. Such measures as a dole and pensions are hardly adequate for a freedom-loving people.

Are these "social welfare" measures being advanced to forestall the rise of communism? Or are they prompted by fear of another war more bloody, probably from within? Or is this vision held out to a tired and baffled people to get their votes in election? Power politics, another term for geopolitics, functions here also. A defeat in war or in election may be equally dangerous. Will the leaders stop short of any measure to fight for power and prestige? Hitler moved boldly too and astonished as well as encouraged statesmen in all power-loving nations. This is how Mr. Churchill could write about him in his 1939 edition of *Great Contemporaries:*

> The story of that struggle can not be read without admiration for the courage, the perseverance, the vital force which enabled him to challenge, defy, conciliate, or overcome all authorities, or resistance which barred his path. . . . I have always said that if my country were defeated in war, I hoped we should find a Hitler to lead us back to our rightful position among nations.

Socio-politics can not subscribe to such a nihilistic program, even for national glory. Socio-politics is people-minded. It is freedom-minded—not freedom for one at the cost of many, but freedom for all. Certainly our great strides in industrial development have not been made to cripple our initiative and enterprise. If man is to grow to full stature he must be set free from all compulsions as well as a dole. It is within our power

to reorganize industry by decentralization, and allow all with initiative to shape their own lives by redistribution of land so that they can breathe fresh air and engage themselves in part-time creative work of their own choosing. This is only possible when we understand the inner nature of man, and opportunities are offered to make his natural talent function creatively. Said Confucius:

> Life and death, possession and loss, success and failure, poverty and wealth, virtue and vice, good and evil report, hunger and thirst, heat and cold, these are changes of things in the natural course of events. Day and night they follow upon one another, and no man can say where they sprung from. Therefore they must not be allowed to disturb the natural harmony, nor enter the soul's domain. One should live so that one is at ease and in harmony with the world, without loss of happiness, and by day and by night, share the (peace of) spring with the created things. Thus continuously one creates the season in one's own breast.

Man as an individual, or in groups, has but one function, and that is, to transform Nature into the instruments of human welfare. It is not region or geography that determines man's destiny. It is the human will, man's energy that changes the natural forces to enrich human life. It is not the nation that ultimately forces the individual to submit to the social milieu, it is rather the individual personality that compels the mores to change, and to reform traditions and institutions.

The science of socio-politics is waiting in the wings. Will the planners of the future consider it seriously? Western nations alone will not be able to apply it. Their frame of reference has been geopolitics. And war-makers are not good peacemakers.

The socio-political goal, it is obvious, cannot be attained without years of earnest and patient effort and sacrifices worthy of the cause. Much of the work must be directed towards building up in the youth of all nations a higher type of character and capacity than is generally available at present. The path is beset with great difficulties; there will be constant temptations to turn back to geopolitics on account of its glamor; bitter disappointment will repeatedly try the faith of those who will venture into this work. But the weary toil can have but one end, if only the workers grow not faint-hearted on the way. A fervent internationalism which rejoices at every opportunity of sacrifice for mankind; a dauntless heart which refuses to be turned back from its objective by difficulty or danger; a deep faith in the purpose of a Providence which nothing

can shake—equipped with these the worker must start on his mission and reverently seek the joy which comes of spending oneself in the service of mankind.

In conclusion, socio-politics would urge universal acceptance of the following principles:

a) Relinquishing of imperialist possession of all "dependent" territories.

b) Abolition of punishment in all its forms.

c) The necessity of continuous social change and improvement.

d) Recognition of imperfection in all present-day societies, democratic as well as totalitarian. (We must clean up our own house, before going to work on someone else's.)

e) Outlawing of extra-territorial rights unless they are reciprocal.

f) No sacrifice of the welfare of the individual at the "demand of civilization."

g) Formulation of criteria for sound social behavior by each religion according to its particular creed.

Supervision of these principles and their implementation should be entrusted to the United Nations.

A BOX OF CANDY

By IRVIN STOCK

MRS. RAY FADER awoke in the morning to find, though not at once, that she had a slight headache. It was Sunday, and after breakfast she was to go to her brother's house for the second loan. As she set the table and made the eggs for herself and Sam, her nineteen-year-old son, the wrinkle was deep between her eyes. She walked about the quiet kitchen with her mind, as usual nowadays, on herself. She was already eating when her husband entered. After an extremely preoccupied evening, he had slept little that night. As long as she was awake, she had felt him tossing beside her. Now, looking at him, she noticed in spite of herself that he was terribly haggard and thin.

Except for his greeting to Sam, who had come in with a book, Mr. Fader did not say a word during breakfast. But though silent (as he had been last evening), he was not as affected by what his wife had to do this morning as she had feared. He looked haggard but his thoughts appeared somehow distracting and consoling. Now and then his eyes rested on her.

Mr. Nathan Fader was not a businessman. He was a carpenter and should have stuck to his trade. But as Mr. Herman Light, his prosperous brother-in-law, liked to say, "These *yidlach* are all the same. Give them a job and they save up to be storekeepers. They make a little money and the son must go to college. Rich, poor—only college!" Mr. Fader had not been able to send Sam to college, something he never forgot, but he had bought a store. Unfortunately, this was during the worst period of the depression. It was not long before the store was gone and with it all his savings.

This was almost a death blow to Mr. Fader's pride, but in a way, it was harder on his wife. She had once been a jolly woman, loved company, nice clothes, pretty plants on the windowsills, chocolate candy. True, these were trifles, but some things she simply couldn't do without. For instance, even now, though her husband did not know it, she always had a box of candy hidden in the closet. And then there were other little self-

indulgences she couldn't hide. Last week, in silent despairing protest at her extravagance, Mr. Fader had ceased to eat an egg for breakfast. Now he ate only a roll.

"For God's sake!" she had almost burst out. "We're on relief. We get ten dollars a week from my brother. Can't we afford an egg?" But she had not dared, partly in fear lest he give his reasons, and partly because she knew how that loan tormented him. Indeed, he never went with her to Herman's house any more, though he and her brother's recently acquired second wife, a small timid woman, got along strangely well.

She could not help glancing often at his face during breakfast. He must, she realized all at once, have lost a great deal of weight in the last few months. She tried to think of something to say.

"You wouldn't want to go with me, I suppose," she said curtly, glancing at him.

A moment passed before he replied to this.

"Why—should I go?" he said then in a low voice.

"Why? Essie would like to see you, no?"

But he looked away from her, found nothing to answer and went on eating his roll. In a minute he was plunged again in his thoughts. And she continued to look at him. She was as much annoyed as touched by his thinness. Suddenly she rose.

"Listen, I'll make you an egg!" she said. "You'll get sick this way!"

But he jumped up at the same time.

"No!" he cried, putting out one hand to stop her. "Sit down! Ray, sit down!"

From his tone it was clear he would not yield. She looked at him, and then, shrugging her shoulders, sat down.

By the time she rose from the table she had grown conscious that he had something to say to her. His eyes were always on her as she moved about the room. But while Sam was there, he said nothing. And Sam, who read his book as he ate, did not go until she too was almost ready to leave. Then Mr. Fader shifted on his seat. She glanced around at him. He was looking at her with a certain intensity. But she was through with her work before he had spoken, and so she went out of the kitchen into their bedroom.

The dresser and bed here were in disorder, but she did not feel like cleaning up. Her head still bothered her and she wanted to get out of the house. At her brother's she was to have a nice dinner, and after it, from the loan, she was going perhaps to buy herself a box of candy. The other box had been finished since Wednesday. But Sam did not go to work today and she knew how he would look at the untidy rooms. In a moment she started on the dresser. At the same time there was a step on the threshold. It was her husband. He looked at her as before. After a glance at him, she continued to work quickly, waiting.

"Ray," he began. He spoke quietly. "All night I was figuring." He hesitated, his hands slowly clenching. Then: "If we don't let ourselves —sink down—we can yet stand on our own feet." And an instant later, "On our own feet," he breathed again. The sentence sounded as though it had been long prepared.

At his first word she sensed what was on his mind. The old story, she thought. She remembered the movie, the candy, and her sympathy faded at once, something hardened within her.

"Yes?" she said, pushing a towel into a dresser drawer.

"Yes, Ray!" His voice rose somewhat. "Today's loan—maybe it can be the last. Maybe it can."

With her expression unchanging, she dropped some clothes that had to go to the laundry to the floor. Then she began to arrange the objects on the dresser.

"All night I was figuring," he said, looking at her. "We sink down —we don't care any more. But if we're strong—if we deny ourselves a little—we won't need it, Ray!"

His gaze did not leave her face an instant. She picked up an empty shoe box, and since it might come in handy, dropped it into the closet.

"Ray!" he cried suddenly. There was anguish in his voice. "Listen to me!"

"I'm listening," she said at once, a little surprised. "Why shouldn't I listen?" As though to prove it, while she dusted the mirror, the dresser, she said coolly, "No loan—what then?"

"What then?" he repeated, his voice loud. But now he hesitated and shifted where he stood. "I—I was figuring on the hardware job." Then, insistent, "I'll get it, Ray. I know I will!"

Again there was a pause. She went on working.

"And if not this job," he burst out, "I'll find something. A man with a trade—and I don't care what I do. Sooner or later—if you help me—I *will* find something!" He looked at her, clenching and unclenching his hands. "Listen, Ray. When—that's not important. It's how we are! Don't you feel that? Oh, how I feel that!"

He said this with a kind of despair, his eyes fixed on her face. There *is*—there *is* sense in this, his expression seemed to say. And indeed, as she looked around at him, Mrs. Fader's calm was suddenly replaced by a faint agitation. She turned abruptly away. We settled all this weeks ago! she said to herself, pushing closed a dresser drawer.

"If I get this job," he went on then, quickly, "it's twenty-five a week. We'll lose the relief, but I'll be glad! I'll be glad! And with this we have Sam's wages—so it's thirty-five. You think that's not enough, Ray? It is! Not for extras every day, not for having all we want—" he hesitated, his eyes, pleading, on her face—"but it's enough, Ray—if we know how to manage."

Finished with the dresser, she had walked over to the bed and begun to smooth out its loose sheet. Enough! she thought, the tears starting to her eyes. But again she thrust this from her. What did she care? She felt him waiting, his eyes on her.

"How—could we manage?" she forced herself to say. But she hurried with the work.

"How?" And taking a step in, he began to pour out the plans, the figures that had been gathering in his mind. They did not have to live here. "On Scott Street—" He faltered—it was a worse neighborhood than Horace. Indeed, hearing that name, her hands suddenly paused. He finished the sentence. "On Scott Street we could get three rooms very cheap. We wouldn't live there forever, Ray!" So much for rent, then. So much for food. He had thought it all out, and the words, intense and pleading, came fast. "We must be strong," he kept repeating. "Movies, Ray—" he stammered once, "banana cake—are they so necessary? Won't it be worth everything, *everything* if we can stand again on our own feet?"

Mrs. Fader got the blue bedspread from the closet. She would not listen to him. Her head ached, she wanted to be outside.

"Why, how much will we owe, Ray?" he was saying, as she smoothed on the bedspread and arranged it about the pillow. His own words seemed

to have increased his conviction. "After today twenty dollars. But that's not so much. It's only a little. If we're strong, if we *want* to, we can save up. We can, Ray! We'll pay it back. And more yet!" His voice grew louder. What he had thought of secretly for days was coming out. "He gave us furniture. He paid the moving man. He'll get it back. Five months —six—every penny he'll get back. Think how wonderful the day we'll go to him!" His excitement rose. "Here, we'll say! We were dirt under your feet because you gave us money. Here, we'll say! Every penny, we'll say!"

Mrs. Fader was through with her work. She picked up the clothes for the laundry and walked over to where he stood before the threshold.

"Every penny!" he cried, moving unconsciously away to let her pass. "So who is dirt now?"

Without knowing it, he followed her through the corridor. He was breathing hard. She stepped into the bathroom, put away the clothes, and began to wash her hands. She did not listen to him.

"Ray," he said through the open doorway. "It's possible, no? Isn't it possible?"

She mumbled something evasively, not looking at him. And drying her hands, she started back to the bedroom.

"I have to go now," she said. "We'll talk later."

He followed her again. As she put on her hat and coat, glancing at herself in the mirror, his eyes did not leave her.

"If we all help," he pleaded with desperate meaning. "If we're strong, Ray—"

"Yes," she said. "The meat is in the ice box. I'll be back after dinner."

She walked quickly to the door.

"Goodbye," she said.

And closing the door behind her, she stepped out into the hall.

* * *

The colored maid opened the door for Mrs. Fader. But almost at her heels came Mrs. Light.

"All right, Bertha—hello, Ray!" Mrs. Light greeted her. She smiled her shy smile and glanced with some eagerness beyond her sister-in-law. Mrs. Fader noticed that she had grown rather pale.

"Hello, Essie. No, he couldn't come," Mrs. Fader said, seeing the direction of her glance.

"He couldn't?" Her smile wavered and almost disappeared. "I—I was hoping—" she murmured. Then, "Come in, Ray. How are you?"

Mrs. Fader answered, and they walked through the hall toward the dining room. She took off her hat and coat.

"Give me your things, Ray," Mrs. Light said. But when she took them, she did not move. "How is he?" she asked. She looked at her sister-in-law as though to see the answer in her face as well. "Last time he was so—discouraged, wasn't he?" And she smiled.

Mrs. Fader, not changing her expression, looked away.

"He's all right, Essie. What pretty curtains!"

Mrs. Light still lingered, holding the hat and coat. She opened her mouth to say more, closed it.

"And Sammy?" she said then. "How is he? I wish—" the words seemed to tumble out and a faint color came into her pale cheeks—"I wish he'd come and see me sometime."

Mrs. Fader had long observed how her sister-in-law felt about her family. Strange to say, it did not please her.

"He's well, too," she answered briefly. And looking at the curtains, "Where did you get them, Essie?"

Mrs. Light dropped her eyes.

"In Krasner's," she said more quietly. Then, "Herman will be home any minute, Ray. We'll eat as soon as he comes."

She had no sooner gone away with the hat and coat when the hall door opened again and Mr. Light entered. He was wearing a straw hat and an expensive white summer suit, which bulged here and there.

"Hello, Ray," he said, his pudgy mouth spreading into a smile. "You're a lucky woman. I'm in a good mood."

Mrs. Fader smiled too, brightly.

"Are you, Herman?"

"Yep." He walked over to where she stood and looked into the dining room. "Ah! The table is ready." But then he turned from the doorway with a more severe expression. "But come, Ray." He gave her a look. "By me business is before pleasure."

They walked into his bedroom, she following. There, beginning to talk as he removed his hat and jacket, he questioned her gravely for a few minutes about their arrangements in Horace Street, their expenses, Sam's job. He mentioned the possibility of his getting them an increase in relief.

He made suggestions. Most of what he said was unnecessary, but his sister answered seriously and respectfully. At last he took his wallet from a side pocket, opened it and removed two five-dollar bills. She reached out her hand, but he had something more to say and she dropped it again.

"What I think I say right out," he pronounced. "For *him*—" he meant her husband—"I wouldn't lift a finger. But a sister is a sister."

And he handed her the money.

"I appreciate it, Herman," she said. But the whole time she had been waiting for him to finish, so she could ask him a question. As he was starting to leave, she hesitated, then said, "You know, Herman, Nate was saying we might—do without this pretty soon."

He stopped and turned around. He smiled unpleasantly.

"How? He'll make a killing in the market—that businessman?"

"No. He thinks he can get a job as a carpenter." She looked at him, conscious of a stir of this morning's uneasiness. "He says a man with a trade—"

"In the first place," her brother broke in, "a man with a trade is a dime a dozen. In the second place, they don't want grandpas."

"And don't think," he added as they went out of the room, "we wouldn't want better to put the money in the bank."

Mr. Light sat down to eat in his shirt sleeves, and for some time he was rather expansive. He smiled, nodded, winked, waited for his sister's approval. He was in a good mood, it turned out, because he had been this morning for the first time in a few days to his Sherman Avenue store. He had found there that a competitor across the street had closed up, and his own business was showing a gratifying increase. He was not, he hinted, without a hand in Feldman's closing. Mrs. Fader responded with apparent interest to all he said. But Mrs. Light, except for a question about Sam which her husband interrupted, took little part in the conversation. She ate without appetite, and most of the time her gaze fell dully on the table. After a time her husband noticed this, and at once it was as though something began to gnaw at his good humor.

"Don't you think so, Essie?" he said suddenly, raising his voice.

She started.

"What?" she said.

The red crept into his plump cheeks.

"You see, Ray?" he said, looking at his wife. Evidently such things had happened before. "She never listens to me."

Mrs. Fader asked a question to smooth things over, but she was not entirely successful.

She did not remain long after dinner. Mr. Light kept glancing at his wife, and there did not seem much left to say.

At three o'clock she rose and her sister-in-law brought her her hat and coat. They stood in the hall, exchanging farewells, Mrs. Fader putting on her things. Then Mrs. Fader opened the door.

"Tell him to come and visit me," Mrs. Light said suddenly, looking at her.

Mr. Light was standing near the dining room entrance.

"What's the matter?" he said. "To him you can talk?"

"Goodbye," Mrs. Fader said, and she left them.

She did not take the bus at once. Three blocks further down on Belmont Street was the cut-rate drug store where she had bought the last box of candy. She walked toward it. The sky was rather overcast, but the air was soft, not too warm. She walked along conscious of the money in her pocketbook. All traces of this morning's headache had long been gone. She breathed in the soft air with pleasure. But though her brother's words had brought her a certain calm, she found herself less comfortable as she neared the drug store. When she reached it, she paused before one of its show windows, irresolute. Her husband might not have gone out; indeed, she might find him in the kitchen. And she could buy the candy tomorrow, near home. After a moment she walked on.

But having decided this, she walked more slowly. Her expression was no longer relaxed. Annoyance with something seemed to grow in her face, and the wrinkle between her eyes became more pronounced. She walked thus two more blocks. As she was crossing the street then, she saw on the corner a small candy store. She stepped up on the sidewalk, and all at once, without transition, it seemed, in her thoughts, she turned toward the store and walked in. She came out with a box of candy in a brown paper bag. There's no reason why not, she thought, even if he sees it. But her heart beat a little faster.

Walking up the stoop at 114 Horace some time later, she felt a slight uneasiness. She opened the hall door and stepped in slowly and quietly. The house seemed empty. Suddenly there was a sound from the direction

of the kitchen. Without thinking, though at the same time she reddened a little, she slipped the bag inside her coat. She stood motionless.

"Nate," she called lightly.

There was no answer.

"Nate," she called again, a bit louder.

Again no answer.

She took the bag in her hand once more and walked into the kitchen. She was going straight to the closet to hide it in the usual place, when, preceded, it almost seemed, by the violent pang at her heart, her husband opened the screen door and stepped into the kitchen from the porch. She realized at once that she was holding the bag awkwardly against her left side, it would slip from her hand. But she could not move.

"You called me, Ray?" he said. But his look spoke, it seemed to her, of all he had said this morning.

She stood still, holding the bag against her side.

"I—" she said, and she felt the bag slipping.

With her lips twisted into a meaningless smile, she reached around her other hand. But she did not grab the bag correctly. The box of candy slipped smoothly out and fell to the floor.

He looked at it and at her, not understanding her manner. Then suddenly he blushed and turned away. It seemed that he meant to leave the kitchen as if he had noticed nothing. But she did not allow this. As though it had been waiting for the slightest chance, her confusion burst all at once into intense anger.

"Yes!" she cried loudly. "I bought some candy! Why shouldn't I?"

He looked at her with a kind of timidity, his cheeks red, and seemed trying to smile. She saw he wanted to go.

"Because you keep fooling yourself with your crazy plans? But who will give you a job? I can't stand to hear the way he keeps talking of jobs! You don't know yet carpenters are a dime a dozen? You don't know yet they want young men?"

"Enough," he said softly, his face averted.

She felt a sudden dismay. But her voice rose.

"It's a crazy dream, a crazy dream, you hear? The way things are, they'll stay forever! As long as he wants to give, my brother, we'll take the loans. And as long as we can, we'll be on relief. You want to fool yourself, all right! Me you don't fool!"

She paused for breath, her eyes on him.

"You're right, Ray," he said as before, his face still averted. He began to walk slowly out of the kitchen.

She watched him cross the kitchen. A moment passed. He reached the doorway. All at once she burst into loud despairing sobs. Her hands, one of which still clutched the empty bag, pressed against her head.

"Oh, my God!" she sobbed, swaying back and forth. "My God! I'm so unhappy!"

He stopped in the doorway.

"Why should you cry?" he said.

She did not hear him. The sobs poured from her.

"Strong—I'm not strong," she sobbed. "What do you want from me? I can't—I have nothing—I want to be happy!"

"Ray," he said, wearily.

"I'm not strong—I want to be happy."

"Ray," he said, his voice breaking. "Why should you cry?"

THE THIRTEEN THOUSAND

By MARKAM P. BRYANT

WHILE 13,000,000 American youth were being drafted into the fighting forces of the United States, 13,000 American conscientious objectors were being drafted into so-called Civilian Public Service Camps. In these camps, scattered from Maine to California to Puerto Rico, the war objectors were to perform "work of national importance."

The story of the thirteen million, vividly told by press, by screen, by radio, is now familiar to all. But how many know what happened to the thirteen thousand? And what was the "work of national importance"? Who controlled the CPS program? Were the COs allowed to make the best use of their skills, talents, and education? Did they receive remuneration? Were they permitted to perform overseas relief and reconstruction service? What was the attitude of the general public? Of the churches? Of GIs? And why did the national secretary of the Workers Defense League assert that COs were compelled to "work under conditions akin to slavery"?

These are questions to which few can give the answers. Yet their implications concern each of us who represents one of America's multifarious minorities—and who of us does not?

II

The Civilian Public Service Program, like our conscript-army, got under way in late 1940. Not until pacifist and other religious and liberal leaders exerted energetic efforts, did the Congress write into the draft act provisions with regard to conscientious objectors which, at the time, were praised as the most liberal ever. True, several vital proposals of the pacifists' spokesmen were not included. True, there were those who did not assent to this praise, and there were many who were decidedly disappointed that anyone had to contend with conscription at all. And, within pacifist circles, were those who, since they could not acquiesce in conscription to the least degree, refused to register for the draft, thereby violating the Selective Service Act; most of these subsequently served

sentences in federal penitentiaries.[1] But, by and large, the COs involved considered that, in the light of conditions then prevailing, the Congress had done all that could be expected.

What was the phraseology of the draft act as applied to COs? Section 5-g specified:

> Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be subjected to combatant training and service . . . who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.

The draft act went on to specify that those who conscientiously could perform neither combatant nor noncombatant military service, were to be assigned to "work of national importance . . . under civilian direction." And, by authorization of Public Law 630 (now 135), men so classified (4-E) could receive "pay and allowances . . . not in excess of those paid to persons inducted into the Army."

Following the passage of the act and after numerous negotiations with Selective Service and other government officials, the spokesmen for the pacifists (mainly members of the three historic peace churches[2]) assumed both the direct administration of the camps and the major portion of financial obligations incurred by the CPS program. At the time, they expected: 1) that drafted men would serve for only one year; 2) that the sponsoring church groups would command reasonable influence over general CPS policy; 3) that COs would be assigned genuine work of national importance; and 4) that, in preference to having the camps administered by the government, the COs would willingly work without pay for the period of one year under church administration.

Their expectations soon turned to profound disillusionment. For, rather than one year, many men were compelled to serve for four; though

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[1]For a variety of related reasons 2,500 conscientious objectors received federal prison sentences during World War II. This number does not include approximately 4,000 Jehovah Witnesses who in many cases did not oppose war but refused war service or CPS assignment on the grounds that they were entitled to ministerial exemption. All but a few hundred have now been released either on the basis of parole or for having completed their sentences which ranged from one to five years. Their story, however, would necessitate an additional six thousand words. Thus, this article is concerned only with the 13,000 who were assigned to CPS.

[2]Mennonite, Quaker, and Brethren.

the church groups essentially financed the program, it was the military men of Selective Service, not the civilians of the churches, who controlled the really vital areas of CPS policy[3]; the "work of national importance" was, for the most part, raking leaves, pulling weeds, chopping wood, digging ditches, clearing trails, building duck ponds, and other "made work" created for the depression-born CCC. And the "willingness" to work without pay lasted, at best, for just about one year.

III

But the most perpetually probed, the most often damned, and the most just of the COs' complaints were the failures of the spokesmen to *assure* that those who wished pay would receive it; that the government would provide equitable allotments for CO dependents; and insurance protection for men while on the job.

Repentance for these three sins of omission has since been made; but it came too late to avoid caustic criticism. Take the pungent words of the pacifist publication, *Pacifica Views*. It "is clear from correspondence and from the *Congressional Record* that the government had no intention of denying pay to conscientious objectors—that this condition was part of the 'purchase price' by which the privilege of private administration . . . was obtained." Similarly, the *Conscientious Objector,* then official organ of left-wing pacifists, had hard words to say: The peace churches "undertook at the beginning to speak for all conscientious objectors and their efforts ended in conditions they wanted for themselves being applied to all conscientious objectors—conditions so repugnant to many COs that 375 of them have chosen prison rather than submission."[4]

The peace churches countered by claiming that they too were disappointed with the prevailing program; that they nevertheless felt that

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[3]The broad, general policy governing CPS was, of course, established by the Congress in the draft law of 1940. But the official policy controlling the actual administrative phase of the program was established and enforced by the Camp Operations Division of Selective Service which included Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Colonel Lewis F. Kosch, Colonel Simon P. Dunkle, Lt. Colonel Franklin A. McLean, and Major Harry H. Fisk.

[4]The editorial (July, 1944) referred to the 375 CPS men who, as of that date, had "walked out" of camp in protest over the various discriminatory practices and the undemocratic precedent thereby being established. "Walk-outs" were subject to prison sentences of from one to five years.

conditions would be even worse if they withdrew from the program; that many men had entered CPS with the understanding that the camps would be administered by the churches and therefore the churches had an obligation not to leave these men at the mercy of direct government administration. The churches countered the critical charges by constantly claiming hope that so long as they remained in an administrative role they would be in a position gradually to bring about better conditions, conditions more like those they had hoped for from the beginning.

The time arrived when the pacifist-administrators became quite perturbed concerning the "big three" omissions. By 1944, the National Service Board for Religious Objectors (co-ordinating agency between the assignees and the state, composed of thirty-five religious denominations) and the American Friends Service Committee joined the American Civil Liberties Union and other liberal groups in urging that the Congress provide pay and dependency allotments for CPS men. In his fiscal report for 1944, Paul Comly French, director of the NSBRO, stated: "Payless work on a one-year basis is one thing, but four years of payless service is a different matter." The National Service Board report went on to claim:

> The question of dependency allotments . . . is one of the major problems and is, we believe, a direct responsibility of the Congress. . . . Compensation for injury on projects is obviously another responsibility of the Congress. . . .

By October, 1945, one of the original sponsors of the CPS program, the Association of Catholic Conscientious Objectors, severed relations with the system; severe self-criticism appeared in their official withdrawal statement. After condemning CPS as a system of punishing a minority under the guise of a democratically-given opportunity which instead was establishing "a precedent whereby other minorities could conceivably be similarly punished," the Catholic association declared: "Not only did the religious sponsoring agencies, including the ACCO, continue in cooperation; but in effect if not in intent, they assured the program's 'success' by cushioning and absorbing whatever protest the men . . . managed to shake loose."

Nevertheless, the churches cannot be considered completely responsible for these three onerous omissions. For it is the military men of Selective Service, after all, who have maintained complete control over the destinies of the thirteen thousand, including whether or not they should be paid. Asked whether individual COs might receive pay, the

United States Comptroller General answered, "the question of what amounts should be paid conscientious objectors is one primarily for the consideration of the Director of Selective Service. . . ." The director of this agency has openly admitted that the attitude of selective Service towards COs is "consciously punitive"; that officials of that agency "were glad to adopt the arrangement . . . involving no pay and no dependency allotments." Precisely, the *Congressional Record* quotes Colonel Lewis F. Kosch, head of the CPS section of Selective Service: "We have been against pay of any kind. Some of the hospital units wanted to pay [COs] the same as other employees. We have been against that [too]." And when in 1943 Senator Wallgren asked General Hershey, "Do you feel that they should be paid?", the General replied, "Definitely not. . . ." True, Selective Service officials occasionally made minor gestures to the Congress to secure nominal allotments for CPS dependents whose dire need could be established with that agency. But they consistently and vigorously opposed pay for the assignees. Further, there is the fact that in April of 1946 when, after endless petitions and earnest pleas, eighty CPS men went on strike against the various discriminatory practices—including the denial of pay—the only response of Selective Service was to turn them over to the Department of Justice for prosecution.[5]

The reasons, then, for the "big three" omissions are three-fold: 1) the certain eagerness of the church groups to remain in an administrative role—with or without these omissions; 2) the persistent enmity adhered to by the military men of Selective Service; and 3) the negligence of the Congress to appropriate specific funds for any of these purposes.

IV

Congress injected another, and perhaps equally frustrating policy into the CPS program—a policy preventing the three historic peace churches from spending their own funds and using CPS members of their own churches (along with other qualified CPS assignees) to alleviate the tragic conditions which then, as now, haunted the hungry, suffering peoples of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

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[5]Six CO-strikers were in the Big Flats, New York, CPS camp. Shortly following the strike, they were given 18-month sentences; they immediately appealed to the Circuit Court and are still awaiting a hearing before that court. The trial of the others has several times been postponed and at this writing is set for early in March, nearly a year after the strike started.

In the early summer of 1943, three hundred conscientious objectors had begun extensive study and preparation for this type of service; a lesser number were, in fact, on their way to China. Word of these actions reached an Alabama Congressman (Joseph Starnes, since defeated). The Congressman immediately tacked onto a pending military appropriation bill a rider prohibiting appropriations for the instruction, education, transportation, or services abroad of CPS assignees. Congress subsequently approved the bill—with the rider; it was interpreted by Selective Service and the State Department as an interdiction of any kind of overseas service for men with 4-E classifications. Such an interpretation is difficult to explain (especially on the part of the State Department) in view of the prior expression of willingness by the churches to defray these expenses. A year later an amendment (to the $49 billion War Department Appropriation Bill) which would have repealed the Starnes' rider of 1943 was introduced into the Senate and accepted by that body of Congress; but when the amendment was submitted to a joint conference committee of the Congress, it was rejected. Consequently, CPS men have had to remain within the continental United States, its territories, and possessions.

V

For an understanding of the thirteen thousand and the psychological pressures to which a system of regimentation subjected them, it is well to examine their educational and occupational experience. The following comparative figures apply to those who served in Friends-administered camps:

> 89 per cent had graduated from high school, as compared with 24.4 per cent for the total population of the United States. . . . 69 per cent had attended college, whereas only 10.1 per cent of the whole country have done so. 20 per cent had completed a year or more graduate work after college. Only 4 per cent had less than 8 years formal education, whereas 8.4 years of schooling is the median for the American population. Thus, 96 per cent of the men in Friends CPS were above the educational level of 50 per cent of the whole country.

A survey conducted during the spring and summer of 1945 showed that of the men then in Friends CPS "49 per cent had been students or professional men, 20 per cent had held clerical or administrative jobs, while less than 10 per cent were unskilled."[6]

[6]There were a fair number of farmers in the Brethren-operated camps, and many in the Mennonite camps. The latter camps were usually upward of 75 per cent

These were the men, in other words, who were put to work raking leaves, digging ditches, pulling weeds. Precisely, the survey showed that "only 37 per cent were assigned to jobs requiring any degree of skill; 58 per cent were doing unskilled work; and only 12.6 per cent of the men in Friends CPS were being permitted to apply their preinduction skills." To make these figures more meaningful, it helps to consider some characteristic cases:

Case No. 1—20 years of formal education, Ph.D. in Political Science; college teacher 3½ years; 14 months European study and travel; two books and articles on international law published; fluent in three languages—assigned to unskilled labor in a mental hospital.

Case No. 2—18 years of formal education, B.S. degree and two years of graduate study in chemical engineering; employed for four years as a chemical engineer—assigned to common labor, pulling weeds in a nursery.

Case No. 3—20 years formal education, Ph.D. in Botany, traveled extensively in U.S., Europe and Central America; Fellow of New York Academy of Sciences, American Association for Advancement of Science, member 9 foreign scientific societies, held National Research Fellowship; employed as Associate Curator of New York Botanical Gardens—assigned to work in mental hospital after being refused assignment requested by Smithsonian Institution to assist their staff.

Case No. 4—The story of Dr. Don DeVault, better than any other, illustrates the all-too-frequent frustration of individual capabilities. At the time his draft number came up, DeVault was devoting his time and talents to teaching and doing scientific research at Stanford University. Accordingly, he was given a draft deferment on occupational grounds. Before long, this classification was challenged, and changed to a 1-A-0,

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Mennonite in population, with few Methodists, who dominated the Brethren and Friends units, and they lacked almost all other affiliations. Brethren camps were about a third Brethren-populated, but had a large variety of religious backgrounds represented.

Mennonite camps had much less diversity and quantity of professional and managerial skills represented in their personnel than did the others; and Quaker units where men with almost every conceivable background were found, had far less agricultural and related skills.

Of formal education, the Quaker units had an average of about a year in college; Brethren about an average of completion of high school; and Mennonite camps about two years of high school.

which manifestly meant he would be in the Army though not obliged to bear arms. Thus, he applied for a 4-E classification which, had it been granted, would have meant assignment to CPS. But his appeal was to no avail; he was ordered to report for induction into the Armed Forces. DeVault declined the invitation, was arrested, tried—and his scientific activities cut short: the judge pronounced an eighteen-month sentence to the McNeil Island Penitentiary.

After a year on the Island, Dr. DeVault was paroled to the government-operated labor camp at Mancos, Colorado. There he was put to work digging ditches, driving trucks, peeling bark off logs, and throwing rocks—rather than bombs. DeVault performed these piddling projects for a while, and then, being a conscientious chemist as well as an objector, came to the conclusion that he could no longer waste his scientific skill while soldiers and civilians were in dire need of a new drug which he might help develop. He was thinking of penicillin, upon which the spotlight of science was then focused.

In a crowded forty-man dormitory at the Mancos camp, DeVault and another chemist set up a makeshift laboratory; during the dim hours following a day of rock throwing, the two began growing molds for penicillin. Despite the non-co-operation of the camp director, they continued the night work for several months. Finally DeVault asked that his parole conditions be changed in such a way as to make possible his spending full time in chemical research. This request only prompted an abrupt transfer to the government punishment camp at Germfask, Michigan, for "non-co-operators."

There conditions, if anything, were worse. The "work of national importance" was that of building duck ponds. But DeVault persisted in producing penicillin, thereby violating a major stipulation of official policy: reporting to regular project. To the authorities, there seemed no recourse other than turning him over to the Department of Justice for prosecution, which they did. He was given a new prison sentence of three and a half years—this time in Terre Haute. The prison bureau, learning of his special skill, soon had him transferred to the Prison Medical Center at Springfield, Missouri, where he was employed as an analytical chemist.[7]

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[7]Dr. DeVault was released from Springfield in June, 1946; since the fall of that year he has been on the staff of the Department of Chemistry at the University of Chicago.

To the *Washington Post,* DeVault's case left little doubt that Selective Service "deals with conscience as though it were a crime." Such was the end result of the official policy which decreed that the work to be done

> is mainly a continuation of the projects originated by the CCC. . . . There is no obligation to provide an assignee with work for which he has been particularly prepared, wishes to do, or regards as socially significant. Neither is there any intention of engaging in what is generally called the social welfare field except as it may enter into the regular projects.

VI

That anything of merit could come out of a program with such obvious obstacles hardly seems likely. Yet contributions of real value were made by those COs who were allowed to volunteer for various "detached service" units which, despite all, developed within the CPS program. For example, there were the Puerto Rico projects; the Smoke Jumper units; the mental-hospital assistance. And benefits beyond measure were achieved through the "human guinea pig" experiments in which malaria, typhus, jaundice, and starvation were challenged by "plague-fighting pacifists."

In tropical Puerto Rico where the malaria menace is twice as prevalent as in the United States, where there prevails the highest tuberculosis rate in the Western Hemisphere, and where, even at best, there is only one doctor to every 5,000 poverty-stricken inhabitants, seventy-five of America's conscientious objectors set up laboratories and X-ray equipment, installed plumbing and electrical systems, and, during the first three months, gave some 1,700 treatments in the crude dispensary. They did dental work, ran recreational programs, and provided educational facilities. "This is no time to glamorize young Americans who decline to fight for their country," remarked a high official of the Puerto Rican Reconstruction Administration, "but the conscientious objectors are helping in a major engagement in America's own backyard: a tough battle against disease." Nor did these projects end with the war. A number of discharged COs have chosen to remain in Puerto Rico and, with the aid of regular doctors now returned from the army, are planning to pursue these war-born projects on a permanent peacetime basis.

In Montana, Oregon, and Idaho, CO smoke jumpers provided protection for our forests. When a fire call sounded, these men, equipped with parachutes, maps, radio communication, and other practical parapher-

nalia, took off in planes, and when they spotted a fire, leaped—often into a dangerous mountain area—and fought the fire at its source. Where formerly a day or more might be required for fire fighters to pack over the rugged mountains and extinguish costly fires, today, with the aid of this new technique first applied in any large way by CPS men, the task can be accomplished in a matter of hours and untold damage to our western timberland stopped in its tracks.

During the course of the war, 3,000 COs served as attendants in mental hospitals of twenty-one states from Washington to Virginia to Utah. The CO-attendants worked from eight to twelve hours a day, fed and washed and dressed the helpless patients; they cleaned up after them, made their beds, gave medications, and shock and heat treatments. They scrubbed floors, gave injections, kept order, supervised occupational therapy, shaved patients, worked on the hospital farms, rendered recreational therapy, and tended furnaces. But of perhaps even greater value was the "reliable body of data . . . and collated reports [which] leave no shadow of doubt as to the need for major reforms in the mental-hospital systems in almost every state." These data were the substance of a shocking article by Albert Q. Maisel which appeared first in *Life* ("Bedlam, 1946," May 6, 1946) and was condensed in *The Reader's Digest* ("The Shame of Our Mental Hospitals," July, 1946). Early in 1943 CO-attendants played a principal part in the state-wide investigation leading to improvements in Virginia's mental hospitals. And later in the same year a CPS unit was withdrawn from the Cleveland State Hospital "for protesting inhuman conditions" found there.

Walter Lerch of the Cleveland *Press* took up their cry, and presently the state of Ohio became the scene of a far-reaching mental hygiene reform movement headed by Dr. D. R. Sharpe, Cleveland civic leader and then President of the Cleveland Church Federation. In a report made in July, 1944, he wrote:

> The resignation of Dr. Hans P. Lee as superintendent of the Cleveland State Hospital is one of the highlights of a mental hygiene reform movement in which COs . . . played an indispensable role. . . .
>
> Not content with their role in producing this investigation, the COs remained on the job, compiling the most extensive report ever to come out of a mental hospital. . . .
>
> Since the withdrawal of the CPS unit . . . various preliminary changes have been made: 1) "resignation" of Dr. Lee; 2) increase in the wages of

attendants; 3) the appointment of a Commissioner of Mental Diseases; 4) repairs and plant improvement; 5) diminishing the patient abuses; and 6) seeking for higher standards in all state hospitals in Ohio.

"For the rest of the country," Maisel's article concludes, "the Ohio experience demonstrates an effective technique through which reform can be achieved."

And in a *Progressive* article, William B. Hesseltine, professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, claims the CO-attendants in 50-odd mental hospitals "produced some minor revolutions in [mental] hospital methods. [By applying] anew the humane techniques which Dorothea Dix [advocated] a century ago, they discovered that the mentally ill respond to sympathetic, cheerful, tactful, and kind treatment." Still another contribution of the COs who served in mental institutions was the launching of the first generally circulated magazine *The Attendant* (now *The Psychiatric Aid*) devoted entirely to facts and opinions on improving the "care" given most of our mentally ill. The magazine circulates to 600 state hospitals and is now the official organ of the National Mental Health Foundation whose national chairman is former Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts. The NMHF is the outgrowth of the CPS Mental Hygiene Program developed by CO-attendants during the war.

Hundreds of COs participated as human guinea pigs in more than twenty-five medical experiments under the direction of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

One of these was the series of malarial studies conducted at New York's Goldwater Memorial Hospital, the Massachusetts General Hospital, and at the University of Chicago. While physicists at Chicago were busy perfecting the destructive atomic bomb, medical scientists there and in the two hospitals succeeded in finding a greatly improved drug with which to treat malaria, mankind's most widespread communicable disease. CO "guinea pigs" were first bitten by female anopheles mosquitoes whose mouths were swarming with tiny but dangerous parasites of malaria. Varying doses of the new drug were then taken to determine whether men exposed to malaria can safely be given the chemical contained therein. (The COs were happy to find that they could.)

The newly discovered drug, though far from perfect, does relieve "attacks of the disease three times faster than atabrine or quinine, doesn't make the patient sick at the stomach as the other two drugs may do, can

be taken weekly instead of daily to keep the disease in a mild state, doesn't stain the skin as does atabrine, and doesn't cause buzzing in the ears as does quinine." Doctors also say this series of experiments was a substantial stepping-stone toward the final goal: finding a completely effective drug with which to conquer this disease which now afflicts more than 80,000,000 people.

From CPS camps and prisons, conscientious objectors came to the campuses of Yale and the University of Pennsylvania, not to attend classes, but to be exposed to hepatitis—or catarrhal jaundice. "At the beginning of the war," said a spokesman of the Surgeon General's office, "we didn't know the cause of the sickness, how it spreads, or the most effective means of treatment and control. Today . . . we know something about all of these matters." To obtain this knowledge, it was necessary for these "guinea pigs" to drink infected water, blood serum, nose and throat washings, and material from body waste of hepatitis patients. It was found that jaundice is a filth disease caused by a virus; that "it can be contacted through drinking water even when it has been subjected to standard filtration"; and that it can "be transmitted by plasma from blood donors, as well as by serum for the prevention of mumps, measles, and other diseases." The experiments made clear that if the virus of hepatitis is to be destroyed, new methods of disinfecting water must be discovered.

Yet the most trying test to which COs subjected themselves was the semistarvation experiment carried out in the Physiological Laboratory of the University of Minnesota, during the summer of 1945. The peoples of Europe (and most other parts of the world) were already being afflicted with starvation. Scientific knowledge on the psychological and physical effects was lacking. At Minnesota thirty-six "guinea pigs" were put on a restricted diet of 1,700 calories a day. They "were obliged to walk twenty-six miles a week and perform normal duties in addition. They grew listless, irritable, and psychoneurotic. Their legs swelled. They lost 40 per cent in weight." "How It Feels to Be Starved," an article in *Fellowship* (July, 1946) based on a recent book[8] by two professional observers of this experiment, describes the powerful psychological effects of even semistarvation:

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[8]*Men and Hunger* by Harold S. Guetzkow and Paul H. Bowman. Copyright 1946: Brethren Publishing House, Elgin, Illinois.

> Sexual urges gradually decreased. It was the rare individual who continued dating women to the end of the starvation. Budding romances collapsed, and some men wondered how they could have been interested in *that* girl. . . .
>
> The tendency toward spontaneous activity, universally present in healthy adults, was notably lacking. . . . Men lost their sense of humor. They did not sing or whistle; music failed to bring its former warmth. . . . They were not interested in the ideas and activities of others, except as related to getting food. . . . Men saw the negative side of things more than ever before. Discouragement and lack of confidence often followed in the wake of their encounters with the real world.

How do men who hunger, even voluntarily, feel toward those who continue to eat?

> One man commented in a letter to a friend, "I'm so hungry I could eat anything, starting on the fat staff." Annoyed at seeing the staff eating their lunches, the men's irritation increased when the staff tried to conceal the fact that they were eating. "There he sat, fat, hiding his lunch, while the aroma from his orange permeated the air," complained one fellow. . . .
>
> One of the more profound changes was the increased unsociability of the men. . . . The men built up a tremendous in-group feeling, excluding their non-starving friends, the administrative and technical staff. They felt apart from well-fed persons, especially those who supposed they knew what it was like to be hungry because they had gone without food for a couple of days. . . .
>
> Although fasting supposedly quickens one spiritually, none of the men reported significant progress in their religious lives. Most of them felt that the semi-starvation had coarsened rather than refined them. They marveled at how thin their moral and social veneers seemed to be. . . .

As to rehabilitation, the comprehensive Minnesota experiment showed that a caloric content of 4,000 and at least a year's time is required for recovery from the effects of six months on as much (or little) as 1,700 calories a day. (Europe's standard diet at present ranges from 800 to 1,500 calories!) "It's nonsense," observed Dr. Ancel Keys, director of the experiment, "to think you can starve people and make them believe in the four freedoms at the same time. . . . To talk about . . . the will of the people when you aren't feeding them is perfect hogwash."

VII

What was the attitude of the general public toward the thirteen thousand? The public pulse on this contentious question was recorded twice during the war. The first recording, made in the fall of 1944, by Dr. Leo Crespi of Princeton's Department of Psychology revealed:

1. The majority of the public sampled in this poll, whatever their attitude toward CO principles, are not merely tolerant of COs but are actually friendly toward them.
2. There is every indication that any active antagonism that may have been manifested toward COs in this war stemmed not from any general body of the public, but from special groups like the American Legion.
3. Three-fourths of the public felt that COs should be paid and provided with dependency allotments by the government.
4. The highest degree of tolerance—indeed approval—of COs was found among the college trained.

A year later, substantially the same reactions were found by Dr. Hadley Cantril, head of Princeton's Office of Public Opinion Research. Dr. Cantril recorded that 70.9 per cent of the public felt COs who are drafted for work should be assigned to jobs which make use of their skills and training; 16.8 per cent felt they should be used in labor camps; and 12.3 per cent had no opinion. As to whether they should be permitted to render overseas relief and reconstruction service, 75.3 per cent of the public thought they should be; 18.5 per cent thought they should not; and only 6.2 per cent expressed no opinion.

In other words, had the general public been consulted and obeyed, COs would have been paid, received dependency allotments, been allowed to apply their skills, talents and education, and those who wished would have been permitted overseas service in relief and reconstruction.

America's churches followed the pattern of public opinion. Virtually all of the major religious denominations passed resolutions urging an end to the various discriminatory practices; recently most church groups have urged amnesty for those COs still languishing in federal prisons[9]; and the constituency of the churches has been asked to lend financial support to the costly CPS program. (To date, CPS has cost the church groups approximately $8,000,000. Most of this has been met by the historic peace churches, but the larger denominations are earnestly endeavoring to make reimbursements for their share of the responsibility.) As pointed out earlier in this article, thirty-five of America's religious denominations

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[9]On December 23, 1946, President Truman appointed a three-man board to review the cases of convicted COs (and several thousand other Selective Service violators). The board is to "recommend those persons it deems deserving of executive clemency." Contrary to the impression given by news reports, no general amnesty has yet been granted at this writing.

were represented on the NSBRO. The Federal Council of Churches served as a consultant member.

For reasons similar to those of the Association of Catholic Conscientious Objectors, all of the church groups except the Mennonites and Brethren had severed relations with CPS by March, 1946. And by this date an additional factor had come into the picture: six months had elapsed since V-J Day and the churches considered that to further administer CPS was to administer peacetime conscription, a program with which they could have no alliance. Since the Mennonites and Brethren are no less opposed to peacetime conscription, it is problematical how much longer they will remain in CPS administration.

Although no specific poll was made regarding the attitude of GIs toward COs, there are reasons to believe that, in general, it corresponds closely to that of the civilians. In fact, *Newsweek* reported that COs in the Army Medical Corps and in other noncombatant units[10] had "the ungrudging admiration of GIs." Statements by soldiers indicate that COs in CPS were at least not envied by their fellow-draftees who went to war. For example, one GI, after reading an article in *Yank* pertaining to the COs at Puerto Rico, wrote: "I've seen quite a number of Axis prisoners of war, and must say that they are getting a much better deal than the conscientious objectors, who are American citizens." In response to the same article, a sergeant expressed this thought: ". . . I think it is a sad day when we, as a nation, work a man in a dangerous and strategic station . . . without any pay at all, or even the means of financing his way home on furlough. A sorry way to uphold the right to think and speak and act the way we see fit, a liberty for which we're sweating out our blood and lives." A similar thought was contained in an editorial of *Man 'O War*, the paper then published by and for American soldiers at Camp Santa Anita, California. "We do not happen to agree with the creed of COs, but we do agree that they have a right to feel as they do. . . . It is ironic that . . . professional patriots would presume to judge the worthiness of . . . COs." Finally, there is the challenging statement of a veteran who, for a time, served as manager in a government-operated CO camp. In his letter of resignation he wrote:

[10]A pamphlet by Dr. Roy A. Burkhart issued by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America states that there were "perhaps as many as 100,000" COs who served in the Medical Corps and other noncombatant units of the army.

> This action is taken only after thoroughly familiarizing myself with the situation. I have found the Selective Service treatment of men in this . . . camp to be the re-establishment of slavery in our nation and the punishment of men whose conscience does not permit their participation in war. As a liberty-loving American citizen and ex-service man, I cannot take part in the administration of a system of unpaid, forced labor.

From the point of view of the American Friends Service Committee, the Civilian Public Service program was unsatisfactory because, in general, "it has created unnecessary frustrations and bitterness, has put men in situations which led to slovenly work habits, has given the men disrespect for the government's ability to handle work efficiently, has failed to create an appreciation for the conservation work needed by this country, and has brought unnecessary hardships to the dependents of the men." On the positive side, the AFSC considers that the CPS arrangement "awakened in many men a new sense of the citizen's responsibility for our government in a democracy"; it cultivated "a new awareness of the need for public health work and for public support of our institutions for the mentally ill." The AFSC also believes that CPS "has shown men the nature of conscription, its waste and degradation."

To the *Christian Century*, these camps "are chiefly significant because they provide an unwholesome precedent for other forms of forced labor." Milton Mayer of the University of Chicago assailed the system as "a little piece of fascism"; and the *Washington Post* characterized it as "stupid and ugly—and unbecoming to a great people engaged in a war for the freedom of human conscience." In the opinion of Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, CPS consisted of "internment camps at which forced labor without pay is exacted by the government as the price of holding a religious belief"; and in the judgment of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Workers Defense League, it constituted "involuntary servitude."

To the thirteen thousand, CPS history received its most ironic footnote on May 10, 1946, when the man who had told the Congress, "We have been against pay of any kind," was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. It was Colonel Lewis F. Kosch, stated the citation, who "helped develop the plan by which all conscientious objectors were able to render valuable service to the country in a way compatible with their conscience and religion"; it was he who, "with sympathetic understanding and a firmness of decision, skillfully and fully carried out the intents of Congress. . . ."

DIEGO RIVERA--PEOPLE'S ARTIST

By BERTRAM D. WOLFE

DIEGO RIVERA is one of those monsters of fecundity such as occur only infrequently in the history of mankind. With his acres and acres of walls, and other acres of oils, watercolors, ink, charcoal, crayon, pencil drawings, Rivera is in painting what a Lope de Vega is in literature. For some reason which no one has ever explained, the Spanish race has produced more than other peoples of these abundantly fruitful prodigies whose spontaneous creativeness enlarges our faith in the capacities of man.

Like Lope, Rivera has the defects that correspond to this overwhelming dynamism. If he were not thus fruitful and overflowing he would not be the painter we know, but another. His work might gain in rigor and self-discipline, but it would lose in opulence, in abounding vitality, in the impetus that comes from that insatiable appetite to cover walls and canvases, to set down the entire spectacle of the times he was born into, the lands he has lived in, the universe which is the setting for all that he has witnessed.

One of the tests of a painter's significance is to stir others into seeing, and to make man aware not merely of his own importance but of the importance to life of art itself. Another test of fruitfulness is the capacity to beget disciples. Like a storm center, Diego Rivera has moved through his native land and the neighboring land to the north, stirring things up and tearing things down, putting art on the front pages of the newspapers, linking it afresh with the community and the larger issues of life. He has sowed controversies and disciples wherever he has gone, and played a leading role in one of the most important aesthetic developments of our day, the revival of public fresco painting.

When, around 1924, rumors first spread north of the Rio Grande concerning a great revival of painting on this continent, of frescoes simple and strong and moving as they had not been for several centuries, and of a painter of legendary proportions and habits who had found a way of bringing art once more close to the communal life of his people, a pilgrimage of our artists began to this art Mecca of the New World. They

watched him and studied under him, learned of the work of other important painters in sufficient numbers to justify talk of a "Mexican Renaissance," discovered what a poverty-stricken government could do by way of patronizing art without curbing its freedom of expression. Then they returned to the United States full of enthusiasm, stirred to creativeness, demanding walls. Followed Rivera's triumphal tour of the United States, coinciding in time with the great depression and its consequences: coinciding therefore with a new social awareness and a need of public employment on public works. His flare for publicity; his jests and tall tales and controversies; his painting of great walls while crowds looked on; his generous readiness to explain himself and his work and to teach his technique to all who asked; above all the power of his example combined to shake our mural painting out of its decades of colorless and banal civic allegory. Good, bad, and indifferent, the public buildings of the United States broke out with a rash of exciting murals. These might be exalted, or they might be deplored or execrated—some were even destroyed—but they could no longer be ignored as had the old courthouse and town-hall decorations which nobody ever saw because their nonentity was swallowed by the walls they were supposed to "decorate."

This power of Rivera's presence and example (and no less of Orozco's and of the Mexican art movement as a whole), to fructify art in the United States, will likely prove in the end to be the most significant example of "cultural interchange" in the whole Good Neighbor Era. And it is good for the spirit of the great republic of the north, as for the spirit of all the other republics of America to become aware of the fact that poor and technically backward Mexico has had so much to teach the United States, and so much to teach the other nations of this hemisphere.

II

The facility and sureness of which we have been speaking were not acquired as a mere gift of nature. Fecundity has to be born in an artist, but that it may bear proper fruit, the inborn talent has to be nurtured and cultivated, purified and fertilized by endless study, pruned and disciplined by exercise. A virtuoso with the brush or pencil requires as much training as a virtuoso with the violin, and, like the latter, he must "keep his hand in" by unending practice.

Undoubtedly, Diego Rivera was born an artist. He learned to draw and paint, as Lope to lisp verses, when he was barely learning to walk and talk. "The earliest memory I have of my youth," he has written, "is that I was drawing." At ten he began his formal study of art in the academy housed in the old convent of San Carlos.

Like all the art schools of the closing nineteenth century it was "academic" and like all those in the new world, it tended to be colonial and imitative, lagging a decade or two behind the latest styles of Paris or Madrid. Yet Mexico was not the worst place in the world in 1896 to begin the study of art. On the staff of San Carlos were several unusual teachers: Felix Parra, because his otherwise conventional academic taste was coupled with an enthusiasm for preconquest Aztec sculpture; José M. Velazco, because he was a truly great landscapist; the aged Santiago Rebull, because he had been an earnest pupil of Ingres. These supplied a stimulus, a seriousness and a discipline which gave Rivera the capacity to survive all the eclectic confusions and rebelisms of his days in Paris, and enabled him in the end to develop the individual style and approach to his art which stamps itself upon all his riper works.

There were other subterranean forces at work in the derivative, imitative, "colonial" Mexico of Porfirio Diaz, which would help to shape the ultimate aesthetic personality of Rivera. These were the forces which had preserved the plastic sense of the Mexican people. They found expression in toys and basketry and pottery, in blankets and embroidered textiles, in *calaveras* and *corrido* (broadsheet ballad) illusrations, in the fantastic masks and costumes and dance patterns of communal *fiestas,* in the scenic arrangements and the popular types that appeared in the people's theaters, in the baroque decoration and images of the churches, in *pulqueria* murals and paintings on the façades of shops, in the very arrangement of wares in the markets. All of these things were ignored in the official aesthetics of the day as vulgar and unworthy of notice, and would remain subterranean, too, for long years in the spirit of the painter who would not become the Diego Rivera we know until he had become aware of them, brought them out to the light of day, synthesized them with the classical training, the technical skills, the experimental "isms" of Paris, into a single unitary language of expression. Whenever life would plough up sufficiently the depths of the painter's spirit, this indigenous plastic sense would come to the surface at long last to fertilize his painting. All that

was required—a little detail!—was that the Mexican Revolution should teach him and his fellow artists to rediscover the Mexican people.

One of the most important of Diego's teachers was not on the faculty of San Carlos, but in a little print shop just a few doors from the school, where José Guadalupe Posada did engravings directly on metal plates to illustrate the broadsheet ballads printed on varicolored paper that wandering singers sang in the market places and sold to their illiterate or non-newspaper-reading audiences as the living journalism and literature of the Mexican masses. An artist, José Guadalupe Posada was at once the greatest and the most fecund of the boy's teachers. Sometimes the influence is direct and obvious, as in Rivera's "Burning of the Judases." More often it is deeper and more indirect: a popular spirit, a sense of organization of masses, of movement and vitality in composition. It was a fruitful complement to the restraining, exacting influence of the draughtsmanship of the school of Ingres.

In 1902 Rivera was expelled from art school for participation in a student riot. Thereby he got the "first lesson" of a series in popular sociology, which was to be yet another significant formative influence. Rejecting an offer of reinstatement, at the age of sixteen he went out into the world to draw and paint from nature. For four years he sketched and painted the Mexican countryside, then received a scholarship from the Governor of Vera Cruz to go to Spain. There he studied under the Spanish impressionist, Chicharro, fell under the influence of Sorolla and Zuloaga, became acquainted with Spanish architecture and Spanish anarchism, learned to know and admire the work of the old masters of Spain, particularly El Greco, felt the irresistible pull of Paris, the center of modern European painting.

Thirteen years he was to spend in Europe, copying masterpieces, apprenticing himself now to one great artist, now to another, and always and endlessly studying, working, sketching, painting. The list of his masters would include El Greco and Goya, Pissarro and Manet, Hogarth and Breughel, Gauguin, Henri Rousseau, Cézanne, Renoir, Picasso, and many others. Then, in the last years before his return to Mexico, came a tour of Italy, most important in his formation as a fresco painter. During all these years he belonged to many successive schools, made many attempts to find himself, did a number of good paintings first as an impressionist, then as a cubist. There is an impressive quality of able work

among these paintings and among his drawings, but only occasionally is there one among them of which we can say at a glance: "This is a Rivera." Through the two decades of wandering and experimenting and learning and achieving, still there was lacking something in his case: an attitude toward the function of his art, an idea that would give organic unity to his spirit and synthesize all his attainments into a single conception.

III

Many forces united all at once to produce that synthesis. First of these were his meditations on the dilemma of the artist in the modern world.

At no time in history was art so isolated from public life as in the Western World at the turn of the century. Community aesthetic feeling had withered and the folk arts and popular plastic sense had been destroyed in the great centers of modern industry. Private patronage, too, had reached its nadir, for the new-rich lacked the taste of earlier ruling classes. Thus it was only by "defying the bourgeois," by working for one's own conscience and the approval of one's fellow artists, that the painters could preserve their integrity. That was the real secret of the forced gaiety, the madcap pranks, the restless succession of "isms," the increasing esotericism, the revolutionism in which aesthetics and social revolution were curiously mixed together. Working only for themselves and each other, and for the narrow circle of specialists in aesthetics who had adopted their viewpoint, the guerrilla bank of Montmartre of which Rivera was one, gave free rein to a craftsman's specialized interest in the experimental problems of his craft. This it was that produced cubism and nonobjective art and all the restless succession of "isms." But while this might beget exciting pictures, art shows and controversies, extend the technical knowledge of the painter's craft, and even create a new type of specialized taste in potential patrons or their specialist advisers, it completed the divorce of art from communal and public life. To Rivera it ultimately appeared as a blind alley.

The year 1917 was an especially significant year in Rivera's thinking: it was the year in which Mexico adopted a new revolutionary constitution, the most advanced, at least on paper, that the world had so far known. The same year saw two successive revolutions in Russia and an attempt to put an end to the World War by revolution. As the year ended, Rivera made his break with cubism. Carrying many of its technical

achievements into his new efforts, he began to apprentice himself, in common with many other painters, to Cézanne, to Rousseau, to Renoir. Then suddenly he decided to tour Italy, study there the frescoes that painters of an earlier day had painted for the communal uses of their cities, and return to his native land to paint for the Mexican people. In the frescoes of the Italian painters from the Byzantines to Michelangelo, he thought he saw the answer to the needs of a popular art capable of nourishing the masses aesthetically and emotionally, of reforming their taste, of telling them a story as simple and moving as that of the medieval church, of recreating a social monumental painting. As he passed through Italy, the visual excitement of its monumental walls was intensified by the battles then going on between socialists and fascists. He left for Mexico with 325 sketches, and some ideas on the technique and social possibilities of mural painting.

IV

One of the great services of the Mexican Revolution to painting was to make it aware of the Mexican people, of the subterranean but still living currents of indigenous popular taste. The other was its aid to the painters in breaking through the vicious circle of private patronage. The Revolution had promised so much to the people: now the government emanating from the Revolution had to deliver in proportion to its capacity, its loyalty and its understanding at least some token payment on the account of the Revolution's promises. Among other things, this entailed a communal building program and a renovation of the educational system. Through the Minister of Education, José Vasconcelos, the government of Mexico became the collective patron of all the artists who offered themselves.

Though its technical secrets had largely perished and its forms degenerated, fresco painting was still a living tradition in Mexico. Indian artists had painted frescoes on the walls of pyramid tombs and temples; in colonial times the message of the Church had been painted for the masses on the thick-walled Romanesque churches. Then a temple of another sort had humbly continued the fresco tradition, a temple dedicated to a ragged and disreputable version of an ancient dionysian god: the *pulquería*. Orozco brought the art of *pulquería* painting and Rivera his researches in Italy, and the union of these two streams, nourished by

the contributions of many others, gave birth to the revival of modern fresco painting.

Rivera's first big wall was done in encaustic, in the auditorium of the *Preparatoria* or National College. It is a work of transition, with the spell of Italy still upon it, using the allegory and design of the early Italian Byzantines. Before it was finished, Rivera had decided that he must switch to true fresco. His next work, which occupied some four years and three months of intensive though intermittent labor, eight, ten, twelve, sometimes fifteen and more hours a day at a stretch, was the decoration of 124 panel walls in the huge patio of the Secretariat of Education. In it Rivera struck his stride, found himself, begot the monumental style we associate with his name, perfected his mastery of fresco.

Al fresco painting is a species of water-color in which earth colors (oxides of iron, manganese, aluminum) are mixed with water and then painted with swift brush strokes upon a freshly-spread smooth surface of still wet plaster. The cement must have dried sufficiently so that the colors will not run, yet must not be so dry that the pigment will no longer enter into chemical reaction with the surface. The color is absorbed somewhat by capillary action, and enters into chemical reaction with the moist lime, forming a film of calcium hydroxide, which mingles with and joins the colored surface and makes it part of the wall itself. In time the action of the air causes its conversion into calcium carbonate, insoluble to water. If the coat of plaster and cement has been properly made and properly joined to the wall, it will last as long as the building itself. Rivera developed the technique of sketching directly on the rough undercoat of the wall itself, then having a stencil traced and perforated on paper in full size, through which perforations powdered lampblack is dusted to reproduce the day's portion of the sketch upon the portion of freshly-spread wet surface that is to be painted. The plaster will remain of the requisite degree of wetness for from six to twelve hours, during which period the artist must cover it with paint—twice in Rivera's case because he models the figures first in black to give the chiaroscuro solidity and roundness, then covers the modelled figures in color. Once the wall has dried sufficiently, no correction is possible except by chipping off the surface and spreading it afresh.

Fresco painters, therefore, cannot paint from nature, nor cover minute surfaces slowly, scratching off with palette knife or correcting with fresh

layers of paint. Even preliminary sketches are but fragmentary to the vast dimensions of a mural's master plan. Rivera seeks to make the composition of the frescoes accord with the architecture of the building, with the uses to which it is put, with the structure of the surrounding countryside. (This last is especially notable in his Cuernavaca mural on the outer walls of the Palace of Cortés, where it reflects and continues the lines of the hills and canyons around it.) The painter must feed his eyes ceaselessly on men and things, digest them in the juices of his thought and imagination, assimilate their meanings and potential relations, then "think with his hand" as the images flow off his swiftly moving brush's tip. Into each touch of what seems to be an endless, abundant improvising, goes the decades of patient training and experimentation, the materials of endless sketches and notes, and all his constant meditation on the world of nature, the world of man, and the world of art. Painting thus Rivera has covered the vast patio of the Ministry of Education, the ceiling and inner walls of the Agricultural School at Chapingo, the shaded outer walls of the Palace of Cortés, much of the vast stairways and courtyard (he is still working there) of the National Palace, movable panels in the Hotel Reforma (since taken down in one of the lesser of the celebrated controversies), a wall in the San Francisco Art School, one in the Stock Exchange Dining Room, and movable panels for the Junior College of San Francisco, walls in the court of the Institute of Art in Detroit, the front of an elevator well (since destroyed by the owners of the building) in Rockefeller Center (Radio City); movable panels in the New Workers School of New York, since moved to the Recreation Center of the Garment Workers Union in Pennsylvania; the walls of the Health Building and the Medical School of Mexico; and still he is covering other walls in other buildings.

The movable panel was devised by Rivera when he painted in the rickety old building, shortly destined to be torn down, of the New Workers School in New York. It is one more addition to the technique of the modern fresco revival, designed to make the painted walls more permanent even than the buildings.

V

"What writing is to those who read," Gregory the Great wrote in the sixth century to the Bishop of Marseilles, "that a picture is to those

who have only eyes . . . wherefore, for the people especially, pictures stand in the place of literature."

By giving Rivera and his comrades walls, the government of Mexico spread out magnificent frescoes before the gaze of a people to whom it could not offer sufficient books or the literacy to read them or even the wage to afford a daily paper. And in all this, there was no conscious intention of irony for a people who, though never far from hunger, yet give of their meagre substance for a bright succession of communal *fiestas,* and who serve their inadequate food in fired clay vessels lovingly shaped and decorated. To provide "pictures that stand in the place of literature," pictures that are at once the program and the critique of the Mexican Revolution; to embody and help to form and strengthen the aesthetic taste of his people; to put art back in the center of communal life where it had not been for centuries, such were the purposes of the frescoes of Rivera and his fellow artists. They will prove to be one of the permanent and significant achievements of the Mexican Revolution, the widening influence of which still continues to spread through the continent.

During all these years of the great walls and frescoes, Rivera has continued to turn out oils and water colors and drawings in various media. All of them show some influence of the monumental style that the artist developed in his frescoes. A few strokes in Chinese ink tracing the bent back of a burden bearer and the lines of tension of his burden show the same drastic simplification and something of the same monumentality in little space, and bear the same imprint which makes the beholder know instantly that "this is a Rivera." All the experiments in other media, in turn, sooner or later find their way into some new device or skill on walls, and thus the two kinds of painting reinforce each other. Taken all together, they portray the history of Rivera's land, the clashing hopes of his time, all the forms that have ever delighted his eye, all the aesthetic problems that have ever stirred his imagination. As truly as of any painter who has ever lived one may say of Rivera that an entire world lives in his painting.

Tossing off thus in prodigal abundance now works of first, now works of lesser rank, but none without the imprint of skill and talent, he can well leave to posterity, as the forest does to man, the task of selec-

tion and pruning. When time has finished the selection and judgment, his complete works—overwhelming in volume—will reveal him to have been one of the most fecund men of talent that painting has produced. And his "selected works"—not unimpressive in total aggregate either—will show him to have been at his best one of the most fruitful and sizable of artists. And when time has given perspective and obscured the zigzags of his political changes of direction, the solid and imperishable core of consistency in the "politics" of Diego Rivera will be seen to lie in this: that he learned from and painted for his people.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY

By LLOYD ROSS

First of the social-democratic parties to attain political power, the Australian Labor Party offers the longest case study in the practices of democratic socialism. Elected as government of the Commonwealth of Australia before the first great war, and having controlled at one time or another every Australian state, Labor revealed the difficulties inherent in the activities of a political party which sought support on the basis of meeting the urgent problems of the electorate, and yet obtained its drive and unity from a social purpose and philosophy. Today, five of the six states have a Labor government. Labor is in control of both houses in the Commonwealth Parliament—the strongest political position ever held at one time by the party.

There are more trade unionists, a higher proportion to total wage earners, than ever before in our history.

Writing at this moment from the height of Labor's political achievement, we could be satisfied with these political results, if on the one hand we were not aware that Australian Labor political victories have generally been followed by splits, defeats, disillusionment, and on the other hand if we did not feel, that Labor had not yet consolidated its position educationally, economically, and administratively. Until Labor takes such a control over economic development that depressions and poverty are eliminated, political victories are short-lived and the impact of Labor on Australian life ephemeral.

II

The "objective" of the Australian Labor Party, boldly stated at the head of its constitution, is:

"The Socialization of Industry, Production, Distribution and Exchange." That seems clear enough. As frank, if not as clear, is the statement of "Principles of Action". . .

Socialization of Industry by:

(a) The constitutional utilization of the Federal, State and Municipal Government Parliamentary and administrative machinery.

(b) The extension of the scope and powers of the Commonwealth Bank until complete control of banking is in the hands of the people.

(c) The organization and establishment of co-operative activities, in which the workers and other producers shall be trained in the management, responsibility and control of industry.

(d) The cultivation of Labor ideals and principles, and the development of the spirit of social service.

(e) The setting-up of Labor research and Labor information bureaus, and Labor educational institutions.

(f) Progressive enactment of reform, as defined in the Labor Platform as set out hereunder.

But Australian Labor has never directly nationalized an industry; its attempts at driving private industry out of existence by competition have been limited in extent and superficial in purpose. . . .

In the details of the platform under the heading of "Constitutional Amendments. Nationalization, Tariffs, Etc.", will be found surrounded by a mass of opinions on every aspect of political demands, more exact demands, such as,

Nationalization of:

(a) Banking and Insurance (including sick, accident, life, and unemployment).

(b) Monopolies.

(c) Shipping.

(d) Public health.

(e) Wireless transmission, including broadcasting.

(f) Sugar refining.

(g) Munitions of war.

These promises theoretically cannot be avoided; yet they have been ignored by Labor governments.

Is not this, therefore, a betrayal of Labor's policy or must not the conclusion be that whatever is the philosophy of Labor, Labor is *not* a socialist party?

If we make such an approach to the discussion, we will fail completely to understand Labor in Australia or a working-class movement—even though the conclusion seems so logical and inevitable.

The problem is not a simple one, since the "party" which lays down the fundamental "Objective" and the "Principles of Action," which sets out the demands, brings forward legislation, which ignores the "Objective," administers a government and attacks the Labor government, goes on strike and denounces strikes, sets up state industries and sells state industries, believes in freedom of speech and restricts freedom . . . is the same "party" in its many members and ramifications, motives and agencies, moods and instruments. We could, therefore, say as does the socialist outside the party, "The Labor Party is not a socialist party"; or as the socialist within says, "The party is socialist and is moving toward its goal," or the critic within, "We are not moving quickly enough," or the politician, "We are moving as quickly as the public desires. Do you want us to be defeated?"

All answers are right, since they are reactions to sectional aspects, and all are wrong if they are *final,* since the problem confronting either the activist or the philosopher of the Australian Labor Party has never been to make unreal generalizations of a group, a mood, an action or a person, but to reconcile a mass of ingredients and purposes. In this way only, can we discover Labor's Way of Life.

The next step will be, therefore, not to discuss the simple words of the objective, as stated in the platform, but to analyze the history of the ideas that have been compressed into one word—"socialization."

III

The formation of the Australian Labor Party in the '90's of the last century was a climax in the democratic and liberal development of the colony, from a penal settlement to a self-governing unit of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

English Chartists strengthened the democratic movements for self-government and abolition of penal transportation in the '50's. The founder of the Eight Hour Movement was a Chartist and English trade unionist. Represented at the Eureka goldfields revolt in 1854 were men from every phase of revolution and reformism from almost every country. International socialists had a paper in Victoria in 1872. The Irish at every stage in our history, either as convicts trying and occasionally succeeding in escaping, or as free men joining any organization with a kick or a threat, linked the unrest of the old and new worlds. The struggles against con-

victism and for local self-government in the '40's and '50's, the democratic agitation that by the '70's had won manhood suffrage, vote by ballot and payment of members, the conflicts over the distribution of land which had produced a liberal and radical force, the beginnings of trade unions, the restrictions on migration—these influenced the existing parties, and made them "progressive," whatever might have been their party titles. These influences became especially important during the late '80's and early '90's when, because not merely had the initial drive for reform subsided among the existing parties, which needed a transfusion from the masses, but also Australia was caught up in the new world-wide economic and intellectual ferment. Internally, this climax meant that the earlier desultory attempts by unions to form an independent political party were widened and consolidated in a Labor Party in the '90's by the stalemate of liberalism, the failure of existing parties to satisfy Labor's demands, the use of police and army in strikes, and defeat in strikes.

Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* reached Australia, was reprinted in a Sydney newspaper, popularized by local reformers. George stimulated the interest in land reform when he toured Australia in 1889. Although he opposed socialist theories and advocated special ideas of "single-tax," his fellow travelers were prominent in the early Labor Leagues and many came to socialism in Australia as in Britain, through the stimulus that they obtained from discussions on the land problem. Organizers of the Knights of Labor visited Australia. Bellamy's *Looking Backward* had an amazing circulation and influence—my father was a member of a "Bellamy Club" in Brisbane in the '90's—and "National Clubs" were formed; every radical answered the critics of socialism with extracts from *Looking Backward*. Also widely read were Gronlund's *Co-operative Commonwealth, Caesar's Column,* William Morris' *Dream of John Ball* and *News from Nowhere,* Olive Scheiner's *Story of an African Farm,* collections of John Stuart Mill's essays.

William Lane converted these ideas into an Australian collectivism in his *Workingman's Paradise.*

The Labor Party had gathered into its organization those trade unionists who wanted the state to provide higher standards for workers and easier methods of settling disputes than strikes, "White Australians" who feared the competition of cheap labor, tariff reformers who wanted to guarantee jobs by exchanging imported goods, republicans, single taxers,

land nationalizers, reformers of every kind. So developed what Pember Reeves, author of *State Enterprize in New Zealand and Australia,* called that "ill-defined blend of Radicalism, Socialism, and Trade Unionism, the Progressive programme in Australia and New Zealand."

The elements mentioned—and others—are still present in the Labor Party. They modify and they impose their meaning on the "party." They twist and distort the program; they make the program; they are instruments of corruption and activists of the moment; they are demagogues of the phrase and canvassers for a lifetime; also they are socialists and idealists; they use the ideal to service their own ends and their ends are often the resolutions of Labor League members . . . but they are all part of the Labor movement.

A political party that is aiming at being the government will inevitably modify its policy to win support; a mass political party will draw to its ranks many who are seeking to satisfy particular interests or at the best many who are not conscious socialists. (Membership in the Australian Labor Party costs less than a dollar a year.) Partly the main limitation is educational; partly it is the effect of the temptation to seek immediate aims. Though harsh words have always been brought against politicians, the politician has generally been the voice of the majority; most of his critics have succumbed to that influence. It is only *beginning* the problem for the critic to say, "If the Labor Party is true to its principles, it would expel them." For who is "Them"? Or to demand, "Labor will always fail to be socialist, until it gets rid of the nationalist, the single taxer, the currency reformer, the publican, the businessman, the communist, the trade union protectionist, the racial demagogue, the isolationist." There would be no one left!

This is only half the story. Labor *is* protectionist, nationalist, etc., etc. but Labor is . . . "socialistic," "internationalist."

The philosophy of Labor *is* socialistic—but what does Labor mean by that? If we cannot answer that clearly, we at least can discover what Laborites have said, from time to time, about their objective.

IV

I propose now to continue the discussion by summarizing the development of socialist ideas in the Labor movement.

Asked by the Chairman of the Royal Commission, which investigated the strikes of the '90's, whether a "belief in socialism—a desire for it—is widely spread amongst your unionists," key union organizers, prominent Labor leader W. G. Spence replied, "Very widely; more especially in New South Wales and Queensland. In fact, generally there is a widespread feeling in favor of some sort of socialism, but men differ as to what it should be. . . . There is a great deal of literature of socialism read, especially in the back country . . . and it is evolving a desire for change. There is a certain amount of vagueness as to what should be the first practical step. . . . I have no hesitation in saying that there is nothing like a revolutionary feeling in any part of Australia." J. C. Watson, then President of the Sydney Trades and Labor Council, and later first Labor Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia (April 27, 1904-August 17, 1904) in an election address said:

> It is disgraceful to the whole community to think we are so far behind England in the liberal character of our laws, after 30 years of responsible government. We in New South Wales are far behind the other colonies, notably New Zealand. It is disgraceful to the community—to Labor as a part of it—that we should have taken part in returning time after time, the men who made and continued such laws. This is now realized and hence at last a new party has sprung up. The constituent elements of this party are not so clever, perhaps, as those which form the bulk of the older parties. But they are men with a definite purpose—the amelioration of the condition of the great masses of the community—of humanity as a whole—and they mean to honestly pursue that purpose until they achieve it. The men of this new party will be honest and true in word and deed—not slippery-tongued and able to twist the people round their fingers, saying one thing and both meaning and doing another.

The first Labor Electoral League was formed at Balmain, New South Wales, April 4, 1891. Its objects were to bring together all "who are in favor of democratic and progressive legislation under one common banner." At the elections on June 17, 1891, Labor was successful in 36 seats out of the 45 which they contested—and became the balancing power in a house of 141 members. The *Bulletin,* then a Sydney progressive and radical paper, interpreting the result, illustrates our analysis. The Labor Party won support, it said, because it

> wants to wipe out the great art and swindle of politics, by taking the direct vote of the whole people on all important questions; it wants no imported

> Governors nor borrowed Generals nor hollow military pomp, no foreign titles nor foreign capitalists, and no more foreign loans, no cheap nor low-priced and diseased emigrants from the slums of Europe and Asia, no more religious feuds, no National Anthem, nor similar doggerel, no Upper House and no more party government. It wants co-operation in place of capitalism, national insurance instead of relief works and benevolent asylums, a universal eight hours system.

If early Labor had a way of political living, and a philosophy, it was *that*—but was it a real philosophy, or no more than a collection of oppositionists?

The members called themselves "socialists." They were all socialists, but what they meant by the term was as wide as the interests of the average elector.

"The paths which lead to socialism are as many as the roads to Rome," said the Melbourne *Socialist,* twenty years later. Frenchman Metin called the conglomeration, "Socialism *without* doctrines."

In June, 1891, the first political Labor platform stated its aim to support "any measure that will secure for the wage-earner a fair and equitable return for his or her labor." The only element that was socialistic was the establishment of a National Bank.

The New South Wales election appeal of 1898 included "the nationalization of all mines."

The "Fighting Platform of 1898" sought—

(1) (a) Abolition of the Upper House.
(b) Introduction of the Initiative and Referendum.
(2) Establishment of a National Bank.
(3) State Pensions for Aged and Infirm Pensioners.
(4) Local Government.

At the beginning of this century Labor was converted to the need for state action, not merely as a method of improving economic standards, but also as a social principle.

After federation, the first Federal Labor Party Interstate Platform, adopted at the 1900 Conference, was divided into three parts: General Legislation, Constitutional Reform, and The Pledge of Loyalty. Only three provisions were included under the term "General Legislation"—(1) electoral reforms, providing for one adult, one vote; (2) total exclusion of colored or other undesirable races; (3) the granting of old age

pensions. The Federal Labor platform, adopted in 1902, included the aim of "nationalization of monopolies" as an immediate task. Interviewed by *The Worker,* the party leader Andrew Fisher, later Prime Minister of Australia (November 13, 1908-June 2, 1909; April 29, 1910-June 23, 1913; September, 1914-October, 1915) said, "No party worthy of the name can deny that its objective is socialism, but no socialist with any parliamentary experience can hope to get anything for many years to come, other than practical legislation of a socialist nature." "From the beginning," however, says Labor politician and historian Black, "I saw the probability of confusion arising in the minds of the electors on the differences between the parties, and strove to make a boundary line by the advocacy of state socialism."

The Commonwealth Convention of July 8, 1905 witnessed the first debate by the federal party on the objective. The suggestion submitted by New South Wales and Tasmania was, "The securing of the full results of their industry to all producers by the collective ownership of monopolies and the extension of the industrial and economic functions of the state and the municipality." In moving this, Mr. Watson, the federal leader, expressed doubt as to the expediency of any objective, but thought that all the injury that could be done in declaring that socialism was part of their platform had already been done. "It was sufficient that they were going for the collective ownership of monopolies and understood their powers in that direction. Having done that they had done all that was possible." This objective, carried by 23 votes to 11, read as follows:

> The cultivation of an Australian sentiment based upon the cultivation of racial purity, and the development in Australia of an enlightened and self-reliant community. The securing of the full result of their industry to all producers by the collective ownership of monopolies and the extension of industrial and economic functions of the state and municipality.

There had, however, been revealed a clear division between those who wanted the ideal of socialism placed in the front of the platform, and those, who in the interests of votes, supported the limiting aim of "nationalization of monopolies." The former declared that they had as much right to step in where there was competition, as where there was monopoly, but the New South Wales proposal was the one that "appealed to the man on the streets," as one Senator said, and was "reasonable" as Mr. Watson declared. The method in the mind of Watson, as we have

noted, was the gradual assertion of the rights of collective control, as monopolies grew, or were encouraged to grow. Socialistic editorial comment on Mr. Watson's socialism was that it reminded one of Newman's hymn, "Lead kindly light, I do not ask to see the distant shore—one step enough for me"!

In 1921 both the Labor Party and the Trade Union Movement accepted socialization as the objective of the party.

There has thus been a progressive development within the party towards the recognition of the socialist idea. Theory extended more rapidly than practice. Before World War I Holman in New South Wales in a mood of temporary boldness established state industrial enterprises in competition with private concerns. T. Ryan and E. J. Theodore started many state enterprises in Queensland under the stimulus of the postwar militancy. Some were closed by Labor, some by anti-Labor. Even when they survived, they had no basic influence on economic development. Australia suffered from the depression as drastically as did the rest of the world. Schemes of monetary reform captured the Labor Party, which held office for a short time in 1929 but was overwhelmingly defeated in 1931.

Seldom has the political leader felt it necessary to judge legislative acts by socialist theory. He has met problems as they have arisen, decided issues on the spot, increased social services, raised old age pensions whenever he needs protection from critics, and improved working conditions, knowing full well that those are the measures desired by the rank and file. Sixpence on the basic wage is worth a pound of theorizing; an hour off the working day wins over a Labor Party Conference if the socializers are too critical.

In the earlier sections I showed that the Labor Party originated as a collection of progressive, reforming ideas, one of which was socialistic. I pointed out that although the socialist element won the struggle, the other elements are influential in theory and practice. I have argued in passing that this is inevitable in Australia—pure socialism is impossible; a democraic party cannot have a "pure" philosophy—a point I want now to develop further.

V

Significant has been the evolution of all prominent socialists into laborites, and the failure of the pure socialist groups either to sustain their purity, or their existence.

The Australian Socialist League, formed by W. MacNamara in 1887, included the leaders of the Labor Party . . . Holman, Hughes, Beeby, all of whom left the Socialist League, and then after reaching positions of political eminence, left the Labor Party. Breaking from the Labor Party in 1897 the league adopted a socialistic manifesto, and contested the first Senate elections in 1899 with six candidates. A split occurred in 1907 when some changed their name to the Socialist Labor Party and others formed the Social Democratic Party, later known as the International Socialist Club. In July, 1907, English agitator Tom Mann, then secretary of the Victorian Socialist Party (VSP), called a Unity Conference, representing six organizations and 2,000 members. Out of this developed the Socialist Federation of Australia and later the Australian Socialist Party (ASP). The Socialist Labor Party would not join. The ASP carried on propaganda for twelve years, was affiiated with the Second Socialist International, quarrelled bitterly on tactics and theory, lost its activists to the Labor Party, even though it was criticizing Labor continuously. For instance in 1910 it reported to the International Socialist Congress in words that someone has used regularly against the Labor Party,

> The Labor Party does not clearly and unambiguously avow Socialism, nor does it teach it; it is unlike any other working-class creation in the world in that it builds no Socialist movement, issues no Socialist books, debates no Socialist problems. It is not international; it is not antimilitarist; it is not Marxian. In politics and practice it is liberalism under a new name; in utterance and ideal it is bourgeois.

After the Russian Revolution the ASP in New South Wales—but not the VSP in Victoria—took an active part in forming the Communist Party, although many of its members resisted until 1922. Unity was then achieved, but a few independent Australian Socialists lingered on in sectarian and purist isolation from both the Communist Party and the Labor Party.

With few exceptions all leaders of socialist groups have ended as leaders of the Labor Party. A superficial interpretation is that they have grown old and tired with agitation. A more basic and significant judgment is that they have realized the futility of isolation from the main stream of Australian working-class opinion and have been tempted by the view—correct, I think—that the Labor Party is the only possible instrument of socialistic change in Australia.

This is possibly the best place to discuss the position of the Australian Communist Party.

The Communist Party claims to be a fundamental uncompromising socialist party—as have so many others. . . . The only advantage that the Communist Party has over these—and it is a tremendous one—is that it generates support and inspiration from the socialist legend of the USSR. The Communist Party is larger than any of the socialist groups. Whether it is more influential than the IWW (of American origin) was in New South Wales or the Socialist Party in Victoria before the last war, is doubtful, but there can be little doubt that today it has more active members, more funds, more full-time functionaries, a greater flow of literature than the Australian Labor Party. Yet with the single exception of one member in the Queensland State Parliament, it has no member of Parliament and shows no signs of ever in Australia winning seats by the direct method of putting up candidates. It has done better than the socialist groups, but the increase in votes has been in direct proportion to its opportunistic appeals for votes, not to Marxian theory and philosophy. Perverting the Leninist doctrines contained in "What is to be Done," the Communist Party has sought support by all the demogogic methods and limited sectional appeals for which it denounces Labor. The hold that it has on young militant people is obtained by its mood and its tradition, not by its consistent loyalty to socialism. Foremost in spectacular, courageous, and often irresponsible moves such as boycotting supplies for Indonesia, raiding empty houses and demonstrating in the streets, the Communist Party nevertheless has made nationalization a shuttlecock of its foreign policy and has dealt with all issues according to the battledoe of the Soviet foreign office. Its party has become a machine more disciplined and bureaucratic than the Labor Party at its worst. But the reasons why it cannot displace the Labor Party as a mass political party are partly that it has no popular new appeal—desperately as it tries to get one—partly that it has no special historical mission, such as had Labor when it was formed, and partly that the more it becomes a mass party, the more it reveals the modifying characteristics of Labor which have been revealed in this article.

This last explanation is important for it will lead to the conclusion that while the Communist Party by winning control over trade unions could be in a position to threaten the control of the Labor Party machine,

that attempt—the success of which at the moment becomes increasingly doubtful—would not resolve the problems stated in this article, and therefore would not necessarily advance the course of socialization or the discovery of a clear and simple philosophy. A Labor Party, dominated by the Communists through the trade unions, would either modify its policy in order to remain popular, or would cause such a break as occurred in 1940 in New South Wales. The story of the New South Wales Labor Party in the two years before that date, when it was dominated by the Communist Party, was one of fluctuation between wild militant moves and unctuous pandering to the extreme right in Labor. The Federal Labor Party Executive finally intervened and dissolved the New South Wales Executive, a minority of which, dependent solely on Communist Party support, formed a "State" Labor Party, was annihilated by the "Official" Labor Party in the early elections, carried on for a while, and was finally liquidated by amalgamation with the Communist Party. Had the official Federal Executive not intervened, there were many signs that the temptation or necessity to get votes was already exercising an influence on political behavior, so that we can anticipate that the price of political victory, whether by Australian Labor Party, Communist Party, or Socialist Party, will be to raise the same issues which we have already associated with Labor. Not that the interim conflict would be without disastrous consequences for Australian democracy and for Labor, but that the problems of socialization cannot be overcome by setting out on the journey again with a pure socialist intention. We cannot select our theories, as we finger books in a library, "Fascism," "Socialism," or "Communism"; Labor socialist politics defy the Dewey system of classification.

Every time a critic of the Labor Party shows signs of imagining that purity of platform provides a test criticism for the Labor Party, he should be brought back to the history of Labor Australia. Vote winning is not the only test for a Labor Party, but vote winning is the method that Labor often has selected for socialization. This does not mean that Labor could not have dared more with the electors; nor that the politician always is the best judge of public opinion; nor that we can condone the tragic failure of Labor to educate its members and the electorate, so that socialist acceleration would be possible; nor that we must tolerate the ignorant politician who knows that to keep his position he must keep the electorate in ignorance; nor that Labor has made no mistakes in assessing the im-

portance of votes—nor especially from the opposite angle, that Labor's social and educational reforms have been of minor importance; but that a Labor policy and a discussion of an alternative to Labor, must recognize that Australia is a democracy and Australian Labor has decided it must work within the limits of this democracy. Every political party which accepts the democratic method must recognize the limits. Labor must be tested against the *limitations of democracy* as well as the purity of socialism. There is no progress to be obtained in absorbing our thinking in a socialist doctrine that will never be accepted by the public, would not be applied without constitutional amendments being made to the Australian constitution, bears no reality to the politics of the nation, and depends on the accidents of a revolution. That the reverse may also be true—that a Labor Party which does not aim at socialism is futile—must not lead us to assume that purity is a substitute for puerility. The individual socialist may keep his conscience clear by keeping his gunpowder dry, but the movement is concerned with results, with progress, with success —and so is the electorate.

Whatever our solutions they must be confined to these basic problems; whatever the criticism, like a dog on a chain, they will be dragged back to these judgments if they try to escape into the romantic.

To summarize, Labor is a popular party; all socialist parties—and there have been many in Australia—which tried to retain their theoretical purity have to be satisfied to be a tiny and ineffectual minority. Labor is a mass party; all parties which aim to win the support of the majority must in normal times suffer from the limitations that have pursued Labor since its formation. Labor is a democratic party, and again, any party in the Australian political environment which opened its membership to anyone who paid a small fee, which leaves its policies to be discussed at poorly attended monthly meetings, which leaves the selection of its candidates to the members of local labor leagues, and which functions in a society where men will seek their economic or personal interests through political parties—such a party is certain to be influenced by elements and purposes that divert it from its long-range basic purposes.

But have I proved too much? If I am accused of producing an apology for the Labor Party, I am sure that the superficial Laborite will argue also that I have apologized the Labor Party out of theoretical exist-

ence. What is left except the ivory tower of the nineteenth century or the oases of the twentieth century? Is not this the kind of analysis which sent Victor Gollancz to a Communist Coventry, Strachey to Parliament, Koestler to oases, T. S. Eliot to poetry and an editor of the New York *Daily Worker* back to the Catholic Church? No—because the Labor Party continues, survives, grows, triumphs. We cannot theorize away a mass party.

But does not the analysis mean, however, that the Labor Party has no philosophy? Does it mean that socialization is impossible? Does it mean that Australian Labor can never be the instrument for democratic socialization? Does it lead to a fatalism that the Labor Party cannot be saved from opportunism, betrayal, corruption?

Those are not the inevitable conclusions.

VI

The strength of the Labor Party was its weakness; the weaknesses were its strength. The power of socialism is that it is so necessary as an economic policy that it survives even the opportunism of the Labor Party. "We are all socialists now," said a Victorian Liberal. "To the socialists of all parties," said Hayek in the dedication of his *Road to Serfdom*. The hopes of socialism are justified by the actions of their opponents. Labor's philosophy is the afterthought of political legislation, often passed by antisocialists.

What remains then is a constant struggle for socialists inside the Australian Labor Party to resist the growth of the Communist Party, to keep the unity of the Labor Party and to fill the organization with socialist ideas. That requires frankness, realism, and honesty. The picture is not a simple or a cheerful one, but the job of a social scientist is one of facing facts, not building dreams. The important thought to remember in conclusion is that the difficulties seem so great because they follow victories that fifty years ago might have seemed impossible.

The interest in this subject for democratic socialists elsewhere centers upon whether the Australian development of gradualism and "opportunism" is inevitable in a democracy or whether it arose from the special circumstances of Australian social development. That subject I am not discussing here but providing an Australian basis for testing elsewhere.

VII

The driving forces in the Australian Labor Party are only partly socialistic. They are humanitarian, equalitarian, liberal. They have been expressed better by the poet than the politician, although they characterize every progressive step in the development of Australian Labor. They are the ideals of a few, even though burlesqued in the peroration of a politician.

The basic difference between Australia and America is that whereas predominant American philosophy found liberty through individual striving, Australian practice and theory sought freedom in collective action. Whereas, therefore, the former stressed freedom of opportunity, the latter emphasized equality. The former organized "Fraternities," the latter turned socialism into fraternity or "mateship."

"No man is good enough to be another's master," said William Morris; and the Victorian Socialist Party sang regularly Morris' "No Master". . .

> Saith man to man we've heard and known
> That we no master need
> To live upon this earth our own
> In fair and manly deed.
> The grief of slaves long passed away
> For us hath forged the chain
> Till now each worker's patient day
> Builds up the house of pain.

"Fellowship is life; lack of fellowship is death," said William Morris, and Jack Curtin, a young socialist disciple of Tom Mann in 1909 and Prime Minister of Australia, 1941 to 1945, lectured often to the Victorian socialists on the doctrines of Morris. Morris hated the prosaic, said the future Prime Minister; ever and always he aimed to develop in life, in every domain of life, a joy. Even in toil, he held that there was no joy in toil for toil's sake. "Nothing is simply producing something, but much is infusing into that work that which will convey a source of pleasure and delight to the worker." And again as Labor journalist in 1921, he mourned deceased laborites. "Never mind! The task of those who live goes on and we must stick to it. But because our ranks are thin, our casualties many, and our sorrows deep, there should be comradeship and the love that is invincible among all—men and women, militants and

moderates—who still go marching on." And later in World War II, Curtin as Prime Minister, spoke to the Australian people in the verses of Bernard O'Dowd, the outstanding Australian poet of equality. "Communism is just being mates," said William Lane, labor leader of the '90's, who fled from the failures of Australian socialism to found a Utopia in Paraguay.

Liberty, equality, fraternity are the ideals of democratic socialism; democratic socialism is the practical exclusive method by which these ideals can be won and retained. Liberty, equality, fraternity are ever present in Labor even when they are abused. They are the most important and permanent and pervasive influences. Linked with equality in Australia is fraternity; "mateship" united both sentiments in the great days of the Australian Workers' Union, the wild days of the '90's, the dreams when the world was wide. . . . Mateship suffered when election ballots were faked, and intrigues for position split the party, but Australian equalitarianism still attracts the notice of the overseas observer.

The vague ideals which seemed often so flabby and unsatisfactory to us when looking for an answer to the problems of socialism are the forces that keep the Labor Party alive—they are too vague to be dubbed a philosophy, but they are real enough to overcome defeats.

The recurring contradiction in the situation is that the qualities which produce victory out of defeat just as surely produce defeat out of victory. Sentiment wins but cannot socialize. Until Labor socializes, none of its problems will be permanently settled, but all its failures are only temporary.

UNION LEADERSHIP

By JACK BARBASH

UNION LEADERSHIP in the United States is characterized by certain basic imperatives—a kind of hard core of qualities which is common to all union leadership. The first imperative is the emphasis on maximizing the favorable position of the union members in the short run; or more tersely, "more here and now."

More here and now means the maintenance of the maximum possible number of job opportunities for the union membership in the discernible present. It means more pay for less work. It means, too, that since the effectuation of these objectives depends upon the existence of a profitable enterprise, union leadership has a real interest in maintaining an optimum profitability for the business which provides jobs for the members of the union. Optimum in this context signifies the lowest profit consistent with providing the most jobs at the highest pay and the best working conditions during a given period.

General adherence to a political and economic philosophy which may appear to run counter to the dictates of more here and now have nothing to do with the validity of this generalization. Thus, both John Lewis, an avowed Republican, and David Dubinsky, a leader of socialist extraction, have found it necessary to lend funds to faltering enterprises in their industries. Both the Cigarmakers, the citadel of union conservatism, and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, with more liberal aspirations, were much concerned with promoting what appeared to them more profitable price arrangements for their respective industries. The Communist-sympathetic National Maritime Union manifests the same concern over protecting its own members in the face of an influx of "green men" who can't find jobs elsewhere—the "trip card men"—as any so-called conservative union shows in taking care of its full-fledged members as against "permit" holders.

Another set of imperatives of union leadership is related to the nature of the union as a democratic institution. Democratic institutions require

politicians to make democracy manageable on a day-to-day basis, since nose-counting is out of the question in all but the smallest aggregates. The union leader must therefore be a politician, which in the labor movement as in any other democratic enterprise means that he must be accessible, personable, and remember and help his friends and supporters.

The way the international president carries on his work reflects one facet of the political character of the modern union. The union president is invariably accessible to the lowliest of local union officials and even to rank and file members in a way that would be fantastic for an important executive of a corporation. If the international office of the union is located in an area of great concentration of union membership—like Akron for rubber, Detroit for automobiles, and New York for the garment trades—the president's office is the forum for the airing of every grievance from issues of major union policy to political squabbles among local union officers. As a result an international union president is constantly in the midst of matters of immediate urgency and has little opportunity for the orderly administration of union business.

A further imperative of union leadership which stems from the political character of unionism is the fact that leadership almost always works its way up from the ranks. The personal following which is the indispensable ingredient of leadership is not at the beck and call of any Johnny-Come-Lately, and is only available to the men who have worked their way up within the union. C. Wright Mills, who has made an interesting analysis of the vital statistics of union leaders, concludes "the majority of these leaders have worked as laborers in the industries with which they later dealt as union officials; the majority took their first union jobs with a local."

A few thumbnail sketches of representative figures in American union leadership re-enforce this point:

> William Green—coal miner, 1889-1900; United Mine Workers sub-district president, 1900-1906; district president, 1906-1910; member Ohio Senate, 1910-1912; secretary-treasurer United Mine Workers, 1912-1924; member executive council, 1913-1924; AFL president, 1924-currently.
>
> Alexander F. Whitney—railroad news agent, 1888-1890; brakeman, 1890-1901; chairman general grievance committee Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 1901-1907; vice-president, 1907-1928; president, 1928-currently.
>
> James Carey—inspector radio manufacturing plant, 1929-1934; assisted in

organizing AFL federal labor union, 1933; AFL general organizer, 1934; president United Electrical and Radio Workers (CIO), 1936-1941; secretary-treasurer CIO, 1942-currently.

Reid Robinson—member AFL Newsboys Union, 1919; mine worker, 1926-1933; secretary Butte Miners Union, 1933; president local union, 1934-1935; international president Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, 1936-currently.

A few union leaders have not come up from the ranks: Donald Henderson of the Food and Tobacco Workers who came into the labor movement via the Columbia University faculty and radical politics; A. Philip Randolph of the Sleeping Car Porters whose interest in the union stemmed from activity in the socialist and race relations movements, and Ralph Helstein who rose to the office of president of the Packinghouse Workers from his position as general counsel to the organization.

The rapid growth of many CIO unions evoked two unusual trends with respect to what Mills calls the career pattern of leadership; first, the comparative youthfulness of the CIO top leadership, the average of which was 42 years in 1945 as compared to 55 years for the AFL; second, leadership transferability, most notably in the case of the Steelworkers where Murray, David MacDonald, Van Bittner, and Clinton Golden had already established their union background in organizations other than steel and, with the exception of the last named, all in the Miners. This is, of course, a reflection of the fact that John Lewis had put UMW officers in charge of the steel industry organizing campaign.

Finally, among the political imperatives of union leadership is the need first to build a following, and second to maintain it once leadership status has been achieved. The intensity of the pressure to build what in less elegant language may be called a machine, varies directly with the level of leadership. Frequently local union leadership may not be highly prized and little effort may be required in getting office and holding it. The Papermakers' investigation notes,

> . . . our locals sometimes have trouble finding a member who will accept an office. There are many reasons why men decline nominations. They may be "too busy," "live too far away," "working wrong shift," or any one of a dozen other alibis. They may suspect an office in the union will hurt their chances for promotion or maybe they would rather be able to criticize the other fellow than have to take some of it themselves. A few sincerely believe they are not qualified.

Where the president, secretary-treasurer, or business agent in larger locals are full-time officials and are, therefore paid, the position is somewhat more competitive. Although the salary is not much more than a better-paid worker receives in the shop, there is more security in the better established locals and the character of the work has a somewhat higher social status.

The systematic character of the efforts involved in building a following depends, of course, on the extent to which there exist rival groups within the union. In any event, union leadership takes these groups into account.

Union groups or factions may divide themselves geographically, by national origin, by religious groups, by industry segments, and by ideology. They are either in the form of informal groupings or well-organized and disciplined factions. They may be part of an administration coalition or in active opposition to the administration.

Luigi Antonini's position as first vice-president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union is in part a recognition of his standing with respect to the large Italian membership in the union. Unions with Canadian membership will invariably give this condition appropriate recognition by providing for some representation on the executive board. When the Pulp and Sulphite Workers set up a research and educational department generally, a special section was also set up for Canada. Philip Murray, whenever he appoints over-all CIO committees, will see that representation is provided for the anti-Communists, the middle-of-the-roaders on the issue, and the pro-Communist groups. It is a common practice for unions functioning in interracial industrial situations in the South, to give representation to Negro members among the various union offices. Probably the only way in which the Hosiery Workers can be kept within the Textile Workers-CIO is to give them virtual autonomy as a group. The fact that Albert Fitzgerald is president of the Electrical Workers-CIO represents in part a concession by the dominant Communist-minded leadership to the strong Catholic group within the union. Union leadership will also maintain its position by playing a balance of power strategy as did R. J. Thomas who, with no following in his own right, managed to hold the presidency of the UAW-CIO for eight years by neutralizing the opposing forces of Walter Reuther and George Addes.

On the other extreme is the leadership which is in such undisputed control of a situation that the problem of cultivating various groups is reduced to the bare minimum of rewarding friends and punishing enemies. In this category would fall George Berry of the Pressmen, Hutcheson of the Carpenters, Lewis of the Miners, and Philip Murray of the Steelworkers.

Thus far we have been discussing the *imperatives* of union leadership, "more here and now," rising from the ranks, and building and maintaining a following. But these imperatives are rarely discernible in union leaders in the simple and unadorned fashion in which they have been described here. Rather, union leadership expresses itself through many kinds of temperaments and personalities; the imperatives constitute the hard core common to all leadership however a particular union leader reveals himself as a total personality.

The "Good Trade Unionist"

Perhaps the most common expression of union leadership is epitomized by what in labor circles is called a "good trade unionist." The good trade unionist makes no pretensions to a co-ordinated philosophy, but does his union job well because he believes it is worth doing for its own sake. The good trade unionist is honest, devoted to his job, and thinks in terms of a labor movement rather than in terms of his own union alone. The question, "What is a good trade unionist?" was put to a group of organized telephone workers. This is how they formulated the answer:

a. Recognizes a picket line.
b. Does not discriminate between color, race, creed, sex, or minority groups.
c. Patronizes union labor.
    1. Advertising to other workers the benefits of belonging to a labor organization.
    2. Unifying effect in labor movement.
    3. Shows spirit of mutual aid.
d. Shows management he profits from unionism.
e. Does not report another worker to employer.
f. Abides by majority decision.
g. Does not carry internal union disputes to public.
h. Keeps union affairs from management.
i. Is sure information about union is complete and correct before released to members.

j. Settles disputes and grievances between members within the union.
k. Organizes the unorganized. Every unorganized worker retards the progress of organized workers.
l. Participates in civic affairs.
m. Brings the principles of unionism to the public.

In some degree every union officer has something of the "good trade unionist" in him.

Rugged Unionism

Further along the gamut of temperamental shades and overtones in which union leadership expresses itself is what might be characterized as rugged unionism. By and large, the union leadership which takes on this attitude matured in an economic and cultural environment which demanded toughness if its unions were to survive. It is indifferent to the effects of its actions on what passes for public opinion because public opinion is regarded as manufactured by forces unsympathetic to unions anyway. The major source of strength of the union, according to this outlook, is its ability "to pull its men off the job." The rugged unionist is unimpressed with the relevance of broad issues of national and international policy to the life of the union.

James C. Petrillo, president of the American Federation of Musicians, and before that head of an important Chicago local, typifies this kind of leadership to a marked degree. Petrillo has one consuming interest as a union leader and that is that no place of amusement which can possibly use a musician should be permitted to get along without one. In recent years he has spearheaded campaigns to get the radio and recording industries to contribute toward the cost of the technological unemployment they create through royalty payments, banning musical programs originating in foreign countries, and the presentation of radio musical programs simultaneously over FM and standard stations.

Discussing the foreign radio ban before a musicians' local meeting Petrillo said,

> There's the tariff. The manufacturers lobby to keep cheap material out of the country. There's the immigration law. The Government, everybody, protects themselves against labor. Why the hell should we be exempt? . . .
>
> For a long time the conductors came from London, all the stars from Europe. They'd stay here several months, make a lot of dough, and then go home. I said, huh, you boys get into the union. There was a hell of a holler from the long-haired boys about that. Well, what about it?

> Then all the Heifetzes, the artists who play in front of the orchestra, didn't belong to the union. They said they didn't need a musician's card. We said, all right, if you don't need a card, go play by yourselves. They're all in now.

"It's this way," Petrillo said, another time, of recordings, "the average band receives in the neighborhood of $1500 for a recording. By the time the record has been discarded it has wiped out around $1,500,000 worth of business for living musicians. Can anyone explain why musicians should help destroy themselves? Hey?"

Petrillo is ruthless and hard with his members as well as with employers. Heavy fines and even expulsions penalize members for violating union rules, and he has little patience with democratic procedure. He stays in office because he has been successful in getting higher wages for musicians than anybody else has been able to get.

Dave Beck of the Pacific Northwest Teamsters demonstrates the same single purposefulness in pursuit of his union goals. In the nature of the fact that the Teamsters occupy a strategic position in modern industry, he operates in a much wider arena than does Petrillo. Beck shares with Petrillo the indifference to what the community at large may think of his practices, although the business community regards Beck as a stabilizing influence because he is considered a bulwark against an incipient Communism on the West Coast led by Harry Bridges, and because he uses union action as a device for eliminating what he thinks is unfair competition. An aspect of Beck's philosophy of union objectivity, summed up in the following, is clear and pointed:

> There are too many filling stations in Seattle. More are threatened. We are going to close some of them. First I advise promoters against starting new stations. If that doesn't work, the Teamsters' Union will simply refuse to service them.

Beck, in action, approaches problems in the same vigorous and decisive fashion. Jurisdictional claims of rival unions, the CIO, and businessmen who won't go along with what somebody called "Beck's voluntary NRA" are treated with forceful dispatch.

The kind of union leadership which Beck and Petrillo illustrate regards unions as business enterprises without humanitarian trimmings. Both these men are illustrious practitioners and perhaps somewhat more sensational in their tactics, but much of American union leadership in the building trades and the metal trades, say, embody in essence this

approach to unionism. Their reasoning, when they think about it in a conscious way, is that their methods are perfectly in accord with the ingenious and determined pursuit of gain which is the hallmark of American business.

Although John L. Lewis of the Miners has fundamentally much in common with Beck and Petrillo, he is in a class by himself because his aspirations are much more ambitious. The milestones in Lewis' post-1932 career—his leadership of the CIO, the break with Roosevelt, his subsequent isolationism, the defection from the CIO, the determined prosecution of the coal strikes during the defense and war period, the inclusiveness of his District 50 organizational drives, and his return to the AFL—seem to have been pointed in the direction of making John Lewis the center of things. Lewis has never, it can be seen, been one to share the front seat of power and authority, as his leadership in the Miners and the CIO effectively demonstrates.

Lewis has followed no consistent pattern in pursuit of power as to where and from whom he has sought his supporters. In building the CIO he established working relationships with men whom he had bitterly suppressed in the Miners Union—men like John Brophy and Powers Hapgood—and with the Communists. Returning to the AFL, he has found his most cordial allies in Hutcheson of the Carpenters, whom he had engaged in a violent scuffle on the floor of the 1935 AFL convention, and Dubinsky of the ILG, who had left the original committee because he would not tolerate Lewis' one-man rule. The paradox is heightened by the fact that it would be harder to find two men farther apart in their conceptions of the purposes of unionism than Hutcheson and Dubinsky.

Lewis invests his actions with an element of drama. Important moves seem to be timed not only for their strategic effect but for their dramatic effect. Yet if Lewis has been daring in his manipulations, he does not appear to have been reckless. In all of his major strike conflicts during the war, Lewis successfully skirted the kind of punitive action that broke the 1946 strike of the railroad engineers and the trainmen.

There is no indication that Lewis has strayed far from the orthodox path in the terms which he has sought to get from collective bargaining. The union shop rather than the closed shop prevails in the coal industry. The demand for a health and welfare fund was of relatively recent origin in view of the hazards of coal mining, which are not of recent origin.

It would be a serious mistake to conclude that Lewis stands for nothing else but a consuming passion for power. The leverage for the power drive is the fact that at strategic moments, such as in the formation of the CIO, he has been able to come across with the basic stock in trade of unionism.

New Deal Unionism

An aspect of ideological unionism is to be found in the social reform temper generated by the New Deal, which conditioned the union leadership born and come of age during the New Deal. Specifically, this means CIO leadership, rather more than AFL, expressing itself in a tradition of loyalty to Franklin D. Roosevelt and a philosophy of slightly left-of-center liberalism.

Philip Murray, president of the CIO and of the United Steelworkers of America, more than any other union leader of consequence, represents the tie between two generations of union leadership; the tie between rugged unionism and a more "social-minded" unionism. For twenty-five years Murray was a top lieutenant to John L. Lewis, and knew as well as anybody could the struggle for survival which was the dominant theme of the union story before 1933. As the pivotal element in the forces and counterforces which have made up the CIO after 1940, Murray has also comprehended what it takes to make unionism function when the theatre of operations is the total community and the national government is under liberal leadership.

Murray's job as head of the Steelworkers has possibly been the easier of his dual responsibility. Unlike any other of the new CIO unions, steel organization had been controlled from the very beginning in 1935 by Lewis, and its top leadership including Murray were men with long schooling in the Miners. The Steelworkers Union was, therefore, exempted from the political jockeying which the more fluid situations in the other new CIO unions produced.

On the collective bargaining front United States Steel—Big Steel—came to terms with the union in 1937. Little Steel—Inland, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Bethlehem, and Republic—were successful in repulsing the first union offensive in 1937, but succumbed in 1941. The general steel strike in 1946 was of shorter duration and with no lesser gains than any other of the major strikes. In short, both within his union and in dealing

with employers, Murray has succeeded in fulfilling the imperatives of union leadership.

It is as president of the CIO that Murray has had to breast the waves of conflict among the constituent unions. There are three recognizable tendencies within the CIO—the anti-Communists, the Murray men, and the followers of the Communist line. In the first tendency would fall men like Walter Reuther of the Auto Workers, Emil Rieve of the Textile Workers, and John Green of the Shipyard Workers. In the center group Van Bittner, Murray's assistant in the Steelworkers and head of the southern organizing drive, Allan Haywood, CIO director of organization, Buckmaster of the Rubber Workers, would be located. In the so-called Communist or left-wing faction there are Harry Bridges of the Longshoremen, Julius Emspack of the Electrical Workers, and Michael Quill of the Transport Workers. The late Sidney Hillman and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers have found themselves at one time or another in all three groups. What has emerged from this welter of conflicting forces it is fair to characterize as the Murray line. During the War, the Murray trade-union policy was one of common-sense adherence to cooperation with the war effort, not quite as obsequious as the Communist line and not quite as belligerent on maintaining normal union prerogatives as some in the anti-Communist group demanded. In the immediate postwar period, the Murray line was against a second wholesale CIO strike offensive to offset a rising price level on the strategic ground that the CIO might be measurably weakened, and was in favor of concentrating on a campaign to reduce prices.

Altogether, Murray has come to ideological unionism not so much from a preconceived disposition in these matters, but from a pragmatic adaptation to the exigencies of union functioning in a period in which government and over-all economic policy became a crucial factor in union calculations. That the ideology has been of the New Deal brand is possibly explainable in terms of his liberal but devout Catholic persuasion and his practical bent that a union cannot stray too far off the political reservation.

Social Engineering

Union leadership with ideological overtones finds another expression in the kind which has been variously characterized as "labor statesmanship" or "social engineering." The point has been made that all union leadership is concerned with optimum profitability of its particular in-

dustry, but the "social engineer" union leader views the problem in a more positive way. In a sense it constitutes a system of union philosophy. The general approach is that the union has a positive stake in maintaining and increasing the efficiency of the industry, that the conflicts of interest between labor and management, while they exist, can be minimized by establishing, adhering to, and developing a kind of collective-bargaining common law.

That the apparel industries should have provided the most fruitful economic environment for the growth of social-engineering union leadership is understandable. Functioning unionism virtually required, as a condition of survival, a consciously industry-wide view. The union leader who has achieved the greatest public distinction as the embodiment of the social engineering union leadership is, of course, Sidney Hillman, the late president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America.

Under Hillman's leadership, the Amalgamated brought under union conditions virtually the entire men's suit industry and raised it from sweatshop levels to some degree of decent working conditions. The Amalgamated was one of the first unions to capitalize on the favorable union climate created by the New Deal.

The key to the coloration which Hillman gave to union leadership is found in observations like these:

> There is no chance to bargain efficiently with an employer whose business is not prosperous: labor must be industry conscious.

or

> We help the employers for one excellent reason. The clothing workers must make their living out of the clothing industry—just as their employers. Until now labor has fought mainly from a sense of outrage against exploitation. Hence it will fight more and more from a sense of social and industrial responsibility.

What Hillman did, in short, was to convert an implicit awareness of every union leader into a philosophy.

These conceptions of union responsibility were implemented by experiments in impartial machinery, union-sponsored research and engineering assistance to employers, labor banking, co-operative housing, and jointly sponsored unemployment and old-age-benefit schemes.

There were other facets to Hillman's talents. He guided the political activities of the CIO through the PAC. He was the key figure in CIO's participation in the World Federation of Trade Unions, and functioned

in important government positions during the NRA, the National Defense Advisory Commission and its successor the Office of Production Management. In all of these activities he demonstrated an administrative competence rare among union officers.

Although his union upbringing was in a socialist environment, there is no indication that Hillman himself ever seriously believed in socialism. After 1936, when the Amalgamated endorsed President Roosevelt, Hillman resolutely opposed the idea of third party movements and used every occasion to emphasize that none of the political movements which he was associated with would be permitted to serve as a proving ground for class-conscious independent politics. Despite these articulate attitudes, it is not unreasonable to infer that Hillman's association with ideologies played an important part in his deliberate bent of thinking in terms of policy and broad concepts.

While he was not an excessively vain person Hillman liked his role as a labor statesman, and in this larger arena he was not averse to making and unmaking alliances as the situation in his opinion demanded, although Hillman himself maintained a fairly consistent position. He was content to play a secondary role to John Lewis in the first years in the CIO. In 1940 he was virtually invited to leave the CIO by Lewis and the Communists when both were taking an isolationist line. After the Nazi attack on Soviet Russia, he did not hesitate to work with the Communists in PAC and in the American Labor Party.

Socialist Unionism

Union leadership with ideological overtones next shades into what may be termed loosely socialist unionism. Few of the socialist unionists are currently members of the Socialist Party, but their roots in the socialist movement are evinced by more concrete things than the token of such membership. There is an overlay of sympathetic attitudes to substantial government involvement in economic affairs not only as a matter of strategy, but as a matter of philosophy, and also a great interest and even participation in movements and causes with broad humanitarian coloring.

David Dubinsky, president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, in many ways symbolizes a whole generation and tradition of socialist union leadership which has clustered about the "needle trades" in New York City. The tradition was in its heyday during the

twenty years or so before World War I. Many of the needle-trades leadership like Dubinsky absorbed its socialism under the oppression of Russian Czarism, and, when it migrated to New York's East Side, established a whole self-contained milieu of union activity and attitudes.

Dubinsky achieved the presidency of the ILG from a position as a vice-president and manager of Local 10, the Cutters Local in New York, one of the most powerful units in the International because of the strategic place of the cutters' craft in the process of manufacturing women's clothing. The presidency climaxed eighteen years of activity in the union for Dubinsky.

At the same time that the ILG under Dubinsky's leadership has organized garment workers wherever they could be found and raised their wages, the union has been the most potent influence in introducing a measure of stability and profitability to the women's apparel industry by much the same approach as that of Hillman and the Amalgamated. The attempts at orderly industrial relations in the former, as a matter of fact, antedate the founding of the Amalgamated.

Dubinsky's socialist orientation to unionism has reflected itself after 1933 in an attempt to prod the labor movement along progressive steps to an extent beyond the necessities of maintaining his own position or that of his union.

The decision to participate in the original Committee for Industrial Organization in 1935 and the substantial material aid which the ILG provided did not stem from any compulsion inherent in the labor problems of the industry—the ILG was well on its way to solid strength through its own effort by 1935. During this period, Dubinsky was quoted as saying "that nothing could overshadow the fact that the CIO represented a movement with which the ILGWU has profound sympathy, whose policies we have traditionally advocated for years past, and whose objectives are close to the hearts of our members."

On the face of it the ILG withdrew from the CIO in 1938 because it felt that the Committee was departing from its original purpose in setting itself up as a *permanent* rival to the AFL. Furthermore, Dubinsky, although nominally part of the top leadership of the CIO, was hardly consulted by Lewis in the formulation of major policy, and he was much alarmed by the increasing prominence of Communists and followers of the party line in Lewis' entourage.

The ideological bent of Dubinsky's leadership is revealed in an observation which he made during the two-year interval when the ILG was unaffiliated: "We derived our moral and spiritual sustenance from being an integral part of the entire labor movement." He advanced three conditions for the return of the ILG to the AFL: that a one-cent anti-CIO per capita be repealed, that the Executive Council of the AFL divest itself of the authority to suspend or expel constituent unions, and finally that the AFL undertake a vigorous campaign against labor racketeering. Whether, as a matter of fact, these conditions were actually fulfilled is open to question. But the ILG was back in the AFL. As if to mark the return well, Joe Fay, a vice-president of the Stationary Engineers assaulted Dubinsky in the bar of the convention hotel in New Orleans, presumably because of the latter's stand on racketeering. The causes to which the ILG has lent financial aid are numerous. Workers' education enterprises, international socialist and labor movements, Red Cross, Community Chests suggest the scope of this aid. At some risk of disaffection within the rank and file, considering the large Italian Catholic membership, the ILG gave considerable financial aid to the Spanish Loyalists and the Italian antifascist movements.

Much of the ILG's extracurricular activities have been directed toward making the union a respected institution in the community. Its educational activities, its contributions for worthy and respectable purposes have had as one purpose to erase the popular idea of union members as racketeers or bolsheviks, and to get across generally the idea of the union as a reputable American institution. There is this much difference between Dubinsky and the two generations of socialist union leadership which he has bridged. The earlier generation were unabashed socialists and the capitalist standards of reputability were of little consequence to them—indeed these standards had been used as instruments of oppression against the struggle of their unions to exist. Dubinsky cherishes the tradition from which he grew, but he is not displeased to have his union and the labor movement accepted even according to the values of a capitalistic society.

* * *

Union leadership with ideological strains of the socialist variety is also found in Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers, CIO. The origins of Reuther's ideology are indigenous to the United

States and stem in part from his associations in the American radical movement.

Reuther was an automobile tool and die maker, the most skilled trade in the industry, and ascended rapidly to a union position of top responsibility in the fluid situation existing in the UAW. In his late thirties Reuther became the UAW president and director of the union's General Motors Department.

Program is a word that figures characteristically in Reuther's public and private discussions. Paul Weber relates an incident in which Reuther was "having it out" with another high UAW official who was complaining that Reuther did not like him. "Listen," said Reuther, "It isn't a question of whether I like you or you like me. As a matter of fact I don't like you very well. But I will go along with you and support you if you are for the same program I am for. All I'm interested in is your program."

The so-called Reuther Plan for the conversion of the automobile industry into the production of airplanes was Reuther's first major venture into the area of national planning. The plan was supported by a formidable array of data relating to unused plant capacity in the automobile industry.

It was during the GM negotiations and subsequent strike of 1945-46 that Reuther utilized a "programmatic" approach on a scale probably unprecedented in an important collective bargaining situation. The essence of the union position which Reuther articulated was the contention that it was possible to raise wages without increasing prices. Reuther had expressed himself in this fashion long before the GM negotiations began.

The GM strike, like most of the other important strikes in the 1945-46 upsurge, was fought not on the picket line—although the union's power to shut the plants down was basic—but in Washington and in the press and over the radio. The union angle which Reuther kept pounding away at was (1) the corporation's ability to pay was the crucial issue; (2) the union was prepared to withdraw its demand for any increase if it could be demonstrated from an authoritative examination of the corporation's books that the increase could not be met without raising prices; and (3) the approach to wage-price policy was indispensable to the maintenance of a full-employment, full-production economy.

Reuther was fully aware that this fusion of wages and prices in a concrete collective bargaining situation was unorthodox and he made the

most of it. When the corporation charged that Reuther's injection of the ability-to-pay consideration was undermining the free private enterprise system. Reuther replied, "All that we have done in this wage case is say that we are not going to operate as a narrow economic pressure group which says 'we are going to get ours and the public be damned' or the 'consumer be damned.' We say that we want to make progress with the community and not at the expense of the community."

Despite his concern with broad issues of high economic policy, Reuther has not been insensitive to the imperatives of union leadership. The original demand on GM for a 30-cent an hour increase was at that time rather a daring proposal. When the company offered the UAW the same 18½ cents which had been accepted by the Electrical Workers (CIO), Reuther held out for the 19½ cents recommended by the President's Fact-Finding Board. Indeed, he could hardly have done less, since to have accepted the 18½ cents would have done possibly fatal damage to Reuther's prestige. The GM strike was settled after 113 days by an 18½ cents across-the-board increase which, with elimination of wage inequities and other concessions, came to, the union estimated, an increase of at least 19½ cents an hour.

More than articulateness is necessary to hold a position of influence in the UAW. Reuther has had to organize his supporters in a more or less cohesive group, particularly since the forces opposed to Reuther have always been well disciplined and organized. This has not been easy for a person of Reuther's disposition. He lacks the temperament that makes for the easy accessibility of the popular leader in a new union like the UAW. Reuther has often been stamped as "standoffish" and intellectual.

Reuther's most important opponent in the UAW is George Addes, the secretary-treasurer, who includes in his following the well-disciplined Communist group. Except for the brief "united front" with Addes in resisting the attempts of Homer Martin (the UAW's first president) to control the union, Reuther and his followers have consistently pursued an anti-Addes, anti-Communist policy. And the Communists in turn within the UAW and the CIO have been Reuther's most articulate opponents. At this writing, the Reuther forces do not control the executive board of the UAW and Reuther is, therefore, in the extremely difficult position of having to act as president of an organization the control of whose governing body is vested in an anti-Reuther coalition.

UNION LEADERSHIP

Evolution of Union Leadership

Union leadership in a given situation follows a recognizable pattern of evolution. In the first stage, leadership is still struggling with the problems of organizing workers and collective bargaining; in other words, with the problems of getting the union established as a going concern. There is little time left for internal conflicts and factionalism. From 1935 to 1938 most of the CIO unions were in this initial stage of leadership evolution.

In the second stage the external pressures are somewhat abated and early fervor wears off. Attention is turned to the control of internal union matters. Identifiable group and factional interests within the union emerge. Contests for union offices develop. Witness for example, the hotly fought elections in the period 1938 to the present among the Automobile Workers, the Newspaper Guild, and the CIO Electrical Workers—all of them unions which had already passed their early struggles for survival.

In the final stage of leadership evolution, one dominant group (or one dominant leader) has established itself and the likelihood of unseating it becomes increasingly remote if it continues to produce results. Voluntary changes among top union offices in this stage are uncommon and occur only in the face of some unsettling circumstances, as when George Browne's conviction for extortion forced his retirement from the presidency of the Motion Picture Operators Union, or when there is a falling out in the administration which is what happened when Dan Tracy defeated E. J. Brown for the presidency of the AFL Electrical Workers.

There is no close correlation, inverse or direct, between the unfolding of the various stages in union leadership and the development of effective and successful unionism. There is no evidence to support the romantic notion that when union leadership stabilizes its internal position, it necessarily goes lightly in pressing collective bargaining demands. John L. Lewis, James Petrillo, and Philip Murray are outstanding refutations of the idea that union leadership turns "soft" with age.

The unique forms of expression which are assumed by union leadership in particular cases should not obscure the large common ground which all union leadership occupies. The fundamental sameness of leadership is most pronounced in the area of strictly union problems. Its diversity is most pronounced in extracurricular functions.

BOOKS

CONNOLLY, ORWELL & OTHERS: AN ENGLISH MISCELLANY

By DAVID DEMPSEY

THE CONDEMNED PLAYGROUND, Cyril Connolly writes in an introduction to this volume of 36 essays and reviews[1] "signifies for me the literary scene of the 1930's, the period of ebullience, mediocrity, frivolity, and talent during which I wrote most of these essays. . . . But there is another sense in which *The Condemned Playground* refers to Art itself; for Art is man's noblest attempt to preserve Imagination from Time; to make unbreakable toys of the mind, mudpies which endure. . . ."

How, we might ask, did the '30's get condemned, if not by the right of literary eminent domain, with Mr. Connolly, as judge, keeping the bullies out of the sandbox so that the mudpies could get made? Their value is appreciated better when one compares them with the mudpies produced in this country during the same decade. The hieratic influence of politics, which did so much to stimulate good intentions and bad writing in the United States, has largely been sidestepped; we get, among the present generation of serious writers in England, the full significance of the '30's—one might almost call this the mudpie decade, as most of its products were written, seemingly, to be thrown at somebody—without the hortatory manifestoes which too often made our authors sound like recruiting sergeants for whatever cause appealed to them most forcibly—the Negro, Socialism, Spain, Communism, the Okies. . . . These are not unworthy subjects, nor did they in all cases produce unworthy books, but too often they were emotional convictions which overstimulated the writer's sense of political responsibility at the expense of his capacity to assimilate them into his art. On the extreme Left, in particular, this gave us the "class conscious" orientation which so frequently burdened our literature with the function of politics.

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[1] *The Condemned Playground:* Macmillan, 1946. $2.75.

The best of the younger English writers have avoided this temptation to moralize on immediate issues. They do not pretend to be members of the working class, romanticizing the salvation of their times in exclusive working-class terms. The poets in particular have risen above partisanship because they have insisted on *being* poets, on raising the problem of political responsibility to a higher level where it could be joined with the issue of humanity itself. They have taken their sounds in the abyss, but they have made their readings on level ground. Even when they were immersed—as Spender recommended that they be—in Conrad's "destructive element," they destroyed within the framework of poetry's affirmative moral thrust, creating, as it were, a set of values out of which an ethical politics could grow. This combination of political prescience with aesthetic independence makes the best of these works enduring mudpies in a more literal sense than Mr. Connolly perhaps intended. It has permitted Spender to espouse Socialism without forcing him to write the Socialist doggerel decanted by so many of his second-rate contemporaries. It has allowed Auden to use poetry as a gastroscope to diagnose the moral biliousness of our times without provoking the nausea now popular among the Existentialists. It has driven Isherwood into a Hollywood monastery without robbing him of his ability to write some of the most completely satisfying "political" novels of our day. With MacNeice and C. Day Lewis, these men have represented the poetic conscience of the English Left, but they have done so without confusing a petition to Parliament with a work of art. In a sense, their work has been molded by their age without being scarred by it.

The appearance in this country, within the last year and a half, of several volumes of English criticism and fiction enable us to place this whole movement in somewhat better perspective. We have three novels by Christopher Isherwood (his first book, *The Memorial,* printed here for the first time; a reissue of *The Berlin Stories;* and the recent *Prater Violet.*)[2] In addition to *The Condemned Playground*, we have an extremely personal disquisition on the state of Mr. Connolly's soul (*The Unquiet Grave*),[3] as well as a selection of stories from his magazine

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[2]*The Memorial:* New Directions, 1946. $2.75. *The Berlin Stories:* New Directions, 1946. $3.50. *Prater Violet:* Random House, 1945. $2.

[3]*The Unquiet Grave:* Harper, 1945. $2.50.

Horizon.[4] And by George Orwell a sheaf of essays in popular culture (*Dickens, Dali & Others*),[5] and a political allegory (*Animal Farm*).[6] I do not suggest that there is any too-close affinity between these writers and the poets, other than a belief in the general desirability of Socialism and a tendency to translate this belief into humanistic rather than doctrinal terms. There is another sense, however, in which the poets, critics, and novelists share a common disaffection from their age—a notable characteristic, for example, of Isherwood's novels of decadence and exile, originally intended as parts of a longer, uncompleted project which was to be called *The Lost*. Orwell sees the '30's as a period of extreme dogma in which the intellectually free are indeed members of a lost minority. Connolly echoes this in an essay on "Writers and Society," in which he defines the intellectual as ". . . the Cassandra of our age, condemned to foresee the future and to warn, but never to be listened to, nor to be able to profit from his foresight. Without power and without money he has spent the last ten years prophesying a disaster in which he will be the first to perish."

Events have made this statement more true today than when it was written. It is part of the price which one pays for integrity. Mr. Connolly —in *The Unquiet Grave*, at any rate—pays with an abnormal concern for personal frustration which is not altogether inapplicable to the condition of the creative artist in general. *The Unquiet Grave* is a private resting place which Mr. Connolly has turned into a public tomb, somewhat after the manner of Lenin's, so that both the curious and the idolatrous may gaze at his spiritual anguish. Like all such receptacles, it yields up a few personal amulets of rare value, as well as a great many dusty old bones. It is a grave filled with self-reproach, projected in the person of Palinurus, Mr. Connolly's alter ego, who "as a myth with a valuable psychological interpretation . . . clearly stands for a certain will-to-failure, or repugnance-to-success, a desire to give up at the last moment, an urge toward loneliness, isolation, and obscurity."[7] The book is an "experiment

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[4]*Horizon Stories:* Vanguard, 1946. $2.50.

[5]*Dickens, Dali & Others:* Reynal & Hitchcock, 1946. $2.50.

[6]*Animal Farm:* Harcourt, Brace, 1946. $1.75.

[7]This is a theme which haunted Connolly in an earlier book, *Enemies of Promise*. Palinurus makes his first appearance in his criticism in 1927.

in self-dismantling, a search for the obstruction which is blocking the flow from the well." Whether one considers the search for this obstruction worth the journey depends on his fortitude in scaling the lofty crags of Mr. Connolly's intellect which, unfortunately, is reached only by means of the spiral staircase and trap doors of his anguished Psyche. There is nothing definitive about the experience except Mr. Connolly himself who emerges, somehow, greater than the sum of his parts.

The truth is that the author is better at tending the graves of others than at occupying one of his own. As a critic he has a rare combination of scholarship, common sense, and humor. These are all displayed generously in the selections of his reviews and essays, written during the last twenty years and collected in *The Condemned Playground*. It seems incredible that a man of this talent should not have been imported before this, but his arrival, in one volume, makes the event all the more exciting. There is nothing much original in Connolly's criticism, in the sense that we have come to expect our critics to give us some special psychoanalytical, political, or economic theory of literature: this sort of thing he leaves to the laborers in the academic vineyards. Literature is something to be enjoyed, understood, related to the totality of man's culture. The specialists have the right and duty to mine the seams of literary scholarship until they choke in their own dust, but somebody must remain at the tipple, sorting the slag from the ore. Mr. Connolly does this with distinction. One can only say: read him. On Sterne: ". . . his beauties are lost on those who contract intellectual hay-fever from fine writing. . . . The tempo of Tristram Shandy must be the slowest of any book on record, and reminds one at times of the youthful occupation of seeing how slowly one can ride a bicycle without falling off. . . ." On Swift: "One cannot hate humanity to that extent unless one has believed in it." On style: "The English language is like a broad river on whose banks a few patient anglers are sitting, while higher up the stream is being polluted by a string of refuse barges tipping out the muck of Fleet Street and the BBC. The English language has, in fact, so contracted to our own littleness that it is no longer possible to make a good book out of words alone." Connolly has a wit that is rare among the best American critics. His advice to a beginning critic, from an essay called "Ninety Years of Novel Reviewing" is worth quoting at length:

> Remember that the object of a critic is to revenge himself on the creator, and his method must depend on whether the book is good or bad, whether he dare condemn it himself or must lie quiet and let it blow over. Every good reviewer has a subject. He specializes in that subject on which he has not been able to write a book, and his aim is to see that no one else does. He stands behind the ticket-queue of fame, banging his rivals on the head as they bend low before the *guichet*. When he has laid out enough he becomes an authority, which is more than they will.

Appreciating Mr. Connolly's acute judgment of literature, one is bound to be disappointed in his *Horizon Stories*. Except for two or three training-camp stories, the war is studiously avoided, whether because good examples were not forthcoming, or because of some principle in Mr. Connolly's mind, it is not possible to say. We get stories that could have been written ten years before, or ten years later. They lack a sense of history, meeting a certain abstract set of critical standards without fitting the contours of their age. One will learn very little about England during the period covered by the selections. Perhaps the single exception is Elizabeth Bowen's "In the Square," a reverberation of the war which, like most of her stories of this period[8] catch the haunting dissonances of these bleak days without really losing their volume; they remain, as it were, muted by her art. Of the best remaining stories only one is in any sense experimental. William Sansom's "The Long Sheet" is a complete departure from realism, and the kind of allegory which the English do much better than American writers, who invariably sentimentalize this type of thing with an abundance of whimsy. "The Saint," by V. S. Prichett, is a vastly amusing study of a religious fanatic, written in a robust style that comes as a welcome relief if one reads this collection at a single sitting. Edward Sheehy's "Prothalamion" is one of the few stories that strives for interior reality and achieves it completely, haunted, perhaps, by Joyce, but a substantial achievement nevertheless. The remainder run largely to the bizarre, or the very tenuous.

One of the most interesting contributors to *Horizon* is the English critic George Orwell, whose essays from this magazine, as well as others which have appeared elsewhere, are collected in *Dickens, Dali & Others*. Mr. Orwell is better known to readers in this country as the author of *Animal Farm*, a little parable on the failure of the Russian Revolution

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[8]In *Ivy Grips the Steps*.

which was given wide distribution by the Book of the Month Club. I, personally, did not find this book to be the natural heir of *Candide* or *Gulliver's Travels*, as some reviewers did. Its satire is of considerably lower order, springing from Orwell's political disillusionment rather than from any general malice toward humanity, as in the case of Swift, or from the intellectual enlightment that makes *Candide* a classic adventure in human folly. Nor do Orwell's pigs and horses have that inverted and often fantastic set of conventions by which we recognize ourselves in the creatures of Aeschylus. They are *literally* human; they live in a real world; in brief, we recognize too much.

As a political tour de force *Animal Farm* is more successful, although far from a conclusive parable on right and wrong. At times Orwell seems to be satirizing merely the perversion of revolutionary ideals, yet there is also a sense of futility about his revolution, as though it was fated to turn out badly because of some flaw in human nature. This is an ambiguous note that runs through all of his writing. Violence, the loss of an objective system of values, the power lust of the few, the stupidity of the many—all contribute to the failure of *Animal Farm*.

The clue to Orwell's beliefs is unravelled in great detail in his book of essays. Like all honest liberals, Orwell is indignant at both the spurious "freedoms" of the extreme Left and the illusory "freedoms" of the Right; a good deal of what is called progress in the twentieth century is in reality a rigid orthodoxy, a rationalization of the total state. Orwell's distrust of "left wing intellectuals," who are held responsible for this state of affairs ("Nearly every modern intellectual has gone over to some or other form of totalitarianism") is the distrust of a man who is rightfully jealous of the middle position. With Orwell, however, this becomes something of a fetish, leading him to be almost as skeptical of progress as of reaction. The good man and the strong man can never be the same. Means and ends in revolutionary action cannot be disentangled.

Orwell is better as a political critic of literature. His essays on boys' magazines, postcard art, and detective fiction are brilliant and thoroughly original contributions to a neglected field of criticism. His dissection of Dali is merciless and, from the moralist position, unanswerable. His tremendous respect for humanist values, however, leads him to overevaluate a writer in terms of his influence, particularly his political influence—a valid point of view, but better suited to the novels of Wodehouse, and

the Raffles books (both extremely interesting studies) in which there is no necessity for definitive literary judgment. Thus, in defending Kipling against the criticisms so fashionable since his death he explains his popularity without really justifying his verse, even as "good bad poetry." Orwell is at his best in his long study of Dickens, who came closer to understanding and writing for the "popular culture" of his day than most of the Victorians. He was, Orwell reminds us, a moral critic of society rather than a revolutionist, an exponent of progress through the reform of existing institutions and the ethical awakening of bad men, of whom Scrooge is one of the classic examples in our literature. To a great extent, Orwell's own position is well stated in this essay. His sympathy for the working classes, like that of Dickens', is tempered by a middle-class appreciation of social stability, yet implemented, as the novelists' was not, by an awareness of the value of politics as a tactical weapon. Orwell believes in progress *and* humanity. He stops short of revolution, short of Marxism. We are waiting, he says, for someone to come along who will blow Marx to the moon, just as Marx blew the moralist position sky high half a century ago.

Two of the sappers who have attempted this are Huxley and Isherwood. It is difficult to believe that the author of *Vedanta for the Western World* is also responsible for *The Berlin Stories* and *Prater Violet,* or that his two audiences share much in common. Unlike Huxley, Isherwood the novelist does not seem to have been greatly influenced by his exile among the mystics of Southern California; he can still write fiction that doesn't sink of its own moral weight. *Prater Violet* is as buoyant as a toy boat, yet it draws so much more water than one realizes at first that reading it becomes an unexpectedly satisfying experience.

If one were asked to define, in a sentence, what *Prater Violet* is about, I think the answer would be that it concerns the inability of the moral man to live truthfully in relation to his times. It is a story of exile. If ever a man lived among alien corn it is the comical, anguished Freiderich Bergmann. A Viennese film director, Bergmann is invited to London to make an historical movie—a kind of Austrian "Student Prince." While the picture is being filmed, Dollfuss fires on the workers' quarters. Bergmann, keenly aware of the impending doom that hangs over his country, must nevertheless go on with his silly musical romance. His personal anguish

almost wrecks the picture, but in the end he is "handled" properly, he gives in, and the film is completed.

Ideologically, *Prater Violet* is a shrewd backward glance at England's age of innocence, when the Oxford pledge had taken the place of the military oath. It is completely lacking in the enormous documentary superstructure we are used to in most novels dealing with fascism, even obliquely. As in all of his books, Isherwood refracts the times through the moral drift of his characters. In Bergmann, this is tragic. The Austrian is aware of his ambiguity in creating an illusion at a time when humanity needs a warning, and he pays for his part in falsifying history by becoming its victim. The irony of his tragedy is that in reading about it you laugh: you are meant to. The scene is played serio-comically. Bergmann, like Arthur Norris in "The Last of Mr. Norris," is punished by a kind of personal nemesis. He is not, as in the case of Norris, pursued by a blackmailer, but rewarded with a job in Hollywood. Here, we may assume, whatever remnant of truth he may have salvaged from the debacle in Austria and the farce in England is squeezed out of him by the Technicolor studios.

The appearance of Isherwood's first novel, *The Memorial*, and the reissue of *The Berlin Stories*—both in handsome volumes by the New Directions Press—followed upon the success of *Prater Violet,* and now makes all his work available in this country. *The Memorial*, subtitled "Portrait of a Family," depicts the breakup of an aristocratic English family from the affectionate point of view of one who has grown up in it, sees that it is doomed, and yet loves it without illusions. As a story, it is thin. What saves it is Isherwood's own minor genius. Surely, no one writing in English today can equal him in the handling of dialogue, and very few in the creation of character. His limitations—a rather narrow range of subject matter, the fragmentariness of his novels—we excuse for the adventure of knowing his people—Mr. Norris, Sally Bowels, Fritz Wendell, Frl. Shroeder, "Herr Issyvoo" himself. Almost all of Isherwood's characters inhabit the same world and, roughly, the same little era—the period between 1930 and 1935, when Nazism consolidated its power in Germany. Most of them are damned, just as their society is doomed. They are part of the politics, as well as the immorality, of evil. The Communist-Nazi struggle for power, in *The Berlin Stories,* is the cross-ruff in a game which only the opportunists can win, and in which everyone, sooner or

later, seeks to be an opportunist. Isherwood does not moralize this, he demonstrates it. Perhaps that is why his lost people have outlived their moral betters through fifteen years of revolution and war and remain, even after their defeat, our own spiritual contemporaries.

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The Constitution and Civil Rights. By Milton R. Konvitz. Columbia University Press. 1947. $3.

It is characteristic of Americans to assume, without ever quite thinking about the matter, that they live in a land of equal rights, that this is assured by basic laws established through the wisdom of the founding fathers, that they themselves understand all about the question through a kind of providential national inheritance, and that any opinion or circumstances suggesting the contrary must be due to ignorance, misrepresentation, malice, or radicalism. The first and most profound shaking of confidence comes when the individual, faced with a practical illustration of the enormity of his error and filled with anxiety by the reality of inequality, stands baffled at his own ignorance of the protective law he has always taken for granted.

For those who are willing to take only a little time and trouble, Dr. Konvitz has written a handbook and a source book so nicely arranged and so reassuringly complete in coverage, that no one who can read need remain at a loss as to the constitutional and statutory status of civil rights in this country. As he says in a preface explaining the limitations of his task, he does not write about political rights, such as the right to vote, or about civil liberties, such as those covered by the Bill of Rights. He is concerned with The Constitution and *Civil Rights,* which "in its more technical, limited sense, . . . refers to the rights of persons to employment, and to accommodations in hotels, restaurants, common carriers, and other places of common accommodation and resort." He is interested not so much in the philosophy of equal civil rights, but in existing legal sanctions and their effectiveness. In 138 pages he provides a rewarding and scholarly analysis of federal and state civil rights legislation, the status of these under the Constitution, the practice and possibilities under the federal criminal and civil codes, and the course of judicial interpretation of these statutes and relevant constitutional provisions. In an appendix of 100 pages he provides the proposed civil rights bill for the District of Columbia, the model state civil rights bill proposed by the American Civil Liberties Union, the proposed federal antilynching bill, the proposed federal fair employment practice bill, all of the state civil rights statutes and relevant general legislation, and citations on all of the state statutes compelling or permitting segregation.

In a way it is too bad that this is conceived and published as a scholarly analysis, handbook, and source book; for it deserves to be distributed and read like a best-seller.

JOHN C. SPARKS

WE NOTE . . .

Let's Make Up Our Minds

Recent defeat has thrust on the liberal the need of rethinking his position and reforming his lines. What kind of an organization does he need to fight the coming battles of the next few years? Is it to be the popular-front Progressive Citizens of America or the non-Communist Americans for Democratic Action (or perhaps some other group like the rumored Common Cause movement)? Simply to deplore the liberal division or to pray for unity begs the question. The liberal who wants to put his liberalism to work must now choose his tool organization. At the core of his decision will be the organization's day-to-day workings, its principles, its integrity, its ultimate effectiveness.

During the war the coalition on the American left operated with great unity and strength. The liberal believed that his immediate battle was identical with that of Allied soldiers everywhere, equally, and often especially, when those soldiers were Russians with their backs against the wall at Moscow and Stalingrad. He applauded and contributed to Russian lend-lease. For Russian Relief, the greatest personal and informal outpouring from one nation to another in international history, he did his fair share. So far as the war was concerned, American Communists and liberals lay down in the same bed together and disturbed each other only occasionally, and then with what might be described as involuntary reflex action.

That is not so possible today. The American liberal is as friendly to the Russian people as before. He knows that the United States and Russia must collaborate for world peace. But he is less willing than the Communist to take his leadership from the Russian government or to accept American Communist interpretation of that leadership. And he does not believe, as the Communist does, in suppression of opposition, either at strategic moments or any other time.

Does the cleavage go deeper? Henry Wallace has said that the differences between liberals (the collaborators with Communism and the noncollaborators) amount to five per cent of the total program. Others would say it was greater. But perhaps the real error lies in trying to measure the difference statistically. When a liberal taking part in a popular front program finds himself frustrated on a point which he regards as important, his frustration takes on for him more than five per cent significance — particularly if the action is repeated and is driven home by the usual Communist methods. For example, the PCA's published program "for political action" advocated outlawing the atomic bomb, which reflects the stated policy of Soviet Russia. But on the international control of atomic energy—a plan which, although obviously socialist, has been proposed by the United States but opposed by Russia—the PCA program was silent. Can this be set down as a passing but honest aberration? It cannot. Its pattern is similar to others, like the Communists' studied vilification of Byrnes and Van-

denburg, and the fellow-traveler loan-to-Russia, no-loan-to-Britain policy of last summer.

What can the liberal do in a popular front situation? He can act like the members of PCA—cease his independent thinking and action about international policies. Or he can oppose the official policy—and be known as a "red-baiter." The choice can be made once or even twice, but as a pattern it soon becomes intolerable.

It should be obvious by now (but is it?) that Communists do not believe in a liberal program. They enter liberal organizations in order to bend them to their will, and if they cannot accomplish that, then their purpose becomes out-and-out destruction.

From time to time liberal leaders have risen to deny that this—destruction—is the logical end of liberal-Communist collaboration. They have believed that the Communist discipline (which they admired) could be contained within the larger discipline of a popular front under powerful leadership. It is instructive on this point, to look at the CIO. In its first days the excitement of a new enterprise held Communist and other union elements closely together. Later, cohesion depended more and more upon the personal prestige and dictatorial power of John L. Lewis; factionalism was distracted and repressed at crucial moments by a greater pressure from on top. "Unity" worked, so long as dictatorship or its threat made it work. But for liberals such a pattern was not a happy one, nor was it stable so long as Lewis could resign or die. After 1940 the war provided external discipline. But today, factionalism in the CIO was never so strong or destructive, and all of Philip Murray's prestige and experience (he is no dictator) have not been able to keep its threat to the union's existence from growing.

Unions are functional organizations. Their primary purpose is a bread-and-butter satisfaction to their membership, and any statements on public policy aside from basic hours and wages, working conditions, and other homely matters, must — however important — be secondary if the union is to win its economic way and keep its strength and identity. If, then, a union's effectiveness can be seriously impaired by ideological differences between Communists and non-Communists, how much more formidable will the disturbance be in the liberal organization formed solely for public pressure and action. Here the principal order of business is the making of a public program, on which, if it is to be a popular front, the groups who form it are already divided. Moreover, even if they begin with a small difference of opinion, that difference is watered and manured with every application of Communist method.

Let us pay tribute to the Communists' belief in their party and in their labors. They eat and sleep their doctrine. Their morale, their precision, their unity put to shame those of any army that ever took the field in battle. But Communism is a way of life, and it is also, as it works out in practice, a conspiracy. To quote Harold J. Laski (who is no red-baiter):

> . . . in the light of experience I am bound to suggest that devotion so absolute develops in those who are moved by it a power within themselves to make simple truth and plain honesty things of secondary importance. . . . It makes conspiracy endemic in such a party, it makes success the sole criterion of methods and thereby it justifies for itself as a party means that it is prompt to condemn in others when others employ them. . . .
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> It is notable that whenever the unity

> sought by Communists has been accepted by other parties, it is the Communist Party alone which has benefitted by that unity. . . .

Liberals do not have to be naive to risk losing their shirts in a popular front. When the liberal American Veterans Committee was formed, the Communists paid it little mind, for, in sight of bigger game, they had already determined to infiltrate the American Legion. As the AVC waxed in influence and numbers, however, they put their traditional strategy to work. At the national AVC meeting in Omaha in June, 1946, they were defeated all along the line in their struggle for some part in national control of the organization. But in spite of hard-working, wide-awake national leadership, chapters in New York State, California, and in some parts of the Middle West are now under Communist control. And if the AVC is not to become a Communist front or is not to split apart, the internal battle must go on; which means that such leaders as Charles Bolté and Franklin Roosevelt must, at least intermittently, take their attention from external national problems to make certain that they and their policies will not be suddenly clipped from behind.

With youth organizations, the problem is still more distressing. Young idealists are naturally drawn to certain vigorous slogans of the Communist youth program, publicly stated but often without the Communist label; and they are unfair game for the undercover tactics of other, more sophisticated young people who have purposefully (but with adult guidance) assumed leadership. The Communist attitude cuts across all boundary lines. It has design and gives that sense of urgency and immediacy to its words and acts which is always so important to youthful enthusiasm. To enter a popular-front youth organization in the first days of Communist leadership is to sense immense possibilities and great achievement in the offing and to have a feeling that you are a participant and not simply a spectator in public affairs. But the popular front is not made up of any Communist majority, and the later awakening of non-Communists in such a front is always rude. Hence we have been treated to a succession of such organizations, each one in the end staggering along the road to impotence or death under the repeated blows of purposeful divisiveness. Not the least of the evils of the popular-front youth organization is the socially immoral methods to which its high-minded, unsophisticated membership is introduced with all the impact of sudden, cynical shock.

We may get a better perspective on the problem of the popular front if we examine some of the arguments which have been put forward in its favor. First: *Effectiveness on the left is not possible unless there is unity.* This has already been dealt with above. Briefly, the popular front does not and cannot provide real unity. And the precarious, synthetic substitute for unity which liberal coalitions have provided in the past can certainly not be called effective except on rare occasions and under extraordinary conditions.

Second: *Any liberal organization or movement which excludes Communists will turn to red-baiting.* This need not be true unless the organization has no positive program of its own, unless it is primarily negative. In such case, it is no use talking about a successful liberal movement, for a movement or organization without a positive program is not worthy to live, nor being promoted in the name of liberalism, is it likely to.

It is true that a Communist line in reverse is little if any better than the Communist line itself. But we must assume that liberals own their own souls and will put forward their own affirmative ideas.[1]

Third: *As a group, the American Communists are numerically few and insignificant; why give them so much attention?* This is a secondary argument and is usually advanced only after some criticism of Communism has already been voiced. It is true enough that membership in the American Communist Party is small. But it has attracted to itself a considerably larger number of fellow travelers, and these people, though unwilling to take political responsibility in the party, frequently occupy prominent places on the platform or in the editorial chair and at crucial moments turn public attention toward Communist objectives with more than mere numerical force.

They are not a menace in themselves, however; for the CP plus all the camp followers it can muster still compose a tiny minority among 140 million people. What is disturbing—and this is what I am arguing—is the group's destructive effect on liberal organizations. The liberal movement is itself a minority, and the organizations within that movement are smaller still. It is well known that no menace to a minority group's morale is greater than the disruptive faction within the group. When the minority group is a liberal one and the inner faction is Communist and already prepared for domination or destruction —one may rest assured that frustration, disintegration, or both will be the order of the day. And a handful of interested people can usually turn the trick.

Fourth: *Ours is a democracy; in America we don't have to worry about totalitarianism (on the left).* This, like the preceding argument, is secondary and apologetic, and although more foolish, is really supplementary to it. The Communists can't win anyhow, it says in effect, so why worry how exaggerated or irresponsible your program is just so it scares the pants off the conservatives. Its defeatism is so clear that it would not deserve attention here had serious thinkers not occasionally embraced it. The answer is the same as above, plus the fact that liberals by definition can't be complacent about dictatorship.

Fifth: *We are politically immature, and the Communists can teach us discipline, tactics, and effectiveness.* After twenty-five years, surely somebody should have taught somebody something about something. But again strictly speaking, this is not the question. You don't properly learn a lesson by having it thrust down your throat. Or to put it another way, if there is something in Communist practice we should know and appreciate, being handcuffed to it isn't necessarily the best method of introduction.

Again, it isn't the Communists who are the enemy on the left but their par-

[1] "Red-baiting" has its evils, but there has also been some loose talk about it. Some anti-Communist bias on the left is simply evidence of liberal frustration, and would vanish with the easing of the frustration. It is also worth noting here that there have been a group of people, neither Communist nor formally allied among themselves, who have mistakenly laid the greatest burden of political blame upon the anti-Communists. It has been their idea that the political crisis would be most truly eased if, say, *The New Leader* would only shut up shop. These anti-anti-Communists, I think, are going around Robin Hood's barn. And though the point is a small one, it is worth my assuming for a brief moment the ridiculous mantle of anti-anti-anti-Communist to say so.

ticipation in the popular front or alliance. The fact is that the existence of a separate, "independent" Communist Party or movement would be good insurance for liberals. It would provide a healthy kind of competition to keep them on their toes. If it has a specific pipeline to discipline and morals, then liberals could freely evaluate that specialty for themselves. Communist success could be a measuring rod for liberal success. (If the party had a sudden or protracted growth, liberals could have only themselves to whom to attach the primary blame.) With the Communists once more on their own and out in the open, liberals could with the best conscience go into court and defend their right to their own opinions and their own organization. For of course Communists *do* have a right to their own organization in a democracy. What they do not have a right to do is ball up the liberal works by affiliation.

* * *

How is the decision to be made? Parenthetically, liberal independence will have a greater chance of coming into its own if the present struggle going on in the CIO is resolved in favor of the non-Communists. The unions, while they must beware of dominating the liberal movement to the exclusion of other groups in the population, make up the single strongest force in the country upon which liberals can depend for support; and among unions, those of the CIO have been the most socially aware and politically active. That is why their internal struggle is so important.

Outside the unions, liberals, as I have previously said, must choose their tool organization. At the moment the Americans for Democratic Action look very promising.[2] In their first statement Communism was explicitly rejected along with fascism. Was this an emphasis and an equation to be held aloft as a first principle as several wry-faced critics were only too quick to proclaim or was it simply the exuberance of youth on first breathing its own fresh air? Presumably it was the second, and a full-blown, affirmative program will presently be forthcoming. We have every right to expect it.

In any case, liberals now have a better than ordinary opportunity to stand upon their own feet. It is time that they seized that opportunity. It is time that the liberal movement cashed in on its promise and became mature.[3]

P. B.

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[2]To date top CIO officials have refrained from making a public choice between the PCA and the ADA but the rejection of the first would seem to have the greater significance since the PCA was an outgrowth of the PAC.

[3]*Editor's Note*: Since the issue discussed here is primarily a choice and since the answers to a number of problems of social change have had to be assumed rather than discussed, other articles and editorial notes in this area may be expected in coming issues.

IDEAS FOR A NEW PARTY

—A SYMPOSIUM

II

THE TIME IS RIPE

By Frank McCallister
Director, Georgia Workers Education Service

The Declaration of Principles is the most comprehensive political statement it has been my privilege to read in many years. It may well parallel the importance of the Regina Manifesto which led to the establishment of the CCF in Canada.

It seems to me this statement lays the basis for an entirely new political movement which will not necessarily be a *third party* but may well be a *second* party to which all liberals, and democratic socialists, progressive laborites, farmers and other groups may rally.

In the South, especially, such a movement is needed desperately. With the labor movement emerging as a power in the region and with the Negro citizens being enfranchised as shackle after shackle is broken, the time is ripe for a great movement to develop.

In Georgia Talmadgism has pushed the Democratic Party toward one crisis after another. People have been so shaken that there has been constant talk of forming a new, liberal poliitcal movement in the state.

The clarity of the Declaration, its emphasis on cultural and moral values, the crying need for a change in the South assure a vast and receptive audience.

A USEFUL START BUT . . .

By Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
Author of "The Age of Jackson"

The left badly needs to begin a fairly basic re-examination of its ideas and of the problems which face it; and this is the time for it, because I don't think the left is going to have a chance to do much more than think and agitate for the next few years. The Declaration represents a good and useful beginning. My own first reactions to it are as follows:

1. The question of a third party seems to me a question of tactics, not of principles. Salmon P. Chase's analysis of third party chances in 1847 holds good, I think, for 1947 too. "As fast as we can bring public sentiment right," he wrote, "the other parties will approach our ground, and keep sufficiently close to it to prevent any great accession to our members. If this be so, the Liberty party can never hope to accomplish anything as such, but only through it, an indirect action upon the other parties." This analysis allows for everything except the imbecility of major-party leadership; but it is not clear that either Republican or Democratic leadership today is as suicidal as Whig leadership in the 1850's. The Republican Party, it should never be forgot, did not kill the Whig party; it arose to fill the vacuum after the Whig party had killed itself.

A permanent third party—or the displacement of one of the existing major parties—seems to me most unlikely at

this time. Nor should the Democratic Party be completely dismissed; everything the Declaration correctly says against it was even more true in 1928, which did not prevent the Democrats from sponsoring the New Deal a few years later. If in 1948 a third party appears to be the shortest way to push the Democratic Party toward a sensible platform, to educate the general public and to prevent the Communists from capitalizing on the prevailing political frustration, it should by all means be undertaken. The fact that a third party will probably not displace one of the major parties is not conclusive against launching one; it was the short-lived Populist Party, for example, which radicalized the sedate party of Grover Cleveland. But a third party has no magic in itself and should be decided on purely tactical considerations.

2. The Declaration ends up the third party argument by saying, "An old party may be captured and used for reform. It cannot be captured and used as an instrument for deep-going social changes, for a radical redistribution of economic and political power." Doubtless true; but I cannot see that the Declaration contemplates anything very "deep-going." The program for action, for example, would get the support in principle of Senator Taft for most of its provisions on education, housing, social security, small business, civil liberties, opposition to militarism; and any New Dealer would go along with the rest of it. The great innovation, apart from the talk about "industry councils" which I don't understand but don't like the sound of, is on the question of means and extent of nationalization. This should be put in the forefront; it is the big question, and you can assume that everyone favors the Wagner-Ellender-Taft housing bill. (Even on the question of nationalization Taft has said that, where monopoly is inevitable, he does not regard public ownership as an infringement on basic principle, though he may not favor it in specific cases.)

3. Liberal rhetoric always makes things sound easier than they are and thus finds it hard to gain the respect of men in a position of responsibility. If any liberal program is to get anywhere, it has to provide other than verbal answers to complicated and concrete situations. Liberal rhetoric about cartels and monopolies, for example, is as stale as conservative rhetoric about bureaucracy and regimentation. The liberal weeklies rarely try to face the kind of consideration about monopolies which Professor Schumpeter, say, presents in *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. The Declaration's economic program has obvious gaps. I don't see, for instance, what happens under it to Sears, Roebuck, or to the Associated Press, or to Hollywood, or to a lot of other forms of enterprise.

I would guess that the main task of the left is to work out answers to the very real economic and libertarian problems raised by the nationalization of basic industries and financial institutions. The device of the independent public corporation regionally administered is obviously of great importance. But tough questions remain. The Declaration promises that "the right to strike remains even though the need for strikes may not arise." This is evasion of the first order. The right to strike exists only as it is used; in any case, it certainly will be used in the crucial transition period. How would nationalization of the coal mines solve the short-run but massive problems of

John L. Lewis? Can public utilities go on strike? Policemen? Are Communist-minded unions, like the UOPW, to be free to organize government employees? It is worth noting that Sir Walter Citrine, on joining the Coal Board, remarked that strikes were no longer trade-union instruments in a nationalized industry. Labor in this country seems to want to nationalize business and preserve free enterprise for itself, just as business wants to place labor under strict control and leave itself free. Phrases like "democratic collectivism," which the Declaration mercifully avoids, do not solve the hard questions involved in the expansion of state power.

WE MUST LEARN

By Eliot M. Meisel
President, Meisel Machine and Tool Company

While the Declaration is intended as a nucleus around which liberals can rally, the refinements will emerge when we consider the practical problem of translating the program into action. Any effort, such as this, to synchronize our economic and political institutions with accelerated patterns of social change must anticipate that opposition which will inevitably arise from those who have most to lose from such change.

We can expect obviously that opposition will stem initially from those economic monopolies which we agree are responsible for the degeneracy and anti-progressivism which characterizes our economic life. An integral part of any liberal program must include techniques by which we can frustrate the potential alliances of large groups with this opposition. Specifically, unless the program is developed with an eye toward its practical application, these monopolists will create for themselves strange bedfellows.

For example, to the worker big business and small business are precisely the same thing. Attempts which have been made in our small business to institute socially progressive measures such as a profit-sharing plan have been viewed with suspicion and were eventually discarded. To be sure, this attitude is understandable in view of the traditional cleavage that has been established between management and labor by decades of conflict. The point is that we must not overlook the illogical but nevertheless real possibility of passive nonco-operation from the man in the shop as well as active opposition from the monopolist.

The line between socialization of big industry and the promotion of decentralized small enterprise must be clearly defined lest the socially useful owner-manager of a small business be estranged from the liberal camp by the fear that his small stake might be swept up in the enthusiasm of a semi-Socialist economy.

It is in the area of foreign policy that the Declaration is disappointing. How can one reconcile the statement that the British Labor Government rejects in words and deeds the British Tory conception of monopoly capitalist imperialism when the present Labor government has made not a move to reconstruct the appalling architecture of its predecessor in India, in Malay, in the Palestine police state, and elsewhere?

CONTRIBUTORS

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